SOCIALISM. For that the Christian Church is now the centre of spiritual life in humanity there can be no reasonable doubt, and as little that social reform is the characteristic political movement of this generation. "Make religion practical, and practice religious," is the command of the divine Spirit more clearly than ever before; and the Law of harmonious cooperation between these two extremes of man's existence is the thought which is shaping itself in all enlightened minds.

"I. REALISM.-But, in attempting to survey the tendencies of the society into which we have been born, let us be sure, in the outset, that we occupy the firm ground of realism. By this it is meant, that we should start in our inquiry from the life amid which we consciously exist, rather than from absolute principles assumed by idealism, or from partial experiments to which empiricism trusts. If man could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God; and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in nature. His appropriate sphere is mediate, between the infinite one and the finite many. He lives by receiving and diffusing life, and grows by assimilating into his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath. Motives are communicated which he must study to manifest in deeds; by reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses; and the medium by which, in him and through him, love and beauty are married and made fruitful, is wisdom. We move and have our being amidst a divine reality, whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns; and in proportion to our full communion with him who is at once the centre and circumference of existence, is our real life. This life we interchange with fellow-men; and we live well, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in acts the ideas through which good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind. The fatalist gazing on the vast sweeping forces of the universe, the enthusiast awaiting the accomplishment of the Almighty's plans, may be tempted to apathy or presumption. But the realist, who recognizes the exact order of events, and yet hears himself summoned to cooperate with an unfolding creation, becomes a hero. He is at once pious, selfrelying, and brave. His energies expand amidst the mighty powers which call him to be their peer. Serene and constant, neither exaggerating nor slighting his special function, assured of the guidance of one sovereign Will, he bears the cross, he wears his crown, emulous only to discharge the duty which humanity intrusts to his fidelity, and aspiring to be a pure medium of divine disinterestedness. His aim is to be made a minister of Providence in his own time and land; calmly confiding, that thus he will be each day regenerate, and that the future will welcome him to ever-enlarging usefulness and joy."—pp. 3-5.

The problem, it will be seen from this, is the relation of the church to socialism, or to determine the law of harmoni

ous coöperation between the Christian church and social reform, "the two extremes of man's existence." The author should have defined his terms in the outset, and told us in what sense he uses the words Christian, church, social, and reform; but let that pass; we shall find his definition of some of them at least, as we proceed. The first step is to fix the method of inquiry, or to determine the point of departure. This the author fixes in realism, as distinguished, on the one hand, from idealism, and, on the other, from empiricism.

But what is this realism? We really wish the author had been more clear and precise in his definition. He obviously does not mean by it the philosophical doctrine of a school well known in the history of philosophy, for that school asserted the reality of ideas, which he denies, since he distinguishes realism from idealism. The real as distinguished from the ideal is precisely what is meant by the actual. His realism, then, is actualism; and that it is, we conclude from the fact that he identifies it, not with pure being, but with life, "the life amid which we consciously exist;" for life is pure being reduced to act, or being actualized, existing, and performing its several functions.

But what is the meaning of starting with the actual as our point of departure? It must be the assumption of the justness and sufficiency of the actual; for if we declare the actual faulty or insufficient, we must draw either upon past experiments, and seek to complete it by reproducing what has been, or upon the absolute principles of idealism, and seek to complete it by embodying new ideas in acts,--both of which the author expressly excludes. But if the actual is just, is complete, satisfactory, what need of reform, social or individual? It strikes us that the author suppresses, in the very beginning, one of the two extremes between which he was to find, or establish, "the law of harmonious coöperation."

According to the author, man must remain below the absolute principles of idealism and above the partial experiments of empiricism, that is, if we understand it, in the actual, or lose his identity, that is, cease to exist. For, if he "could ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth, he would be reabsorbed in God, and, by becoming immersed in the flood of transient circumstances, he loses himself in nature." Reabsorb is to absorb again; for, in this word, re is iterative, not simply intensive. Consequently, the au

thor must hold that man was originally absorbed in God, and has been evolved from him. Evolution denies creation. The author, therefore, denies the creative Deity, and, therefore, God himself; for the radical and fundamental conception of God is that of creator, since we recognize his being only in the category of cause, as we apprehend the cause in the effect. What, then, can the author mean, when he talks of God, of the Divinity? and on what authority does he presume to deny God, and the fact of creation? Authority is as necessary to enable us to deny as to affirm. By absorption in God, the author must mean the loss of identity; for he makes it the opposite extreme from losing ourselves in nature. Hence, the saints will be unable to enjoy the beatific vision,-for in that they are supposed to "ascend to dwell at the fountain-head of truth," without losing their identity, and ceasing to exist. Hence, again, the author denies even the possibility of the immortality and heaven which our Lord and his apostles taught, and which all Christians hope for. On what authority does he do this? How does he prove that man cannot dwell at the fountain-head of truth, without being absorbed in it, that is, becoming identically it?

Man's "appropriate sphere is mediate, between the infinite one, and the finite many." Will the author tell us what that is which is mediate between God and nature, between one and many, between infinite and finite, that is, which is neither the one nor the other, neither infinite nor finite? Is there any proportion between infinite and finite? If not, as there is not, will he explain to us how something can be mediate between them, below the one and above the other? We had supposed that all which is not infinite is finite, and all which is not finite is infinite.

Man "grows by assimilating into "--we should say to, not into-"his own person inspiration from above and experience from beneath." Does this mean that the inspiration is from God, and the experience from the devil? That would be no forced interpretation. If the inspiration is actually received, is it not experience? Why, then, may not experience be from above as well as from beneath? Does the author use the word inspiration in its ordinary theological sense? Then he teaches that all men are divinely inspired. But what proof has he of this? How can there be divine inspiration, if God is not? and if all men are divinely inspired, what need of the university-for which,

we shall soon see, the author contends to instruct them, to mediate by intelligence between the church and the state, the divine element in man and the human? If he uses the word in a different sense, by what right does he do so, without defining expressly in what sense? Suppose man does grow by the means asserted,-how are we to know whether he grows good or bad, unless we know the character of the inspiration and experience which he assimilates? By what criterion determine that character? "By reflection on ends fulfilled, he gains capacity for larger impulses." Why on ends fulfilled, rather than on ends to be fulfilled? And what business has the author to recur to ends fulfilled, since they can have been only partial experiments, which his realism excludes? What sort of impulses do we by reflection acquire a capacity for,-good or bad? Are we rendered impulsive by reflection? and are they, who reflect the most, the most impulsive in their character? Impulsive actions are not virtuous actions; for virtuous actions are voluntary, and performed with foresight of the end. The more subject to impulse we are, the less of virtue we have. Is it desirable to enlarge our impulses and diminish our virtues?

"The medium by which . . . . . love and beauty are married, and made fruitful, is wisdom." What sort of love and beauty, spiritual or sensual, does wisdom unite in wedlock? What children are born to the wedded pair? What is the fruit of the union? Whence comes the wisdom which is its medium?

"We move and have our being amidst a divine reality." The author evidently means here, by "divine reality," what he has just called "the life amid which we consciously exist." Is the life, which we found to be the actual, the divine reality or is the divine reality simply actuality,-the actual life we live, the actual universe? Which is the author's meaning? If the former, we live true life, life according to the divine reality; and then what need of reform? If the latter, all actuality is divine reality: how, then, is reform possible? Who ever dreamed of reforming the divine reality?

"Whose perfections are progressively revealed in societies, races, and heavens, as solar systems are evolved from parent-suns." How know we that there are any solar systems but our own? or if there are, that they are evolved from suns? How know we that our earth, for instance, has

been evolved from our sun? Are the conjectures of cosmogonists and astronomers a solid basis for science? What is the author's authority for saying that societies, races, heavens are evolved from the Divinity, instead of being created by him? How knows he that the divine reality is progressively evolving societies, races, heavens? We have great respect for the author, but we cannot believe matters of such vast moment as these on his word alone.

"In proportion to our full communion with him”—God, the divine reality-"is our real life." Full communion with God, with divine reality, is the same as "to dwell at the fountain-head of truth." So our real life is in ceasing to live; and in proportion as we attain to it, we lose it, by losing our identity! We have read that "he who will lose his life for Christ's sake shall find it;" but we do not recollect having before read, that he who shall find his real life in God shall lose it. Our real life is, we agree, in full communion with God; but what right the author has to say this, after having virtually affirmed that such communion would be the loss of our existence, and denied its possibility by virtually denying the existence of God, we are unable to comprehend. Of contraries, one must be false.

"We live well, just in degree as we conspire with our age, our nation, our neighbours, to embody in acts the ideas through which good evermore flows in to reanimate mankind." Which ideas are those? and what right has the author to recur to the ideal? The plain English of this is, we live well, when we conspire with our age, our nation, and our neighbours, to do good. Is the well-living in the conspiring or striving to do good, or in conspiring with our age, or nation, and our neighbours? If the former, the author merely utters a truism; if the latter, he assumes that our age, our nation, our neighbours, that is, all men actually living, for neighbours, as here used, must be taken universally, are right, conspire to the right end, and live well. If so, what is the necessity for reform, social or individual? All are right as they are, as already implied in your realism; and what more can you ask? Surely, you would not reform right, truth, sanctity?

"But the realist, who recognizes the exact order of events." Who is he? Who, less than omniscient, can recognize the exact order of events, or even that there is an exact order of events? Who is able to say that the order of nature has never been or never can be interrupted by