formed under them are the earliest. Man is always superior to his productions, and these are superior to their productions. Reverberations grow fainter and fainter in the distance. Mark the difference between the men who made our Revolution and the men of to-day. Between George Washington and James K. Polk there is a distance; and there would have been a greater distance still, if it had not been for the continued operation of causes not introduced or essentially affected by our Revolution. Certainly, then, no more love can be in the Association than there is in the cause introducing Association. Then the associationists must get, under civilization, without Association, all the love they can have with and under it. But if we can have the love without Association, then there is no need of Association; if not, Association is impracticable. Here is a conclusive argument, not only against Association, but against every scheme for effecting the real progress of man or society by virtue of a purely human principle. Proceeding on a purely human principle, man, it is easy to demonstrate, can no more be a reformer than an institutor,-that is, he can neither by way of reform, nor by way of institution, introduce or establish any thing superior to what he finds existing, or which, in fact, does not fall below it. His boasted improvements are such only in relation to the order he introduces, and consist solely in getting more and more rid of the contradictions to it retained at first from the preexisting order. The departure on a human principle from the existing order is always a step towards something inferior or less perfect. Man can fall from the civilized state to the savage; he never rises spontaneously from the savage state to the civilized; and for the very good reason, that in the moral, no more than in the physical world, can the stream rise higher than the fountain.

Moreover, the love itself, which our associationists rely upon, can never be adequate to their purpose. It is, at best, only human love, the natural sentiment of philanthropy. This answers very well, when the work to be done is simply to propose grand schemes, make brilliant and eloquent speeches, or when there are no disagreeable duties to be performed, no violent natural repugnances to be overcome; but it fails in the hour of severe trial. Your philanthropist starts with generous impulses, with a glowing enthusiasm; and so long as there are no great discouragements, no disgusting offices in his way, and he has even a small number

of admiring friends to stimulate his zeal, applaud his eloquence, flatter his pride, and. soothe him for the rebuffs he meets from the world, he may keep on his course, and continue his task. But let him find himself entirely alone, let him have no little public of his own, which is all the world to him, let him be thwarted on every point, let him be obliged to work in secret, unseen by all but the all-seeing Eye, encounter from men nothing but contradiction, contempt, and ingratitude, and he will soon begin to say to himself, Why suffer and endure so much for the unworthy? He who loves man for man's sake loves only a creature, a being of imperfect worth, of no more worth than himself,. perhaps not so much; and why shall he love him more than himself, and sacrifice himself for him? The highest stretch of human love is, to love our neighbors as we love ourselves; and we do injustice to ourselves, when we love them more than we do ourselves.

Nay, philanthropy itself is a sort of selfishness. It is a sentiment, not a principle. Its real motive is not another's good, but its own satisfaction according to its nature. It seeks the good of others, because the good of others is the means of its own satisfaction, and is as really selfish in its principle as any other of our sentiments; for there is a broad distinction between the sentiment of philanthropy, and the duty of doing good to others,-between seeking the good of others from sentiment, and seeking it in obedience to a law which binds the conscience. The measure of the capacity of philanthropy, as a sentiment, is the amount of satisfaction it can bring to the possessor. So long as, upon the whole, he finds it more delightful to play the philanthropist than the miser, for instance, he will do it, but no longer. Hence, philanthropy must always decrease just in proportion to the increase of the repugnances it must encounter, and fail us just at the moment when it is most needed, and always in proportion as it is needed. It follows the law so observable in all human society, and helpsmost when and where its help is least needed. Here is the condemnation of every scheme, however plausible it may look, that in any degree depends on philanthropy for its

success.

The principle the associationists want for their success is not philanthropy,-the love of man for man's sake,—but divine charity, not to be had and preserved out of the Catholic Church. Charity is, in relation to its subject, a super

naturally infused virtue; in relation to its object, the supreme and exclusive love of God for his own sake, and man for the sake of God. He who has it is proof against all trials; for his love does not depend on man, who so often proves himself totally unamiable and unworthy, but on God, who is always and everywhere infinitely amiable and deserving of all love. He visits the sick, the prisoner, the poor, for it is God whom he visits; he clasps with tenderness the leprous to his bosom, and kisses his sores, for it is God he embraces and whose dear wounds he kisses. The most painful and disgusting offices are sweet and easy because he performs them for God, who is love, and whose love inflames his heart. Whenever there is a service to be rendered to one of God's little ones, he runs with eagerness to do it; for it is a service to be rendered to God himself. Charity never faileth." It is proof against all natural repugnances; it overcomes earth and hell; and brings God down to tabernacle with men. Dear to it is this poor beggar, for it sees in him only our Lord who had "not where to lay his head;" dear are the sorrowing and the afflicted, for it sees in them him who was 66 a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity;" dear are these poor outcasts, for in them it beholds him who was "scorned and rejected of men;" dear are the wronged, the oppressed, the downtrodden, for in them it beholds the Innocent One nailed to the cross, and dying to atone for human wickedness. And it joys to succour them all; for in so doing, it makes reparation to God for the poverty, sufferings, wrongs, contempt, and ignominious death which he endured for our sakes; or it is his poverty it relieves in relieving the poor, his hunger it feeds in feeding the hungry, his nakedness it clothes in throwing its robe over the naked, his afflictions it consoles in consoling the sorrowing, his wounds into which it pours oil and wine, and which it binds up. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me.' All is done to and for God, whom it loves more than men, more than life, and more than heaven itself, if to love him and heaven were not one and the same thing. This is the principle you need; with this principle, you have God with you and for you, and failure is impossible. But with this principle, Association is, at best, a matter of indifference; for this is sufficient of itself at all times, under any and every form of political, social, or industrial organization. He who has God can have nothing more.

But our gravest objection to associationism is, that it implicates the justice of Almighty God. The associationists tell us that their plan is indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe. By man they must mean men, or else they are talking of an abstraction. The species has actual existence only in individuals, and the question relates only to actual existences. It is absurd to suppose that God cares for species, and not for individuals,-for the ideal, and not for the actual,-for the abstract, and not for the concrete. When, therefore, the organization of Labor and Association is proposed as indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny,-when its friends tell us, as they do, that all the past has been only a preamble to it, a necessary preparation for it, they tell us in effect that no human being has, as yet, had within his reach the means of fulfilling his destiny. But it will not do to say this. God can create no being and appoint him to a certain end, that is, make it his duty to gain that end, and not provide him with sufficient means of gaining it, if he chooses to avail himself of them, without contradicting his own justice, and thereby proving himself unjust. If there is a single individual of our race that fails to attain to his destiny, either here or hereafter, through defect of means, not through his own fault, the blame is chargeable upon the Creator. But God is infinitely just, and we cannot accuse him of injustice without blasphemy. Then the means of fulfilling his destiny, whether here or hereafter, must always be within the reach of every man; and if any one fails to fulfil it, he has no one to blame but himself. Then Association never has been, is not, and never can be, necessary for the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe, or elsewhere; for man, every man, can fulfil his destiny, if he chooses, without it.

These are some few of the objections which seem to us conclusive against the views and schemes of the associationists. They by no means exhaust our list of objections; but we stop with them, because we regard them as amply sufficient of themselves. But let not the associationists imagine, for a moment, because we refuse to go with them, that we are better satisfied with the present condition of our fellow-men than they are, or that we any more despair of its amelioration than they do. When we deserted the movement party and took refuge in the church, it was not because we had become indifferent to human suffering, or because we despaired of solacing it. Never did the young

enthusiast, the fierce declaimer, the bold radical, feel more alive to every form of human suffering, or entertain a stronger hope of relieving it, than we did, when our kind mother was pleased to receive us and own us as one of her children. It is true, we did not embrace the church for the reason that she is a social reformer, for the reason that we believed her capable of effecting the good we had attempted, or which our friends were attempting, without her. In view of what she promises her faithful and obedient children, all that we or they contemplated is not worth a moment's consideration. Nevertheless, she furnishes in abundance all the means necessary to remove all real evils, and to secure every possible good.

Let not the associationists misapprehend us. We do not ask them to embrace the church, because she is the proper agent for acquiring the good they seek for their fellowmen; for we wish them to embrace her from higher and worthier motives. For ourselves, we have been, and are even now, loath to dwell on what the church can do for us in this life, lest we should be interpreted as assigning false motives for yielding her the homage which is her due. We are unwilling to pursue a line of argument, which, however proper it may be in itself, ignorance or malice may torture even into the appearance of placing time before eternity, society before heaven, or man before or in competition with God. The church must be embraced for a heavenly motive, or no advantage inures to us from embracing her. She is here to prepare us for heaven, and heaven is the only end that we can legitimately seek. The good she effects for this world is incidental, and should never be made the motive for becoming or remaining a Catholic. But, bearing this always in mind, we may without impropriety show that she can do enough for us, even in this world, to satisfy all reasonable men.

Some of the associationists are already looking towards the church, apparently despairing of success in their enterprise without her; but they are looking to her, we fear, rather with the wish to obtain her sanction for their plan, and her assistance to carry it out, than with any sincere disposition to submit themselves to her direction and discipline. If she will accept Fourierism, they are ready to accept her. But she will make no such agreement with them. She will be all, or she will be nothing. They must accept her unconditionally, or she will not accept them.