Previous liens.

897. Capture and condemnation as prize override all previously existing liens.

The Battle, 6 Wallace's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 498.

As against captors, the ownership of property cannot be changed while it is in transit. The capture clothes the captors with all the rights of the owner which subsisted at the commencement of the voyage: and anything done thereafter, designed to incumber the property, or to change its ownership, is a nullity. The Sally Magee, 3 Id., 451.

Requisites of judgment condemning prize.

898. A judgment of a prize court sustaining the validity of a capture must contain or be accompanied by a statement of the grounds on which it is founded.

Treaty between France and Peru, March 9, 1861, Art. XXV., 8 De Clercq, 201.

The sentence of a prize court condemning a vessel is not conclusive as to any matter of fact which was the ground of condemnation, unless that matter of fact be clearly and certainly stated in the judgment as a ground of condemnation. Hobbs v. Henning, 17 Comm. Bench Rep., N. S., 791 : 11 Jurist, N. S., 223; 34 Law Jour., C. P., 117; 13 Weekly Rep., 431; 12 Law Times, N. S., 205; Christie v. Secretau, 8 Term Rep., 192; Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East's Rep, 155; 1 Smith, 372; 2 Taunton's Rep., 85. But such sentence is not evidence of what may be gathered from it by way of inference. Fisher v. Ogle, 1 Campbell's Rep., 418; Dalgleish v. Hodgson, 5 Moore & Payne's Rep., 407.

Capture by unlawful means.

899. A capture made by means involving a violation of neutrality or the breach of any provision of this Book, is an unlawful capture.

An illegal outfit, or augmentation of force, in a neutral country, not only involves liability for personal penalties, but also infects captures subsequently made during the same cruise, with the character of torts, and justifies and requires a restitution to the parties who have been injured by such misconduct. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 283; The Grace Para, 7 Id., 471.

Jurisdiction of remedy against wrongdoer, in case of illegal capture.

900. After a capture has been duly adjudged illegal, any court of otherwise competent jurisdiction in

any nation a party to this Code, may give a remedy against the wrongdoer.

The courts of a country have no jurisdiction to redress torts committed on the high seas, against the property of its citizens by a cruiser of a friendly power, unless the cruiser was fitted out in violation of its neutrality laws. The injured neutral must resort to the courts of the captor for redress. L'Invincible, 1 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 238; Moxon v. The Fanny, 2 Peters' Adm. Rep., 309.

But after the foreign prize court has adjudged the capture illegal, the neutral court may decree compensation in damages. McGrath v. The Candelero, Bee's Adm. Rep., 60.

Trial of contraband persons.

901. In the case of persons captured as contraband, proceedings may be taken by them or by the captors to have the legality of the capture judicially determined.

Uniform procedure.

902. The nations uniting in this Code, shall take measures to adopt uniform rules for procedure in cases of prize.

EFFECT OF A STATE OF WAR ON OBLIGATIONS OF NATIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS.

ARTICLE 903. Existing obligations not in general affected.

904. Public debt not confiscable.

905. Treaties unaffected by war.

906. Effect of war on executory contracts.

907. Removal of interdiction.

908. Anticipation of war.

909. Extension of time.

910. Interest, damages, &c., for delay.

Existing obligations not in general affected.

903. Neither a state of war, nor a treaty of peace, annuls existing rights or obligations, except so far as their existence is incompatible with it, or as is otherwise provided in this Book.

Public debt not confiscable.

904. War does not exonerate a belligerent from the obligation to pay its public debt, by whomsoever held,' nor does it suspend the payment of principal or interest, as it falls due.

1 Fioré, Nouveau Droit Intern., v. 2, p. 313. This principle, says Pradier Fodéré, (Id., note,) is now adopted by modern governments. See instances of the honorable application of this principle in Twiss, Law of Nations, pt. II., pp. 110-114. By the treaty between the United States and Hayti, Nov. 3, 1864, Art. IV., 13 U. S. Stat. at L., 711, it is provided, that neither the money, debts, shares in the public funds or in banks, or any other property of either party, shall ever in the event of war or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated.

And the treaty between France and Peru, March 9, 1861, 8 De Clercq, 197, provides, that neither debts due by individuals nor public stocks, nor shares in companies, &c., can be seized, sequestered or confiscated to the prejudice of the respective citizens and to the benefit of the country where they may be.

Treaties unaffected by war.

905. War does not affect the compacts of a nation, except when so provided in such compacts; and, except also that executory stipulations in a special compact between belligerents which by their nature are applicable only in time of peace, are suspended during the war.

Halleck, (Intern. Law & Laws of War, 371,) says: "A declaration of war does not ipso facto extinguish treaties between belligerent States. Treaties of friendship and alliance are necessarily annulled by a war between the contracting parties, except in respect to such stipulations as are made expressly with a view to rupture, such as limitations of the general rights of war, &c. So, of the treaties of commerce and navigation; they are generally either suspended or entirely extinguished by a war between the parties to such treaties. All stipulations with respect to the conduct of war, or with respect to the effect of hostilities upon the rights and property of citizens and subjects of the parties, are not impaired by supervening hostilities-this being the very contingency intended to be provided for,-but continue in full force until mutually agreed to be rescinded. There are many stipulations of treaties, which although perpetual in their character, are suspended by a declaration of war, and can only be carried into effect, on the return of peace."

Kent, (Commentaries, v. I., p. 420,) says: "As a general rule, the obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostilities. But, if a treaty con

tain any stipulations which contemplate a state of future war, and make provision for such an exigency, they preserve their force and obligation when the rupture takes place. All those duties of which the exercise is not necessarily suspended by the war, subsist in their full force."

As to the restoration of treaty obligations suspended by the war, see Bluntschli, Droit Intern. Codifié, § 718.

See also Society for the Propagation of the Gospel . New Haven, 8 Wheaton's U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep., 464; the debate in the House of Commons, on the Declaration of Paris, of 1856; Speeches of Sir George Lewis and Mr. Bright, of March 11 and 17, 1862; and of the Earl of Derby, of Feb. 7, 1862; Dispatch of Mr. Marcy to Mr. Mason, of Dec. 8, 1856; Phillimore's International Law, v. III.. App. 21; Dana's Wheaton, Elem. of Intern. Law, note 143, p. 352.

Effect of war on executory contracts.

906. All executory contracts which directly subserve the purposes of war, and to which enemies, active or passive, are parties; and all executory contracts between any parties the execution of which would by reason of war involve a violation of any provision of this Book, are annulled, by the existence of war; saving the right of just compensation for any performance already had. The validity of other contracts is not af fected by the existence of war.

But this article does not apply to international compacts.

In a recent case in the court of appeals of Virginia, (Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Warwick, Insurance Law Journal, vol. I., pp. 115, 126,) the distinction is stated thus: Where the contract is made before the war, but not executed by either party, and the carrying it into execution would involve a violation of the duties of the parties respectively to their country, in the new relation which the war has created; in that case its execution not having been entered upon, and it being uncertain how long the war may last and prevent the execution of the contract, it may be dissolved; and this not to the prejudice of the parties, or either of them, but for their presumed convenience and benefit to be absolved from the obligation of a contract, which, in the changed relations of their countries, cannot be carried into execution. On the other hand, if the contract is partly executed, and rights under it have vested, and it cannot be dissolved without the loss or forfeiture of one of the parties, and it cannot be carried into execution consistently with the duty of the parties to their countries respectively, while the war lasts; in such case it should not be dissolved, but only suspended. But if it can be carried into

execution notwithstanding the war, without conflicting with the obligation of allegiance of either party, it will be neither dissolved nor suspended.

Removal of interdiction.

907. A contract, which is annulled by the last ar ticle, is not restored to validity by the return of peace. Esposito v. Bowden, 4 Ellis & Blackburn's Rep., 693.

Anticipation of war.

908. The anticipation, however well founded, of a war not declared or commenced, does not affect existing obligations.

Pole v. Cetovich, 9 Common Bench Rep., N. S., 430.

Extension of time.

909. The time for performance of any act which is forbidden or prevented by war, in respect of which act time is of the essence of the obligation, except in the case of obligations annulled by article 906, is suspended until a reasonable period for performance after the interdiction or impediment is removed.

The authorities seem to agree that in case of statutory or prescriptive limitations, the period of war is to be deducted from the time limited. In respect to conventional limitations, such as those usual in insurance policies, &c., there is a difference of opinion whether, 1. The same rule should apply; or whether, 2. The intervention of war wholly annuls the conventional limitation; or whether, 3. The party should only be allowed a "reasonable time" after the removal of the disability. Simmes v. City Fire Ins. Co., 6 Blatchf., 455. Apperson v. Bynum, 5 Coldwell's (Tennessee) Rep., 341.

When presentment of negotiable paper cannot be made on account of the disturbed condition of the country, by civil or foreign war, present ment will be excused during the continuance of the obstacles, and for a reasonable time thereafter. Polk v. Spinks, 5 Id., 431. In such case, the notice of protest to a party in the hostile country must be sent when the interruption of intercourse ceases. Harden v. Brown, 59 Barbour's (New York) Rep., 425; citing Edwards on Bills, 458; Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brockenbrough's U. S. Circ. Ct. Rep., 20, 34.

Interest, damages, &c., for delay.

910. No interest, damage, or penalty is incurred, by reason of the non performance of an obligation while its performance was rendered unlawful by war.