the benefit of a contract he has estopped himself from denying in the courts the validity of the instrument by which those benefits came to him." The appellant having received the money of the appellee for the purpose of the protection of the city against claims arising from vacating the streets and alleys in question, it is bound under an implied promise to return the same. Lockwood & Strickland Co. v. City of Chicago, supra; Mowatt v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. 578. Without passing on the validity of the ordinance vacating the streets and alleys in question, we are of the opinion that the appellant is estopped in this proceeding to urge the illegality of that ordinance as a defense against the repayment of the money paid by appellee. The superior court therefore did not err in sustaining the demurrers to appellant's third, fourth and additional pleas. The judgment of the superior court will be affirmed. (No. 13355.-Order affirmed.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS VS JOHANNAH S. CONLEUR et al. Appellees.-(JACOB GLOS, Appellant.) Opinion filed June 16, 1920—Rehearing denied October 8, 1920. I. APPEALS AND ERRORS—appellant cannot take advantage of imperfections in record which do not affect his interest. An appellant cannot take advantage of alleged imperfections in the record which do not in any way concern him or his interest but relate to other persons as to whom the errors, if they exist, can be availed of by no one but themselves. 2. TAXES-party notified of petition for tax deed cannot object that trustee in trust deed was not notified as trustee. Where lots have been sold for taxes and the purchasers at the sale after the expiration of the period for redemption file their petition for deeds to be issued to them, a party who is notified of the petition cannot object that one to whom he has executed a trust deed has not been notified as trustee though said trustee is notified individually for whatever interest he has. 3. SAME-Section 217 of the Revenue act does not apply to foreclosure sale for tax lien. Section 217 of the Revenue act does not apply to a sale under a decree foreclosing a tax lien, and a compliance with that section is not necessary in order to obtain deeds. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. GEORGE FRED RUSH, Judge, presiding. JOHN R. O'CONNOR, and ALBEN F. BATES, for appellant. WALTER E. Moss, for appellees H. W. Ward, C. H. Tharp and E. H. Wood. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion. of the court: On June 18, 1914, the People of the State of Illinois filed the bill in this case in the circuit court of Cook county to foreclose the lien of the State for taxes on 287 lots in different subdivisions of three sections of land in Cook county which had been forfeited for more than two years for non-payment of taxes. There were several hundred defendants, including Jacob Glos, and also unknown owners of notes, trust deeds and parties interested. Glos appeared and answered the bill, and a decree of foreclosure was entered on June 26, 1916, directing a sale by the county treasurer and ex-officio county collector and providing for redemption within two years from the date of sale and conveyances upon a failure to redeem. The premises were advertised for sale and were sold on September 20, 1916, and certificates of purchase were issued to the several purchasers. On December 5, 1916, the county freasurer filed his report of sale, which was approved by the court on the same day. There was no redemption, and on February 20, 1919, H. W. Ward, C. H. Tharp and E. H. Wood, purchasers at the sale, with another as to whom the petition was afterward dismissed, filed a petition alleging service and publication of notices as required by law and the ex piration of the time of redemption, and asking for an order directing the county clerk to execute deeds to them for the several lots purchased by them. Glos on March 1, 1919, filed a general demurrer to the petition, which was overruled, and on December 15, 1919, upon a hearing the court granted the prayer of the petition and directed the county clerk to execute deeds to Ward, Tharp and Wood conveying to them the premises purchased by them, respectively. From that order Glos appealed. Many of the alleged imperfections in the record do not in any way concern the appellant or affect him or his interest in any way but relate to other persons, known or unknown, as to whom no error, if any existed, could be availed of by anyone but themselves. The appellant was found and personally served with the notices required by law, and objections that there was no statement in the petition that persons other than those named in the notices. served could not be found, that it did not state that there were, in fact, no others interested in the property than those named in the affidavits, or that diligent search and inquiry were made for parties interested in the respective lots and parcels of real estate, will not be considered. The appellant appears to claim that he had some interest in notices being given to August A. Timke, to whom the bill alleged he had executed a trust deed to secure his promissory note for $100,000, but if his interests were in any way connected with Timke as trustee, so that he could object for him, the record shows that Timke was personally served with the notices required by the statute and appeared and filed his demurrer to the petition. He was a defendant individually and as trustee, and one objection is that the notices served on him did not name him as a trustee but only as an individual. He was notified for whatever interest he had and the notices were sufficient. The objection that it does not appear that W. E. Moss, at the time he served the notices or at the time of the search and inquiry for other persons, was the agent of the holders of the tax sale certificates, is overcome by the record, which expressly shows that he was a duly authorized agent. Objection is made to the notices served of the expiration of the time of redemption because they said that the date of redemption of the premises would expire on September 20, 1918, which meant that there was only one day upon which redemption could be made. The statute requires notice stating when the time of redemption will expire, and the notices giving the date on which the right of redemption would come to an end were a compliance with the statute. Section 253 of the Revenue act authorizes the foreclosure of a lien for taxes in any court of competent jurisdiction in the name of the People of the State of Illinois whenever the taxes for two or more years upon the same description of property shall have been forfeited to the State, and the foreclosure in this case was for unpaid taxes on premises purchased by the petitioners which had been forfeited for from twelve to sixteen years, successively. The claim that it was necessary, in order to obtain deeds, that there should be affirmative proof of compliance with section 217 of the Revenue law is negatived by the decision in Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63, where it was held that the section does not apply to a sale under a decree foreclosing a tax lien. Section 216 was complied with, and the notice and evidence are not subject to the objection made in People v. Banks, 272 Ill. 502, that conclusions, merely, were stated. They specifically set forth the notices given and the facts constituting service of the same. There is no merit in any objection made, and the order of the circuit court is affirmed. Order affirmed. (No. 13306.-Reversed and remanded.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. MARTHA HOLTZ et al. Plaintiffs in Error. Opinion filed June 16, 1920-Rehearing denied October 8, 1920. I. CRIMINAL LAW—conviction cannot be sustained by mere presence of defendants and opportunity to commit the crime. Proof of mere presence and an opportunity to commit the crime charged is not sufficient to justify a conviction even though the defendants are unable to show who did commit it, but the burden still rests upon the prosecution to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime was actually committed by the defendants and not by some other person. 2. SAME when proof of motive is material. Proof which establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient without proof of motive, but the presence or absence of a motive which would lead the defendant to commit the crime is material and important in determining whether he did, in fact, commit it, where the evidence of guilt is entirely circumstantial. 3. SAME-proof of motive is not, alone, sufficient to sustain a conviction. Proof of motive, though competent, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction unless a consideration of all the evidence convinces of the truth of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 4. SAME-existence of insurance policies and joint ownership of property do not show motive for murder. Where two women are charged with the murder of the husband of one of them during a shooting in which the husband of the other was wounded and which they cannot explain except by the presence of burglars in the house, the existence of insurance policies on the lives of the husbands, in which the wives are, respectively, beneficiaries, and the fact that one of the wives was joint owner with her husband of the home in which both families lived, do not, alone, show a motive for the crime. 5. SAME what is necessary to conviction upon circumstantial evidence. It is essential to a conviction upon circumstantial evidence that the facts proved be not only consistent with the defendant's guilt, but that they be inconsistent with his innocence upon any reasonable hypothesis. 6. SAME-husband or wife cannot testify for a co-defendant if the testimony affects the defendant wife or husband. Where a wife or husband is indicted with another defendant the respective husband or wife cannot testify for said other defendant if the testi |