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cannot upon his own motion sue out a writ George C. Richardson & Co., creditors of of habeus corpus and thereby obtain his dis- Day Bros. & Co., to the amount of seven charge on the grounds of having been illegally thousand seven hundred dollars, filed a bill brought within the jurisdiction of the court, to set aside the transfer to Day on the ground but if the state of his asylum from which he, that it was preferential and fraudulent, and was illegally taken demands his release it charging that the assignees had neglected will be granted. See case of Daws, 8 Penn., to take any measures for the recovery of St. 37: Daws was taken aboard a steamboat such property. A demurrer was filed to the at Detroit, Mich., and without due process bill on the theory that complainants, being of law conveyed to Erie, Penn., where he only simple contract creditors, had no standwas placed under arrest. He sued out a ing in a court of chancery, as they had no writ of habeus corpus from the Supreme judgment against the insolvent firm; also, Court. The court upon the hearing held that the County Court, which had acquired as follows: "In the case of the escape of a jurisdiction of the insolvents and their assets, fugitive from justice from this state to Mich- was the proper tribunal to hear matters reigan, after having been charged in this state specting the insolvent's assets, and the asby indictment with forgery, his arrest in the signees were the only parties to seek to relatter state without legal authority by those cover such assets. In deciding the demurrer, who made it, does not entitle the prisoner to Judge Gresham said that it was true that the discharge before prosecution, his release not insolvent firm had determined to make an asbeing demanded by the Executive of Michi- signment under the state law; that C. B. Day gan." Justice Gibson in stating the opin- knew of such insolvency and intention; that ion of the court said, "Had the prisoner's re- it was agreed, for the purpose of evading the lease been demanded by the Executive of law, that Day should receive the transfer of Michigan we would have been bound to set him at large."

IN the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Judge Gresham rendered a decision of more than ordinary

the property first in pretended payment of his debt; and that a formal assignment should be made subsequently, such a palpable evasion of the statute might not be sustained. question, however, was not presented for decision. It was clear that no suit could be

That

interest, on the 16th of last month, in the brought against the assignees and Day until

case of Richardson v. Day, as to the rights of contract creditors to sue a party to recover assets after he has made an assignment of his property in the County Court. Day Bros., & Co.. were wholesale and retail dry

a demand had been made on the assignees to sue and they had refused to do so. The bill nowhere alleged that before the suit was brought the creditors requested the assignees to sue and that they refused to comply.

The assignees were the proper persons to bring all suits to recover property belonging

to the estate. The demurrer would be sustained solely on the ground that the suit was brought by a creditor without a demand being first made upon the assignees to bring the suit.

goods merchants at Peoria, and September 28th last, being indebted to Charles B, Day, a brother of one the partners, in the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, transferred to him their entire stock of goods, worth three hundred thousand dollars, as security for the two hundred thousand dollars and also as security to the amount of five hundred thous and dollars of the firm's paper. Day at once! took possession of the property, and on Oct-ober 9th following, the firm made an assign- | ment of its remaining property to William The defendant, an attorney, is prosecuted by Jack and L. D. Puterbaugh. Subsequently information of the district attorney for de

FEDERAL COURTS.

CRIMINAL LAW-ILLEGAL PENSION FEES.

manding and receiving a greater fee for ob- plaintiff was a bona-fide holder.-Tracey v. Town of Phelps-(Wallace, J.)--Federal Reporter, February 10, 1885.

taining a pension fee from a client than the statute allowed. To this information defend ant demurred. Held, that no prosecution could be sustained for overcharges made subsequent to 1878. Demurrer sustained.United States v. Van Vleit-(Brown, J.)— Federal Reporter, February 10, 1885.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. Head-notes to opinions prepared by the Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Official Reporter, to appear in his reports:

17--10.--Daniel C. Lynn 7. Caleb M. Lyerle. (Opinion by Walker, J., reversing and remanding.) Filed at Mount Vernon, January 22, 1885.

I. Specific Performance-As to payment

DEED FROM HUSBAND TO WIFE-INVALID as to Existing CREDITORS WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED.-William B. Bayne, being sued upon his bond, conveyed to his wife all his property prior to the rendering of judg- of purchase money.—Where a party conveyment against him. The alleged considera- ed a tract of land to his son-in-law for $1.tion from Mrs. Bayne to her husband was 200 taking five promissory notes of $200 various sums of money loaned to him at each from the grantee, one to each of the various times. Creditors of Wm. B. Bayne grantor's five daughters, the other $200 befile a bill to set aside the conveyance by ing the grantee's wife's share of the purchase Bayne to his wife on the ground that it was money, and the conveyance was set aside at done to defraud them of their rights. Held, the instance of two creditort of the grantor that the deed was valid between the husband and the notes ordered to be surrendered and and wife but void as against creditors exist- canceled, which was done, except as to one ing at the time the transfer was made.- note which had been paid, after the land Boyne v. State-( Alvey, J.)—62 Maryland was advertised for sale the grantor agreed to Reports. discharge the judgments and the lein on the land and did so upon the agreement of the grantee to pay him $1,200, which he afterward refused to do, or to give his notes for the price- Held, that a court of equity would compel him to pay the sum really due from him; and that he could not defeat the relief on the alleged ground, the conveyance was originally made to defraud creditors, it being claimed on the other side that the transaction was a distribution by the grantor among his daughters.

CAPLAS AD RESPONDENDUM GUARANTY COMPANY.—Where a company whose business it is to guarantee the integrity of employes for a consideration, and save the employer harmless and where the employe has proved faithless and is charged with embezzlement, the guarantee company is entitled to a capias for the arrest of the said employe.---London G. & A. Company v. Ged. des-(Blodgett, J.)-Federal Reporter, Feb.

uary 10, 1885.

2. Attorney when communications are privileged. Where two parties go together to an attorney, and there make statement to him in the presence of each other, they are not confidential communications intended to be withheld from the opposite party, and there is no error in permitting the attorney to testify to such statements.

MUNICIPAL BONDS — FRAUDULENTLY ISsued—BURDEN OF PROOF.--When it appears that municipal bonds were fraudulently is sued, the burden of proof is on the holder, to show that he purchased them for value without notice of the fraud. Held, that the 3. Where, on a bill to compel the granquestion of fraud in their issue was properly tee of land to specifically perform his consubmitted to the jury and also as to whether tract, the court in decreeing that he pay the

4.

sum agreed to be paid, and making it a lein the land owner, he may be restrained from on the premises, made no disposition of the doing so by injunction. injuction previously granted restraining him. from cutting and selling timber from the land: Held, no error, as the decree fixed the rights of the parties, and when the defendant should execute the decree the injunction would fall or cease to hold good.

Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Union couuty; the Hon. Daniel M. Browning, Judge, presiding.

Eminent domain- What elements of damages included. In the condemnation or land for a right of way for a railroad across a farm, the necessities and conveniences of location for farm crossings should be taken into consideration, and after the condemnation they will be presumed to have been, and that damages were estimated upon the hypothesis that a farm crossing would not be constructed and maintained at any particular point when it would directly and seri

Mr. W. C. Moreland, and Messrs. In- ously affect the safe and efficient operation score & Maxey, for the appellant

Mr. M. C. Crawford, for the appellee.

14—8—James Chalcraft v- The Louisville Evansville & St. Louis Railway Company. (Opinion by Scholfield, J., affirming.) Filed at Mt. Vernon, January 22, 1885. Appeal and writ of error

I.

of the road.

Writ of error to the Appellate Court, for the Fourth District; heard in that court on appeal by defendant in error from the circuit court of Edwards county; the Hon. C. S. Conger, Judge, presiding.

Mr. Wm. F. Foster and Mr. J. M. Campbell, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. H. J. Strawn and C. H. Patton, for the dejense.

-From and to Appellate Court-Injunction.-A bill for an injunction only, not being a suit to re- | cover money or chattels, is not affected by the statute limiting appeals and writs of RAILROADS RIGHT OF ONE ROAD TO error to $1,000 and an appeal lies from the CROSS THE TRACK OF ANOTHER ROAD-BY final judgment of the Appellate Court to this | AGREEMENT OR BY THE RIGHT OF EMINENT court without regard to the magnitude of DOMAIN.—A railroad company in construcof the interests involved. ting their road has the right to select the

2. Railroads-Duty to make farm cross-place where they shall cross the track of a ings.—The word “necessary" in the statute road already constructed and may procure requiring railroad corporations to construct the right of way across the track of the road farm crossings "when and where the same already built by mutual agreement or by may become necessary for the use of the right of eminent domain. See 71 Ill., 333; proprietors of the lands adjoining such rail-97 Ill., 500. If by the crossing damages is roads,” was used in its more popular sense, thereby caused to the former company that is and is equivalent to the words, "reasonably no bar; the presumption is that full compensaconvenient." tion will be rendered. See 108 Ill., 265.

right of way for a crossing, by mutual agreement, and subsequently seeks to obtain additional width of land by proceeding on the right of eminent domain, the fact that the original crossing was obtained by consent or agreement is no bar to thus obtaining an additional width. See 17 Ill., 123: 18 Ill.,

3. Same-Farm crossings subject to pub-, Where the latter company has obtained a lic interests.Where the erection and maintenance of a proposed farm crossing over a railroad track will directly affect the operation of the road, as a means of public transportation, by seriously tending to increase the danger of collisions, this will be a sufficient reason why such crossings should not be made, and if attempted to be made by 324; 36 Conn., 196. No difference what

the exigencies are which render additional NEY ON FUNDS RECEIVED.—Plaintiff employtracks, and a wider crossing necessary; 100 ed defendant to attend to certain matters of Ill., 137; 105 Ill., 73; 105 Ill., 511. The litigation at a stipulated sum per day while petitioner by acquiring a partial right of way so engaged. The defendant upon the settleby contract is not thereby estopped from con- tlement of a certain claim received moneys demning a further right of way.-C. & W. I. for plaintiff in the sum of $5,922.25; when RR Co, v ICR R Co-(Sheldon, J)—Filed requested to pay it over to the plaintiff he at Ottawa, January, 1885, offered to pay over $3,722.25, retaining $2,200 which he claimed was due him for services rendered. This claim for services the plaintiff denied and thereupon brought this action. On the trial the plaintiff was called as a witness to show the facts which he had previously set up in the affidavit, upon which The defendant interposed an objection on the capias issued in commencing the suit.

SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS.

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HOMESTEAD-CONTRACT TO CONVEY BY HUSBAND WITHOUT THE CONSENT OR SIGNATURE OF HIS WIFE, VOID.-Where a husband contracted to convey his homestead for an agreed consideration, without the consent of his wife, and received part of the purchase the grounds that the proposed testimony was money and a promissory note for balance, immaterial, which objection was sustained by in an action brought to recover on the note the court. The court thereupon directed it is held that the conveyance being made a verdict for defendant and plaintiff appeals. without the consent of the grantor's wife the Held, that the trial court erred in excluding note is without consideration and void. the testimony, and directing a verdict for deHeld further, that defendant having paid part fendant. A new trial is ordered.-Robinson of the money with a knowledge of all the v. Hawes (Champlin, J.)-N. W. Reports, facts he cannot recover the money so paid. January 28, 1885. -Thimes v. Stumpff-(Johnston, J.)—Filed January 7, 1885.

DIVORCE- WHAT CONSTITUES EXTREME CRUELTY.—-In Carpenter 7. Carpenter, 30 Kans.., 712, it was held that any unjustifiable conduct on the part of the husband which so grieviously wounds the mental feelings of the wife, or so utterly destroys her peace of mind as to seriously impair her bodily health or endanger her life, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty, although no physical or personal violence is inflicted or even threatened. In the case at bar the husband often spoke to his wife unkindly, and insinuated that a child which had been born of the marriage was not his child. Held, that the charge of extreme cruelty was sustained. Avery v. Avery-(Horton, J.)—Filed January 7, 1885.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—LIEN OF ATTOR-

COMMON CARRIER-CONTRACT TO TRANSPORT A CIECUS FROM PLACE TO PLACE.-Defendant company contracted to transport a circus belonging to plaintiff, with all its men and equipments, along its line of road, stopping at such places as plaintiff wished to exhibit. The train was to be operated and run under the control and management of plaintiff, subject to the rules of the defendant company. The contract was made at greatly reduced rate and plaintiff executed a release for any damages accruing. A collision occuring, causing great damage to the plaintiff he brings this action to recover. Held, that it was competent for defendant to stipulate for exemption in such contract, and that it could not under said contract be held liable as a common carrier.-Coup v. Wabash. St. L&P. Ry. Co.-(Campbell, J.)—Filed January 28, 1885.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS--DEFINITION

OF.—Judge Story defines a promissory note of dower on the ground that the decree of as follows: "A written engagement by one divorce was void. The statute in Maine person to pay to another person therein provides that "when residents of this State named, absolutely and unconditionally, a certain sum of money at a time specified therein." The definition by all text-writers is substantially the same.

go out of it for the purpose of obtaining a divorce for causes which occurred while the parties lived here, which do not authorize a divorce and it is obtained it shall be void in this

An action of debt was brought on a note State." Held, that this statute is not appliwhich was in the following form:

cable when the party bona-fide establishes his residence in another state.--Gregory v. Gregory—(Virgin, J.)—Cent. L. J-, Febru

"$366.66. COLDWATER, Mich., Feb. 27, 1883 "On the first day of November, 1883, we, the undersigned, whose post-office is Algan- ary 13, 1885. see, County of Branch, State of Michigan, jointly and severally, for valve received, SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. promise to pay E. M. Birdsall & Co., or order, Three Hundred and Sixty-six, (66100) Dollars with interest at 7 per cent. per annum if paid when due; if not so paid then the interest shall be 10 per cent. per annum from date. We also agree to pay exchange and all expenses, including attorney's fee, incurred in collection. Payable at the First National Bank, in Coldwater, Mich.

"We do hereby relinquish and waive the benefits of all laws exempting real and personal property from levy and sale, and all benefits or relief from valuation and appraisement laws."

GEORGE R. PURDY, ELNATHAN GEORGE." Held, that such an instrument is not negotiable according to the law.-Merchant's Nat. Bank of Auburn v. Purdy-(Champlin, J.)-N. W. Rep. January 31, 1885.

VENDOR AND VENDEE-TIME OF, ESSENCE OF THE CONTRACT.---In a contract for the sale and purehase of land, it was agreed that the vendor should furnish the vendee an abstract of title, The contract also contained this clause, viz: "This contract to be void if the settlement of this purchase is not had within twenty days from the delivery of the abstract." Held, that the clause per se, makes time of the essence of the contract, and that if the vendee failed to signify his acceptance of the title within twenty days, he could not insist upon specific performance on the part of the vendor.-Judd v. Skidmore--(Berry, J.)—Filed January 29, 1885.

ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY--PERFORMANCE OF A PHYSICAL ACT IN PRESENCE OF JURY.-Plaintiff brings an action for personal injury which she sustained while getting off defendant's cars, by reason of negligence of the employes of defendant. While giving her testimony on the trial plaintiff testified

SUPREME COURT OF MAINE. DIVORCE—OBTAINED IN ANOTHER STATE FOR CAUSES NOT ALLOWED BY THE STAUTE OF THE STATE OF THEIR DOMICIL.-Plaintiff that the injury had caused her to be lame or and defendant were residents of the State of Maine. The husband, desirous of procuring ing a divorce removed to the State of Illinois and after one year's residence as required, files his petition for divorce and thereupon obtained a decree. Having conveyed some real estate situated in Maine subsequent to the decree of divorce, and soon thereafter died, an action is brought by the divorced wife against the grantee for her right

to limp when walking. Defendant's counsel thereupon requested the court to order her to walk across the room in presence of the jury, that they might see in what degree she was lame. This the court declined to do, and defense took an exception. Upon appeal defense rested chiefly on this exception. The trial court overruled a motion for a new trial. Held, that as to this ruling the exception was well taken; that it would have been proper

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