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• Ibid. Wib God] That is, in the fight of God, and in the deter. minate counsels of his Providence. See the Message of Nathan 10 David, i Chron. xvii. 11, &c. Psal. cxxxii. 11, &c.
Ibid. In him is all my delight ] The affix has been dropped, and if ci, the word following this, was not originally read bo, this word bas been dropped by the transcribers.
Per. 4. A Sun shall rise] The Sun of righteousness. Out of the two images or characters here applied to the Melliah (the juft or righteous One, and the Sun), Malachi seems to have formed the glorious title of The Sun of Righteousness. And it appears pretty plain that he had these last words of David in his eye, when he wrote chap. iv. 1. and 2.- A Bodleian MS. of note adds Jabveh, Jehovah, the Sun, Mall rise ; but as the sense is complete without this addition, I have not inserted it in my translation. It seems to me to have been incer. polated from the margin of an Heb:ew copy.
Per. 5. Skall flourish] This word in the present text has been die vided into two; the former part having been thrown to the former clause, the latter to the latter; and thus the nominative case has been separated by the transcribers from its verb. It is amazing how fuch a mistake hould at first be made, or have kept its place so long; but there it might till have continued, if the metre had not pointed out the corruption and emendation at the same time, to the conviction, I should think, even of the most prejudiced against it. It appears from the context, that Belial is a noun of number, and requires a plural verb.-Belial seems to be derived from two words, wbich fig. nify rejecting the yoke. The wicked, or sons of Belial, are with fingular propriety put for the enemies and opposers of Christ's kingdom; those, who, in the language of the same divine Pfalmift, take counsel together against the Lord, and against his Anointed, saying, Let us break of their bonds, and cast away their yokes from us, Psal. ii. 2. and 3. refusing to submit to that easy yoke, which they are invited by himself to take upon them, Matth. xi. 29.
Per. 7. Shall be burned) After this word is added, in the present text, bejabat, in the seat. That it has no place here, both verse and Sense demonstrate; nor do the commentators give any tolerable mean. ing of it. It was probably interpolated from the period below; but if the metre bad not shewn it to be irreptitious, we might still have been perplexing ourselves about it with as little success as others. -The Reader owes the elucidation of this beautiful scripture to that incomparable critic, the late Dr. Grey, as he has already been told in the Preface.'
On the whole, we deem this work well worthy to be recommended to the curious Reader, who will find in it much in. formation, and many proofs of the Author's ingenuity.
ART, II. Philofopbical Difèrtation. By James Balfour, Esq; of Pile
of these Discussions for the good design of his publication; but we cannot highly compliment him for his philosophical precision, or his comprehen
of sensations, pafons and affections; the sources either of pleasure or pain ; and we consider all these mental qualities as uniced and subhiting in one and the same subject, though we do not comprehend the Dature of it, but give it the general name of a spiritual subitance. A late very subtile philosopher is pleased to affirm, that these mental qualities have no common principles of union and subfiftence ; but they are loose, and independent of one another. But this is contrary to our clearest perceptions ; for, when we have at one and the same time the different sensations of smell, sound, talte, &c. and also feel the respective pleasures attending them, we are conscious that they are all united in one and the same subject. Further, when we pursuç a train of reasoning, we are conscious that it is one and the same priociple which discerns the evidence of the premises; which compares them together, and discovers the force of the conclufion : and we are not capable of having any stronger evidence, than what arises from this intimate consciousness. The only principle upon which the fore-mentioned opinion can be founded is this, that what we cannot comprebend, cannot exist. But this is a principle which supposes maa omoiscient, and is therefore infinitely absurd. We may, no doubi, bave certain means of knowing that something exists, though we are Dot able fully to discover its particular nature. But, it may be said, “ since we know not the essence either of mind or matter, how can we know their difference? For aught we know, this obscure thing called matter, may be capable of such modifications as may produce thought, and such qualities as are supposed to be purely mental.” But in answer to this, however unknown the internal nature of these different substances may be, yet, from the incompatibility of their koown external qualities, we may with certainty infer, that they cannot exist in the same common subject. We shall therefore proceed to thew, that the mind cannot be divisible, and therefore cannot be material. Let us suppose any sensation whatever ; a degree of pain for example; if this pain was felt by matter, then, as matter conGfts of parts, every part must feel the pain, for pain is a real sensation, not a relative idea, like that order or harmony which may arise from a certain disposition of the parts of matter. Instead of one fimple pain, therefore, which is felt, there must be as many distinct pains as there are different parts, exceeding all number, as matter is divisible in infinitum, than which nothing can be more absurd. Indeed, if we suppose matrer susceptible of thought (the most real and interesting quality that we can imagine), then the different parts of matter must think, and the thought of one part must be disa tinct from that of another ; for though the several parts are united in point of contact, yet they are different in nature, and separable from one another : thus, instead of one fimple thinking being, we must have jonumerable such beings. The fimplicity of thought, therefore, is altogether incompatible with the compounded nature of matter. Further, it has been mewn in a former dissertation, that matter is incapable of active power; but we know the activity of the mind, by the consciousness of the power it has of arranging and comparing its ideas at pleasure. This active being, therefore, cannot be material. Indeed, the qualities of mind and matter are perfectly incompatible : matter can be divided, and one body become cwo, or more, different bodies; but thought cannot be divided even in imagination, so that
one fimple idea Mall become two distinct ideas, or one process of reafoning become two different processes; and this we perceive by in. ward consciousness, the most certain and most immediate source of evidence. The ancient Materialists represented the soul as a kind of harmony resulting from a certain organization of the body; and, confequently, that it was totally dependent upon the body, subject to all its variations, whether of increase or decay; and, at laft, annihilated upon the total dissolution of the body. It must be allowed, that there is a semarkable sympathy betwixt the soul and the body; and this sympathy is intended to serve very necessary purposes in their present fate of union. Yet, whatever the soul may suffer from its sympathy with the body, a little refle&tion upon the quality and powers of the mind will de mon trale, in the clearelt manner, the essential difference betwixt these two principles, and the superiority and command which the one has over the other. Mind is evidently posielled of active power ; we feel its strong exertion in the whole process of our reasoning. It calls in ideas at pleasure ; it arranges and compares them ; it examines their agreement or disagreement. These operations are not the effe&ts of any other active being behind the curtain; it is mind, the conscious mind, which is the immediate cause of them. The active power of mind is also very conspicuous in the opposition it makes to the passions. By a firm and continued exertion, it is able to subdue the strongest paflions, and resists the keenelt apperites, even to the death and dissolution of the body; and such atchievements are the most convincing proof of its active power and high authority. Mind, therefore, and matter are in themselves very different principles. There is nothing in matter that can give the least fufpicion of active power ; and what is called vis inertia, is a quality standing in opposition to a power of moving itself. Matter, therefore, is but a paflive inftrument, of a minifterial nature, and entirely subject to che adive power of mind; whereas, mind is capable of high exertions: it chooses and changes its objects; and these are often subtile, spisitual, and sublime, totally repugnant to any qualities of matter. I believe nobody was ever bold enough to affirm, that matter, totally quiescent, is susceptible of reason, will, and active power. If it is pollible for matter to admit of such mental qualities, this must be the effect of some particular motion, collifion, and concourse of its parts; and the cause of such motion mult either be mind or matter itself. If we suppose it mind, then this mind, upon the supposition, must be immaterial: this must be giving up the question, as it forces us upon the absurd distinction of immaterial and maierial minds. But let us suppose that matter can move itself (a thing formerly Thewn to be im. pollible), yet forely the blind impulles of brute macier never can produce so beautiful and so noble an effect as an intelligent and active spirir. The Epicurean notion of the material universe being the effect of the fortuitous concourse of atoms, is justly exploded as the grofleft abfurdity; bue it would be a much greater absurdity to suppose, that from such concourse of atoms a world of spirits could arise, capable to hold a correspondence with one another from the moft diftant parts of the globe -each of whom is in its nature of greater excellence and importance than all the materjal world put together. The boundless powers of imagination, which no extent of space or time cap limit; the regular process of reasoning, these exquisitely fine senses, which open to us