were almost the only ones who treated the Indians with any approach to justice, and the early annals of the State are less disfigured by records of persecution than most others.

Two causes may be assigned which together partly account for the progress of corruption: First, Pennsylvania has profited more from the protective tariff than any other State, and no people can grow rich out of unjust gains without suffering a decline in morality. A second cause is to be found in the history of the relations between the Legislature and industrial enterprises. After the United States Bank had been refused a new charter by the General Government it was chartered by the State of Pennsylvania. This institution had been able to work considerable corruption in the government of the whole country; so it was hardly to be expected that the government of a single State could withstand such a trial. As early as 1817-18 a scheme for an extensive system of external improvements was presented to the Legislature by the govenor, the main features being the improvement of the navigation of the principal rivers with their tributaries. In 1825 the Schuylkill navigation canal, which had been projected almost thirty years before, was completed. The completion of the work was an occasion of public rejoicing, and gave an impetus to other enterprises of the kind. Within a few years six million dollars had been borrowed by the State for the purpose. In 1829 the money required for the internal improvements had brought the Treasury of the Commonwealth to the verge of bankruptcy.

In 1854, the Pennsylvania railroad from Harrisburg to Pittsburg was completed, and in the same year the North Branch canal, the last one built by the State, was also finished. Three years later, the whole line of public works between Philadelphia and Pittsburg was transferred to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, at the price of seven and a half millions. "They had failed to be a source of revenue to the State," whatever else they might have been the source of.

The essential parts of the story have been told; the Pennsylvania road has become one of the two or three greatest railroads in the world, and has almost unlimited influence in the Legislature - practically owns the Legislature, as one writer puts it. Other great corporations have their influence, and the Legislature is hopelessly corrupt.

"The

A

pernicious and alarming results of special legislation," a chronicler tells us, "with other evils connected with the working of the Constitution of 1838, demanded a reform in that instrument." new Constitution was adopted in 1873, prohibiting all special legislation and making other changes "of vital importance." But it was too late: the people had become accustomed to corruption in their government, and a good Constitution could not save them. The mistake had been made seventy-five or a hundred years before, when the Legislature first began to undertake industrial enterprises and to legislate upon industrial matters. The present debauched condtion of Pennsylvania politics, and not of Pennsylvania politics alone, is the natural fruit of INJUSTICE, ignorantly committed with the best of motives, for the common welfare

the injustice of habitually compelling men to contribute to projects from which they cannot derive benefits proportioned to the amount each has contributed.

Lottery and State's

Consistency is not a fault which will ever be justly attributed to Rights. our Congress. When a few years ago, "in response to a general demand," the regulation of railroads was undertaken, the range of power delegated to the commission was expressly confined to interstate commerce. As all the States have regulated railroads to some extent, and most of them to an indefinite extent, they would probably have resisted an attempt by Congress to reduce their regulations to uniformity. True, such national regulation happens also to be unconstitutional, but that is an accident resulting from the thoughtlessness of the founders, for which present legislators do not hold themselves in any way accountable. But there would have been pretty active resistance, for one thing, and there was no "general demand," for another, so the States were left to regulate roads within their territory each for itself. Again, last winter, when the Supreme Court threatened the so-called police power of the States over imported liquor, Congress hastened to the rescue. But how is it with this lottery law? Here are two vices: drunkenness and gambling. At the same session of Congress two laws are passed, the one expressly relegating the repression of drunkenness to the States, the other expressly assuming the duty and power of repressing gambling. If inconsistency can go further, it must be left to a future Congress to discover how. But that is not all. Of course, the origin of the inconsistency of this particular inconsistency - is with the post-office, as is the origin of so many other injurious elements in American politics. Congress did not aim directly at the Louisiana Lottery, but only indirectly, through the post-office. The carriage of mail to and from the lottery has been prohibited, and the carriage of lottery advertisements. So far, so good. But I am a little curious to learn by what article of the Constitution or by what general law Congress has acquired the power to meddle with commerce inside the State. Let it be granted that lottery letters and advertisements going from New Orleans to New York or Boston may be constitutionally stopped, as a part of interstate commerce. But suppose that a lottery agent established in New York merely mails letters to other inhabitants of the State, or that a newspaper containing the advertisement is mailed to a citizen within the State, is it quite sure that stopping these does not exceed the constitutional power of Congress? It is to be hoped, and I think expected, that this question will finally reach the Supreme Court. Having regard to the recent decisions of that body, the constitutionality of Congressional interference will probably be upheld. But it is just as well to learn the worst. Then we shall know that even the pretence of a limitation of powers has been abandoned. What a worthless thing a constitution turns out to be! It must be confessed, however, that the fault lies with the post-office. But for it, a Philadelphia haberdasher would not now be the censor of our morals and literature. If gambling is not "commerce" however, and if the regulation of it within the State is not one of the acts forbidden in the Constitution by implication, then it is difficult to find a reason for limiting the interference to the post-office. If the truth were known it might disclose the fact that Congressmen were bribed to pass bribed by favors in the shape of this law postmasterships for their friends and "heelers."

The Sun, N. Y., ridicules the Pawnshops. notion which prevails in the Farmers' Alliance that the Government should establish storage warehouses for grain and

other products, where farmers may deposit their crops and borrow money at a low rate of interest on the security. The editor says:

"It is out of the question for the Government to run an agricultural pawnshop."

It is to be deeply regretted that the editor does not explain what difference there may be between running an agricultural pawnshop and a mining pawnshop. The recent Silver Bullion Law has turned the Government into a mining pawnshop. Nor does there seem to be any sufficient distinction between pawn-brokerage and banking that one can be justified but not the other. Yet the Government has constituted itself banker for several purposes. In the first place, there is the grand monopoly of one end of the whole banking business, produced by arrogating to itself the function of issuing money for circulating purposes, and by refusing to enforce, or to let others enforce, obligations contracted in other terms than in its "legal tender." In the second place, the post-office is intruded into the banking business by means of the money-order department. And since we have mentioned the post-office, perhaps some one will kindly explain what the difference is between carrying letters and making or lending money, or storing silver or grain, such that it is proper for the Government to assume the one function but not the others. The truth is, of course, that there is no rational halting place between the discharge of a single industrial function by the Government and the discharge of all industrial functions by it. And so it will prove, not only rationally but historically. The Government will be gradually urged on to complete socialism, or it will be arrested and cut loose altogether from industry. Which course will be pursued depends upon the intelligence of the people. But the factors are so complex that it is difficult - shall I say impossible?- to tell which tendency will prevail.

In The State Control of Corporations and Industry in Massachusetts, GEORGE K. HOLMES assumes the role of apologist for Socialism.*

* Political Science Quarterly. It is proper to state that the writer expressly disclaims any such intention. But professions cannot be permitted to outweigh performance. The regulations he advocates are clearly socialistic.

He begins by saying: "In our new era of industrialism the people are compelled to look to the State for help." Of course if this statement is true, it leaves nothing more to be said. The context shows that the writer regards the sign of his "new era" to be the subordination of competition, and he speaks of the " development of combination." It is a sufficient reply to his superficial remarks on this head to observe that combination voluntarily entered into, and voluntarily regulated, does not tend to replace competition, but is merely an incident of industrial development by no means deserving the distinction of a "new era," as compared with the implied competitive era. By as much as voluntary coöperation is handicapped by compulsory regulation, by so much does the State succeed in checking the development of combination, to the detriment of economic progress.

But the writer thinks he has discovered a criterion for distinguishing beneficial regulations from injurious ones. "Massachusetts is now recognizing and maintaining some of the natural monopolies." This seems to exhibit the criterion on which he chiefly relies. It is no doubt very impressive and persuasive. He must be a very unreasonable man, hardly worth the waste of argument, who is unconvinced by Massachusetts. When the perfect wisdom of that enlightened Commonwealth, impersonated in her incorruptible Legislature, has once delivered itself with great travail, who so arrogant to believe that a mouse has been brought forth?

As to corporations, the first (?) interference of the State was in the appointment of bank commissioners, in 1851. These have been replaced by the savings-bank commissioners. They superintend savings and State banks, and have confided to their care laws prescribing a division of risks, naming the classes of securities which may be taken, and regulating the treasurer's bond. The State does not hold itself liable for losses incurred by confiding depositors.

A Board of Insurance Commissioners was appointed in 1855, now only one commissioner. His duties are described. He inspecis the books and affairs of insurance companies. The laws confided to him are intended as safeguards for the interests of policy-holders against fraud and insolvency. It is stated as a fact that:

The Massachusetts insurance commissioners have waged an unremitting warfare against the frauds of insurance companies.

It is further stated, as though it were a fact of precisely the same order, subject to the same verification, as little open to dispute that:

the result is that to-day this State is unrivalled in the financial soundness of its companies and in the fairness and justice with which the policyholder is treated.

The commissioners have been active. It seems that an attempt was once made to " galvanize into life" a certain fraudulent benefit association; this attempt was thwarted. A foreign fidelity company was fined in 1886 for making a false statement; and the public has been warned against other frauds.

The Board of Railroad Commissioners was established in 1869. Their business is to:

keep themselves informed as to the condition of railroads and railways and the manner in which they are operated, etc., etc.

The laws whose enforcement this board has to look after are very numerous. There are laws about the condition of the roadway, about freight rates, about passenger accommodation, about capital stock, about brakes and brakemen, non-explosive fluid for lighting, vacuum brakes and safety valves on engines, color-blindness of employees, crossings at grade, connections with other roads, accidents, milk cans these are some of the things the railroad commissioners have to look after. And they have done well. They have compelled "cheap" transportation of fish from Cape Cod to Boston; they have had the location of a station changed; they have provided stations and trains to summer resorts; express trains have been made to stop at certain stations; a milk train has been stopped at "an obscure station" - in fact, the railroads do nearly everything the commissioners order or advise.

Then there is the Commissioner of Corporations, first appointed in 1870. His duty is to look after the organization of corporations in general, and to see that the stock is really paid

up.

Gas and electric lighting companies are attended to specially. They too have commismissioners, first appointed in 1885. Their works and meters are subject to inspection; and gas must come up to a statutory standard. It is not stated whether a statutory standard has been as yet prescribed for electric light. Upon complaint, these commissioners may "order any reduction they deem just and proper" in the price of the gas, or of the electric lights, " or any improvement in the quality thereof, and they must pass such orders and take such action as are necessary thereto."

The Board of Arbitration, established in 1886, need not be scrutinized, as it acts only in case employers and employees unite in submitting to their decision.

Another regulative agency is the Board of Inspectors of Factories, of whom there are twenty-three, drawn from the district police, first appointed in 1878. Factory laws are back of them, and laws aggressing on the personal liberty of women and on the parental responsibility of parents. Factories must be built according to approved plans; i. e., plans approved by the inspectors. Seats must be provided for women! No child under thirteen years may be employed in the factory; children under eighteen years must not be given work for longer than ten hours in a day. In 1886, 1,083 factories were "inspected," and four hundred eighty-two orders were issued, and "generally complied with."

Finally, there is a Commissioner of Foreign Mortgages, first appointed in 1889. Here are the facts * They show what Massachusetts has done. Conclusive as this action is, in favor of State inspection and regulation, still recognizing that there are many unreasonable persons in the world, outside of Massachusetts of course, - additional evidence may be introduced for their benefit, evidence which must be conclusive. It is this:

Of the success of the regulative State agencies which we have been considering, their own reports contain fair statements.

Then follow twelve pages of extracts from the reports of the successive officers who have had the discharge of these regulative functions, interspersed with explanatory notes and comments. I have quoted the remark with which they were introduced because I feared that my statement that this

was the "evidence" on which the writer rested his case would not be credited Even now, if any one is tempted to think that I have misrepresented the writer, I shall not blame him; for such ignorance is indeed in

credible.

Perhaps I should add that the reports of the officials do contain the kind of evidence Mr. Holmes intimates. The only criticism to be made on that head is that such evidence, whatever its formal character, is infinitesimal. Reliance on it only emphasizes the curiously blind faith with which the writer suggested that the relation of cause and effect between the diligence of the commissioners and the relative financial soundness of Massachusetts insurance companies is a fact of the same order, and one to be as readily discerned as the fact of the existence and diligence of the commission. This blindness, and the assumption that the success of regulation can be proved from the reports of the regulators, hang together; they are the twin fountains of a misunderstanding so complete that resulting errors cease to be amenable to reason.

BOOKS.

The Co-operative Commonwealth. An Exposition of Socialism. By Laurence Gronlund. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1890.

Our Destiny. The Influence of Nationalism on Morals and Religion. By Laurence Gronlund. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1890.

Free Political Institutions; Their Nature, Essence, and Maintenance. An Abridgement and Rearrangement of Lysander Spooner's "Trial by Jury." Edited by Victor Yarros. Boston: Benj. R. Tucker, 1890.

An Introduction to Social Philosophy. By John S. Mackenzie. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1890.

Mr. Laurence Gronland has issued a "revised and enlarged edition" of his "Co-operative Commonwealth," and has made a book out of some articles lately contributed by him to the Nationalist magazine. Taken together, the two books constitute somewhat over five hundred pages of falsity, the like of which is not to be found in literature. The exclamation of every one who attempts to read them must be, "surely never man spake like this man." It is impossible to write five hundred pages without occasionally making an approach to truth, and accordingly these books contain a few redeeming sentences. Mr. Gronlund repudiates Mr. Bellamy's "love for militarism, equal wages, and appointment by the retired functionaries." Apart from this and a very few other passages, it is little exaggeration to say that what he has written is false false in premises, false in attempts at reasoning, false in conclusion, false every way. We do not care to confirm this statement, even by so simple a means as quoting a few passages and making it an induction from them. Any one who wishes to verify it can readily do so: the books are easily accessible.

It is not likely that these books will do much harm. Some persons will probably be deceived by them; but such persons would be sure to be deceived by something else if the books had not been written.

It is a pleasure to turn from Mr. Gronlund's incoherent ravings to Mr. Yarros's essay. "Free Political Institutions" is still a taking title, though freedom is not such a word to conjure with as it was a while ago. In a few countries the people have, after a struggle, obtained something which they are pleased to call freedom, and they find that it is not the supreme good their ancestors thought it would prove. So, without giving it a full and fair trial, they seem inclined to seek their chief blessedness in something else.

The essay begins with the assertion that "the theory of free government is, that it is formed by the voluntary contract of the people individually with each other; and they associate for the maintenance of those laws only in which all are interested." Some such theory was in the ascendant when the Constitutions of the United States, and of some of the older Commonwealths, were adopted, and even now words somewhat similar to these are frequently used, but in such a way as to show that their authors mean nothing by them; and it may be doubted whether the full import which Mr. Yarros attaches to them was ever realized by our legislators. At any rate, the movement has for some time been towards the older theory that:

"Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience unto the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions that they be no hindrance to the common good for which societies are instituted; unless they do this they are not perfect."

If this supposition about man's nature is adopted, the conclusion will be reached that he

will not observe the laws of his nature if left free to do as he pleases, but from this to the assertion that certain men should be chosen as rulers seems rather a wide step.

As the explanatory title suggests, the essay deals chiefly with the jury system. It is frequently decided at debating societies that the jury system should be abolished; and it is easy to show that, as it exists at present, it is exceedingly imperfect. Of course the theory is that trial by jury is trial by the nation; that if twelve unprejudiced men, chosen at random, agree upon the merits of a case after careful consideration, their judgment is that which would commend itself to every one. The ground taken by Mr. Spooner is, that, in restricting the power of juries to deciding questions of facts merely, the theory of the system is violated. If the Government is to select the jury, or is to dictate what laws are to be applied, then the trial is by the Government rather than by the Nation. The jury should try and judge the whole case: the facts, the laws of evidence, what evidence is to be admitted, the law which is to be applied, and the interpretation of the law. These demands are sufficiently revolutionary; but, as the administration of justice is far from perfect, any revolution is to be welcomed which would further the end in view. The views put forth in the pamphlet will not commend themselves to lawyers, but the question is whether, if they were adopted in practice, trials would be more likely to be decided in accordance with justice. This is a large question, but it must be admitted that Mr. Spooner has made out a strong case for the affirmative.

A more pretentious book than any of the foregoing is Mr. Mackenzie's "Introduction to Social Philosophy." Philosophy, according to the author, is distinguished from science in that it is not of any direct assistance in dealing with the practical problems of life; its function is to take the problems and general facts brought to light by science and discover the true relations between them. This Mr. Mackenzie has done from an Aristotelian standpoint, and has done it, we think, better than any one else. It is not implied, however, that if Aristotle were alive now he would be content with his former standpoint, but his disciples seem unable to improve it.

The social problem - the problem of social welfare-is, in our author's opinion, the problem now most pressing for solution. To be sure, this has confronted the world in all ages, but it has not always been the most pressing; for instance, there was a time when the most im