for the judge to have directed plaintiff to fendant. Held, that the telephone company walk across the room as requested, but the is a public servant and must supply all apfact of her injury and consequent lameness plicants alike without discrimination.-Webwas fully established alliunde and the judg- ster v. Neb. Telephone Co.— ( Reese, J.)—Nment of the lower court in affirmed.-Hat- W. Reports, February 7, 1885. field v. St. P. & D. R. Co.-(Mitchell, J.) Filed January 21, 1885. SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA. MORTGAGE — ALTERATION AFTER EXECUTION EFFECTS OF. -Plaintiff brings this action to cancel a mortgage on a homestead on the ground of fradulent alteration of the mortgage after it was executed. Plaintiff and her husband executed a promissory note for $750 to one Wood, and executed a mortgage as plaintiff supposed on two certain lots known as No. 1 and 2 in a certain block. When plaintiff appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the execution of the mortgage lot 1 and 2 was the property described in the mortgage, and she executed the mortgage. Subsequently the notary substituted the Nos. 13 and 14 instead of Nos. 1 and 2. Nos. 13 and 14 represented the homestead where the plaintiff and her husband lived. Held, that the alteration voided the mortgage and plaintiff was entitled to judgment accordingly.-Perean v Frederick -(Maxwell, J.)—Filed January 20, 1885. TELEPHONE COMPANY-A PUBLIC SERVANT AND BOUND TO SUPPLY ALL CUSTOMERS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION.-Plaintiff applied for and obtained a telephone, placed in his office, but for some time afterwards while the telephone directory was in course of prepparation he could not make use of it. When the bill for its use was presented plaintiff expressed a willingness to pay as per agreement, for the time he had used it, but refused to pay for that portion of time which had expired before the directory was completed during which he had not used it. There upon the instrument was removed from his office. Subsequently plaintiff made an application for an instrument to be again placed in his office, which was refused by the de NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A STATUTE PROHIBITING A LEGITMATE BUSINESS TO BE CARRIED ON BY A PARTY IN HIS RESIDENCE. In May, 1884, the legislature of New York SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. GAGEE TO TAKE POSSESSION WHEN HE FEELS alty of twice the amount of interest SO “UNSAFE OR INSECURE."--Plaintiff executed charged, and the same may be recovered by to defendant a chattel mortgage on certain the person who has paid it. or by his legal property, among which was one mare. The representatives. Barrett, Landis & Co., as mortgage contained the usual clause provid- is alleged, had paid a larger sum of money ing that the mortgagee might at any time charged as excessive interest by the defendwhen he felt “unsafe or insecure," take pos- ant bank. Barrett, Landis & Co., becoming session of the property. Pending the term insolvent and the plaintiff being one of their for which the mortgage was to run, the mort- creditors, he brings this action to recover the gagee did take possession of the mare and penalty prescribed by act of congress. The caused her to be sold. In an action by the defense interposed is chiefly on the ground ed mortgagor for wrongful conversion, it is held that a creditor is not a legal representative, the defendant was not liable; that the terms and hence does not come within the statute of the mortgage vested in him an absolute as to who may recover. Held, that the statdiscretion and the exercise of this discretion ute makes the penalty a debt and as such did not depend upon the fact whether he had may be recovered by a creditor. See 1 Otis, reasonable grounds for considering himself 35; 10 Otto, 244. The bank may off-set insecure or not. Allen v. Vose (Haight, any expense incurred in the way of exchange J.)-Albany L. J., January 17, 1885. and any just debt against the borrower. Barrett v. Shelbyville Nat. Bank—(Turney, J.)-Cent. L. J., February 13, 1885. SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. RAILROADS - SIGNALS AT HIGAWAY CROSSING.-The statute of Wisconsin impose upon railroad engineers the duty of sounding the whistle and ringing the bell in approaching the crossing of a highway, and makes the company liable for damages accruing in consequence of their neglect to do so. Plaint SUPREME COURT OF OHIO. SALE OF LAND UNDER AN EXECUTION PAYMENT OF DEBT BEFORE CONFIRMATION OF SALE-ERROR TO CONFIRM SALF.-On the 8th of March 1881 the sheriff sold certain real estate belonging to plaintiff in error to satisfy liens existing against said property, and on the 10th, two days later, made his report of said sale to the court. On the 5th of April following the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the sale upon the ground that iff's wife was driving a horse and buggy on a the liens together with costs had been fully paid, he having since the sale paid the same. This motion was overruled 'and a motion to confirm the sale was allowed. To this ruling plaintiff took exceptions and thereupon prosecuted an appeal. Held, that it was error to confirm such sale against the debtor's objection.Judgment reversed. Reed v. Madigan-(Owen J)--Cent. L. J. February 13 1883. SUPREME COURT OF TENNESEE. highway which was parallel to the railroad NATIONAL BANKS THE TAKING OF USUR- DECEDENT'S ESTATE APPOINTMENT OF ing usurious interest shall be liable to a pen- Where a party dies intestate leaving a brother and a niece as his only heirs, and the consideration of this note alleging that it they both non-residents of the state, the "was and is for and on account of differences niece petitions the court for the appoint- in option deals in grain on the Board of ment of an administrator who is a resident Trade, in the city of Chicago, and for no of the county where the property of the de- other or different consideration whatever. ; cedent is. The brother of the decedent ap- that said option deals were gambling conpears and objects to the appointment asked tracts and absolutely void, and that said note for by the niece and asks the appointment was given solely for differences in option of a party not a resident of the state. The deals as aforesaid, and is void for want of court grants the niece's petition, and the consideration." brother of decedent appeals from this ordep. Held, that the order of the court was not error and is affirmed.-Sargent v. Watts (Cole C.J.-N. W. Reports, February 7 1885. VENDOR AND VENDEE SUB-DIVISION OF A VILLAGE- -SALE OF LOT DESIGNATED BY A PLAT.—The defendant laid out a plat of a village on land he owned locating streets and alleys. He sold to plaintiff a lot, which by the plat was a corner lot. The streets as laid out were used for some time in common by the purchaser and the original owner. The original owner determined to vacate the plat and closed up the street in front of the lot which he had sold to plaintiff. There upon the plaintiff brings this action in trespass for closing up and obstructing the street. Held, that although there was no public dedication of the street yet plaintiff had rights in the street in front of his lot which defendant could not abridge.-Donohoo v. Murray-(Orton, J)-N. W. Reports, February 7 1885. SUPERIOR COURT OF COOK OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 5, 1885. These option deals or contracts which are to be considered gambling contracts and therefore void, are defined in the 130th section of the criminal code. They are contracts for the option or privilege to sell or buy at a future time. Such contracts, if upon sufficient consideration, were valid at common law; they are neither bets, nor wagers, nor wagering contracts upon general principles, nor are they in violation of the 131st section of the criminal code, or any similar statute like the eight or nine Victoria, which enacts that all contracts or agreements by way of gambling or wagering, shall be null and void," but they are null and void simply because they are prohibited and declared void by this section 130 of the criminal code. * There was no evidence introduced on the trial of this cause tending to support this plea There was no evidence either that the defendant ordered the plaintiff, as his broker, to enter into such option contracts, or that the plaintiff did in fact make such contracts or deals, or that the consideration of the note iu suit was wholly or in part for differences growing out of such transactions. If the defendant can only attack the consideration of this note by special plea, it is an end of this defense; but as counsel outside of the issue presented by this plea urged upon the THE COURT STATES WHAT OPTION DEALS OR triak, and upon the motion for a new trial, CONTRACTS ON THE BOARD OF TRADE CONTRACTS AND VOID. SMITH, J.-The suit is upon a promissory note; the defendant by special plea attacks that the proof makes a case justifying the court in finding that the defendant employed the plaintiff not to buy and sell grain, merely to makes wagers or bets in his behalf as to future market prices in violation of section 131 of the criminal code, it may be proper contracts of re-sale under which it could be placed and disposed of: the fact would still remain that the plaintiff, under orders from the defendant, had become personally liable upon contracts in which he had no personal interest above his commissions. to consider the case in this aspect also. purchase and sale should, as far as possible, The testimony of both the plaintiff and the be made upon such terms as to amounts defendant proves unmistakably that the plain- and times of delivery as to relieve both the tiff made actual purchases and sales, or rather plaintiff and defendant from embarrassments contracts for actual purchases and sales of which might arise from having on hand at grain in the usual course of business upon any one time large amounts of grain without the Chicago Board of Trade; that he made these purchases and sales under orders from time to time from the defendant. These contracts were in plaintiff's name and he be came personally liable upon each of them for the actual receipt or delivery of the grain purchased or sold, as the case might be. Not only is there no testimony tending to prove that the defendant engaged the plain-, tiff to deal in differences as it is termed, but the standing rules of the board, of which the plaintiff was a member and where he was to deal, prohibited such deals and provided that if the plaintiff should engage for the defendant in the business of dealing in differ ences on the fluctuations in the market price of and commodity without a bona fide purchase and sale of property for actual delivery, he should be deemed guilty of unmer- on behalf of his principal. cantile conduct and for the first offense liable to suspension, and for the second offense expulsion from the board. Had the defendant engaged the plaintiff to deal merely in differences upon the future fluctuations of the market—in other words to make bets or wagers upon future market prices, he would have engaged him in an illegal business and the plaintiff could not recover for losses, advances or commissions growing out of such transactions. But having engaged him to buy and sell merchandise on his account for a commission, the plaintiff was entitled not only to his commissions but to indemnity for advances made and money paid under contracts on which he himself became personally liable. And in such case it is no answer to say that the defendant embarked in this business as a mere speculator and for merely speculative purposes, and with the under Surely, under such circumstances, the plaintiff made no wager contracts with the parties with whom he dealt; and how can it be pretended that he made bets or wagers with the defendant? It requires two parties to bet or wager; each must have a chance to win, and be subject to the hazard of losing; but here, no matter what the future market may be, the plaintiff neither win nor loses, but simply collects his commissions as compensation for services rendered and liabilities incurred A careful examination Tenny 7. Foote, 4 Bradwell, 594, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 95 Ill, 99, and Gnizewood 7. Blane, 73 Eng. Com. Law. Reps. 538, upon which the decision of Tenny 7. Foote is based, together with the recent case of Thacker 7. Hardy, 4 Law Reps. Q. B. Division, 685, where the whole subject is very fully and ably reviewed and Gnizewood 7. Blane is limited and explained, will dispel all confusion of ideas upon this important subject, and satisfactorily show that the law is as I have held in this case. The motion for a new trial is overruled and judgment is ordered on the finding. Cary, Cody & Gary, for plaintiff. E. F. Runyan, and Haley & O'Donnell, for defendant. MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS. March 8, 1883. standing that the contemplated contracts of ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PRESUMPTION AGAINST ion of the court. to be taken, upon which two audits were stated, one allowing, and the other disallowing the claim of the appellant. The court upon the proof rejected the account allowing the assignment to Merryman, and ratified the account which disallowed it Before finally ratifying either, however, the court offered to direct the allowance of fifty dollars for appellant's services and no more, and to have that put into the account it would ratify. This was refused by the appellant, who appealed from the order of the court ratifying the account which excluded his claim. The court said: "The relation of counse and client is a fiduciary one, requiring the court to scrutinize any contract between them, and upholds only such a one as is apThe real labor parently reasonable and fair. Orlando F. Bump, for appellant. William J. O'Brien, for appellee. IRVING, J. Upon the application of “The President and Directors of the German Fire Insurance Company of Baltimore," who hold the first mortgage on the property, with as sent therein to a decree, the Circuit Court of Baltimore city passed a decree against Henry Otto, the mortgagor, for the sale of the mortgaged property, and had appointed Lewis H. Robinson, trustee, to sell the same. It appears that the appellee, John Euler, had the second mortgage on the property, and employed the appellant to look after his in this case was performed by Mr. Robinson, rights to the surplus proceeds, after paying the trustee, who has been allowed a fee of the first mortgage. The property was sold, one hundred and fifty dollars for his services. and the sale reported and ratified. Appel- If Mr. Merryman will take a fee of fifty dollant filed a petition in Euler's name, asking lars for his compensation, I will ratify an acthat he be made a party defendant, and that count making him that allowance." the surplus proceeds, after paying the first mortgage, might be awarded to him. He was made a defendant by order of court. Appellant then filed Euler's claim with the interest which had accrued added. Upon an examination of all the evidence in the case, we think that the court not only took the right view of the law, but also offered Mr. Merryman all that could possibly be asked under the circumstances. There was some difficulty in respect to the title that was Subsequently the appellant filed a petition in his own name, setting up an assignment to be sold, because of the extinction of the from John Euler for one-half of any sum that might be awarded Euler in the case. That agreement was dated the 25th of November, 1881, ( the same day on which the sale took place), and was an assignment under seal. To the allowance of this claim on the part of the appellant the appellee objected, and filed a petition asking its disallowance: 1st. "Because the same was procured from him when he was in a condition making him uncounscious of what he was doing or the effect thereof." 2nd. "Because the only professional labor performed by Merryman in the case was filing the claim of the appellee; and that the said Merryman had no right to any allowance out of the funds in the trust ee's hands." The court ordered testimony leases upon the property, which required some negotiation to perfect the same. This duty, it seems, devolved on the trustee to sell, and the court says he performed nearly the whole service rendered the parties, and ordered him paid accordingly from the proceeds of sale. It is not necessary to go more minutely into the facts. It is immaterial whether the appellee was drunk when the assignment was made, or not; for it was abundantly clear that the relation of client and attorney existed; and under such circumstances, the law makes a presumption against the attorney and in favor of the client. In such case the onus is on the attorney to prove the entire bona-fides and fairness of the transaction, which he has failed to establish to the |