cording to Article 750, passive enemies are treated as to a certain extent in a condition of peace; a condition which it is one of the purposes of this Book to maintain for non-combatants during war, it should seem proper to allow them, as a general rule, to sue in the courts of any nation. Thus, no restriction on the resort to civil justice is contained in this Book, except such as is implied in the power of a belligerent to interdict the presence of foreigners. See Article 913. In Juando v. Taylor, (2 Paine's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 652,) it was held, that no suit or proceeding could be maintained in the courts of a neutral nation by the subjects of one belligerent against the subjects of another, for acts growing out of the war. ARTICLE 930. Suspension of remedies. 931. Private rights protected. 932. No civil remedy against lawful hostilities. 933. Prescriptions and statutes of limitations. 935. Failure to protect foreigners. Suspension of remedies. 930. A belligerent may suspend, during the war, the right of enemies, whether active or passive, to resort to its civil courts for judicial remedies, except in cases of prize. The general principle, that peaceful commerce, subject to the restrictions defined by this Code, is lawful, requires the continuance of judicial remedies, subject of course to a power of suspension, which will provide for all the exceptions to the freedom of intercourse. According to the recent case of Zacharie v. Godfrey, (50 Illinois Rep., 186,) the question whether an alien enemy should be excluded from the courts of a nation, depends on the consideration of his actual residence during the war in the hostile country, and the probable effect of a recovery, to place the money recovered within reach of the enemy, rather than of his citizenship in the hostile nation. The disability is a suspension of the remedy, not an extinguishment of the right of action. Private rights protected. 931. Subject to the last and the next two articles, a belligerent is bound to recognize and protect the private rights of passive enemies and neutrals, both in respect of person and property; and, except when the courts are open and can afford adequate redress, to punish offenses against the same, by military authority. Lieber's Instructions, ¶ 37; Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 532; Elzee v. Lovell, 1 Woolworth's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 102, 110. The principle, that an alien enemy has no standing in court, and cannot appear and defend his property, seized as a prize of war on the high seas, does not apply to a claimant in the admiralty. An alien enemy may appear as claimant of his property, libeled for condemnation as forfeited. United States v. Shares of Stock, 5 Blatchford's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 231. No civil remedy against lawful hostilities. 932. Acts done by the military power, if within the scope of military operations, as defined by this Book, are not the subjects of civil remedies against individuals, except in the cases herein provided. Compare Articles 721, 722, 723, 887 and 888. An action does not lie in the courts of one nation for acts done by the military forces of another nation, while the two were at war. The remedy is by application to the government. But this rule does not apply to a civil or domestic war. A number of American authorities, in cases arising in the late civil war, held that an act which is a violation of the laws of war, such as burning a court-house, appropriation of private property, &c., is not justified by the command of a superior officer. Christian County Court v. Rankin, 2 Duvall, 502; Yost v. Stout, 4 Coldwell, (Tennessee,) Rep., 205; Witherspoon v. Woody, 4 Id., 605; Terrill v. Rankin, 2 Bush Rep., 453. Prescriptions and statutes of limitations. 933. The declaration or existence of war between nations prevents the operation of the rules of prescription, and the running of the statutes of limitations,' of each nation, as against members and domiciled residents of the other, from the declaration, or the first act of hostility, whichever may be the earlier, to the final ratification of the treaty of peace, excepting such time as the parties were permitted to remain in the country and the courts were open to them.3 Jackson Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 6 American Law Reg., N. S., 732. 1 Perhaps conventional limitations of actions, like those common in insurance policies, should be included with statutes of limitations in the above article. If they are not so included, the effect of Article 909 will be to allow a reasonable time only after the removal of the obstacle. 2 Ogden v. Blackledge, 2 Cranch's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 272; Hanger v. Abott, 6 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 540; 2 Wildman's International Law, 17. 3 Under the rule proposed in Article 930, this exception seems proper. The same; in case of civil war. 934. The existence of civil war in a nation prevents the operation of its rules of prescription and the running of its statutes of limitation,' as against members and domiciled residents of other nations, in those cases in which the issuing or the effectual service of process could not have been had, by reason of the interruption of the course of justice. Act of Congress of United States, of June 11, 1864, 13 U. S. Stat. at L., 123. See Whitfield v. Allison, 1 American Law Review, 188. 1 See note to last Article. Failure to protect foreigners. 935. A belligerent is not liable to foreigners for injuries or losses caused by the enemy. The rule of international law is well settled that a foreigner, who resides in the country of a belligerent, can claim no indemnity for losses of property, occasioned by acts of war of the other belligerent. Opinion of U. S. Attorney-General in case of the Bombardment of Valparaiso, 12 U. S. Attorneys-General Opinions, 21; and letter of Secretary Marcy, in the Greytown case, there quoted. 18* PART IX. THE TERMINATION OF WAR Many of the questions discussed in the books, bearing on this subject, are, in modern usage, settled by treaties of peace; and it seems therefore unnecessary to prescribe in great detail, by an International Code, the principles which would regulate a peace made without treaty. ARTICLE 936. War, how terminated. 937. Effect of peace. 938. Definition of "completed conquest." 939, 940. National character and allegiance of conquered nation. 941. Effect of completed conquest as to persons and property. 942. Effect of overthrow of insurrection. 943. Duress of negotiators. 944. Effect of treaty of peace. War, how terminated. 936. War may be terminated by a complete conquest, or by a cessation of hostilities, and the resumption of peaceful intercourse between the belligerents, with or without a treaty of peace, or other compact. Halleck's Intern. Law and Laws of War, p. 845. Where no treaty of peace is made, the date of the resumption of intercourse may, perhaps, be a convenient rule to fix the termination of the See Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, § 700. war. The time of a treaty taking effect is provided for by Articles 196 and 197. Effect of peace. 937. Upon the termination of war, unless otherwise provided by compact: 1. Each belligerent is entitled to all movable public property of the other of which he has lawfully acquired possession by the war,' except such as is exempted by article 840, subject, however, in case of conquest of territory, to the rules prescribed by Chapter III. of this Code; 2. All hostilities, except the detention of movable property previously captured, and all constraint of persons taken prisoners of war, except such as is necessary to preserve order, must cease; 3. All occupation of hostile territory not the subject of complete conquest, must cease as soon as practicable : 4. All belligerent rights not reserved by this Code, except those necessary to the preservation of order, and to the adjudication upon the title to property captured, cease; and, 5. Treaties and other obligations between the belligerents, which were suspended by the war, revive, except so far as they may be incompatible with the altered. state of things.' 1 See Article 938 of this Code; and Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, § 715. Perhaps the principle that all public movable property of the hostile nation, other than military treasure and contraband of war, seized and appropriated by the belligerent nation to its own use, should be considered compensation for the cause of the war, ought to be embodied as a positive regulation; though this is rather a matter of agreement than a right of the conquered nation. 2 The rights of war exist only while the war continues. If peace be concluded, a capture made immediately afterwards on the ocean, even where peace could not have been known, is unauthorized, and property so taken is not prize of war, and must be restored. See Lawrence's Wheaton, Elem. of Intern. Law, p. 884, § 5; Dana's Wheaton, § 547. 3 Twiss, Law of Nations, pt. II., 353, § 178; Phillimore's Intern. Law, vol. III., p. 145. In the case of Preston, the Attorney-General of the United States gave his opinion that the cessation of the war of the rebellion, and the peace proclamation of the President relieved from parol and from military jurisdiction, rebel officers who had surrendered and had been discharged upon parole. 12 Opinions of U. S. Attorneys-General, 120. 4 Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, § 716. 5 By the doctrine of uti possedetis, in the absence of any compact, each belligerent is entitled to the sovereignty of the territory and the ownership of all public property of the hostile nation of which he has military |