tiff had no adequate redress at law. The de- ways in a safe condition and where a bridge cree affirming the right of plaintiff to the un- has stood a long time, or for other reasons obstructed use of the roadway is affirmed.Nye v. Clark—(Campbell, J.)—Filed January 14, 1885.

has become unsafe, township officers are inexcusable for not taking notice of its condi

tion. In such case, upon trial in an action for damages, the negligence of the township BY through its officers can not be established by admission of a commissioner to third parties. It is only necessary for an injured party to show by proper testimony that the officers had knowledge of the unsafe condition or knowledge of such a state of facts as would reasonably make it their duty to examine and take such steps as to protect the public from danger.-Stebbins v. Township of Keene. (Sherwood, J.)-Filed January 14, 1885.

right to waive the commission and that the
plaintift might recover.-Wass v. Atwater
(Dickinson, J.)-Filed January 10, 1885.

A

RIGHTS OF PRE-EMPTOR OF PUBLIC LANDS. previous ruling of the appellate Court distinctly made upon any point may be followed, modified, or over-ruled in other cases which

which it is made it is a final adjudication from which the parties cannot find relief. A person who is lawfully recognized by the register and receiver as the holder of public lands under the pre-emption act, or the timber culture act, takes the same and all permanent improvements on it, together with the exclusive right of possession free from all claimants, except the United States.Hiatt v. Brooks- (Cobb, J.) —N. W. Rep. Jan. 24, 1884.

INSURANCE CONSTRUCTION OF POLICY come before the Court, but in the case in POLICY COVERING BUILDING AND ADDITIONS. -When a policy of insurance upon an "elevator building and additions," and a warehouse stood two and one-half feet from the elevator but was attached to or connected with the elevator by boards or strips nailed upon the two buildings, and was used in common with the elevator for storing grain. Held, that the warehouse was covered by the policy. The time of payment of loss held to be fixed from the time that notice of loss was given and not from the time that formal proof of loss was made.—Cargill v. M. & M. Mut. Ins. Co.-(Dickinson, J.) N. W. Rep., January 24, 1885.

SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA,

In an

PROMISSORY NOTE MATERIAL ALTERATION—A CONTRACT ON SAME PAPER WITH NOTE MODIFYING THE SAME DETACHED-Where a promissory note was given and on the same paper on which the note was written was an agreement between the parties, which modified the note on certain conditions; this contract subsequent to the deliv. ery of the note was detached and the note thǝn transferred jor value to an innocent purchaser, who was plaintiff below. action upon this note judgment was had for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Held, that the note in question is not the paper which defendant signed and hence he is not liable even in the hands of an innocent holder. Also held, that where a note is made and delivered without any rate of interest being specified in the face of the note and the rete subsequently expressed by writing in the word or figure necessary in the blank form to express the rate of interest, that such a change by the holder is a material teration and voids the note.-Davis & Henry(Maxwell, J. )—Filed Dec. 30, 1885.

PRACTICE SALE OF INTEREST PENDING THE SUIT SUIT MAY BE CONTINUED IN NAME OF ORIGINAL PARTY- Where there is a transfer of interest during the pending of the suit, the action may be continued in the name of the original party or by permission of the court the transferee may be substituted for the original party. In order to avoid a sale on the ground that it is made in fraud of creditors it must appear that the purchaser had knowledge of the fradulent purpose of the seller, or at least he must have had notice of such facts as should put him on his guard and upon inquiry.-Temple v. Smith (Maxwell, J.)-Filed Dec. 30, 1885.

SUPREME COURT OF NORTH

CAROLINA.

--

DEED TO A MINOR — LOSS OF DEED – SUBSEQUENT CONVEYANCE TO ANOTHER.Certain lands were conveyed by deed to the plaintiff,a minor,and the deed delivered to his father to keep for him. The deed was destroyed without being registered and the same grantor subsequently conveyed the lands to the defendant. In an action to recover the land it is held that the plaintiff, being an infant, was incapable of parting with the estate conveyed to him or of assenting to the destruction of the deed, and that equity would restore him to the position he was in before the deed was destroyed.

Brendle - Heron—[Ruffin, J-]—88 North indeffinitely and the fact of acceptance by the Carolina. bank will be inferred from an unreasonable delay in protesting. Held, that under the facts in this case the holder was entitled to

SURETYSHIP—ADDITIONAL SECURITY WILL. NOT DISCHARGE ORIGINAL SURETY.--Where recover. McMichael v. IS. Nas. Bankadditionol security is given by the principal (Green, J.)-Leg. Adviser.

debtor, the time for payment remaining unchanged and the remedy for collection remains unchanged the original surety is not thereby discharged. Where an assignment of property was made to secure sums due and future demands with power of sale not to be executed, till after six months notice. An action was brought on two bills of exchange protected in the assignment, which was set up as a defense. Tindall, C. J. says: "I am of opinion that such an assignment can only be considered as a collateral security, and that the personal remedy is not suspended, as there is not any clause to that effect in the deed."-Stillings v. Lane(Smith, C. J.)--88 North Carolina.

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYL-
VANIA.

BANK HOLDING A CUSTOMER'S CHECK SOME DAYS AND THEN PROTESTING - LIABILITY TO PAYEE.-In an action upon a bank check it appeared that the check was given to the plaintiff March 1, 1875, in payment for a fire loss. At the time it was drawn and

SUPREME COURT OF RHODE

ISLAND.

SHERIFF LIABILITY FOR ESCAPE NOT LIABLE AS BAIL, BUT ON HIS OFFICIAL BOND. -Where a sheriff suffers an arrested debtor to escape he is not liable as bail for the debt, but is liable on his official bond for the esunder his official bond he can not have recape, and if compelled to pay damages course upon the debtor for the amount which he is compelled to pay. See Brown 7. Lord, Kirby 209; Dresser 7. Fifield, 12 R. I. 24; Adams 7. Hedgpeth, 5 Jones 327; Adams 7. Jones, 1 Winst. 199. A sheriff having been obliged to pay money in consequence of an escape cannot maintain an action to recover it for the reason that in doing so he must allege his own breach of duty.---Carpenter v. Fifield (Mattison, J.)-14 Rhode Island.

PARTNERSHIP APPLICATION OF PARTNERSHIP FUNDS IN PAYMENT OF DEBT OF PART

NER.Two parties enter into partnership at
which time one of the parties is debtor to B.
After the partnership is formed the firm con-
tinues to purchase goods of B. In opening
the account with the firm B. transfers the bal-

ance on his books previously entered against
one of the members of the firm and there-
after applies remittances from the firm to the
Held, that the
credit of the firm account.
firm could not recover in set-off the excess

delivered, the books of the bank showed a balance in favor of the drawer, which increased up to March 10th. On March 5th plaintiff deposited the check in a Philadel phia bank for collection and it was sent forward with instructions to make immediate returns or return if not paid. It was receiv. ed by the defendant bank on the 6th of March. The defendant bank was in straightened circumstances and short of funds at the time. of the firm's checks over the firm's purchases. On the 9th of March, three days after the Held further, that the firm was entitled to the check had been received, a letter was rebenefit of the misapplied funds.—Cornells v. ceived by defendant bank from the maker of Stanhope--(Durfee, J.)--14 Rhode Island. the check requesting that the check be not paid; thereupon the check was protested for non-payment. The holder of the check brings this action against the bank to recover. Held, that a bank has no right to hold a chech

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. COMMON CARRIER-EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY BY CONTRACT.-A carrier may contract with a shipper whereby he will be exempt

from delays occurring from any other cause by the lessor, and judgment of restitution is

given from which defendant appeals. Held,
that the lease being executed and delivered
on Sunday was absolutely void and no sub-
sequent act of the parties could ratify it.
The parties could not ratify an illegal con-
tract, although they might have made a new
contract with reference to the same subject on
a subsequent week-day.
It does not appear
that any such new contract was made. See
Moore 7. Kendall, 2 Pin. 99; Hill z. Sher-
wood, 51 Wis. 46; Thomas v. Hatch, 53
Wis. 296; and Harrison 7. Cotton, 31 Iowa,
16. Judgment of the Circuit Court is revers-
ed.--Vinz v. Beatty--(Cole, C. J.)--Filed
Dec. 16, 1884.

than the negligence of himself or his servants, provided he does not transfer the goods to connecting lines. See Railroad Co., v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Hooper 7. Wills, 27 Cal. 11; Adams Ex. v. Fenlick, 38 Ind. 150. Where the carrier receives goods for transportation over his own and connecting lines he cannot thus limit his liability. See Bank of Ky. 7. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U. S. 174; and Lawson on Carriers § 225. Like wise when the carrier ships the goods by any other route than that agreed upon he becomes an insurer. See Fatman 7, Cincinnati R. R. Co., 2 Dis. 248; Robinson 7. Dispatch Co., 45 Iowa 470. Goods were shipped from Worcester, Mass., to Muscatine, Iowa, to go through without transfer. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-- CONVEYANCE BY When they reached Chicago they were trans- FATHER TO SON-THE FATHER TO RECEIVE ferred to a warehouse and were there burned. A CERTAIN PORTION DURING HIS LIFE.Held, that the company wae liable notwith- A father conveys to his son certain lands and standing the shipper had in the contract re-personal property, in consideration the son leased the company from liability.—Galves- allows him the use of one-half of the buildton R. R. Co., v. Allison—(Stayton, J.)— ings thereon and delivers to him one-half of Filed May 1, 1883. the products of the farm each year as long as he or his wife shall live, and the further consideration that he shall pay a certain sum to another son and daughter each, upon the death of the father and mother. In an action of replevin by the administrator of the grantor, it is held that the assignment of the property by the father was in trust for his own use and void under the statute of Frauds as against creditors. The legal effect of the agreement was a division of the property among the children.--Severin v. Rueckerick —(Lyon, J.)—Filed Dec. 16, 1884.

INFANC -MINOR'S CONTRACT VOIDABLE NOT VOID DISABILITYA PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.-Where a court charged the jury that when a contract is made with an infant either party may disavow the contract when the minor attains his majority, is held, error. The disability of infancy is the personal privilege of the infant himself, and none but he, or his legal representative can take advantage of it. Other parties who contract with an infant are bound by it, although he or his representative may take advantage of his disability.-Harris v. Musgrove—( Delany, J.)-Filed May 8, 1883.

LIBEL-NEWSPAPER COMPANY--DEMURRER.--When an action is brought to recover damages for a libel published in a foreign SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. language the complaint must contain the LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASE EXECU- alleged libelous article in the language in TED AND DELIVERED ON SUNDAY-NOT VALID which it was published and a translation of -A lease of certain premises was executed the same into English, with an averment that and delivered on Sunday and on the same the translation is an accurate rendering of day lessee took possession of the premises. the original, or that the said words, being Subsequently on account of non-payment of translated into the English language, have, rent an action of unlawful detainer is brought and were understood by the persons to whom

they were so published to have the meaning VALUE.-Where municipal bonds regularly and effect alleged. Held further, that where issued and sold by the treasurer to a party for such action is brought against a newspaper value, and absconds with the preceeds, it is company and against a defendant in his in- no grounds of defense by the corporation. dividual capacity it is not sufficient to aver There is no rule of law better settled than that the defendant is the principal owner of that which affirms the title of a bona-fide holdthe newspaper, but it must contain the aver- er for value of negotiable paper without rement that defendant controls said paper and gard to how the party who transfers it come is individually responsible for its contents. into possession. Otherwise when the paper Simonson v. Herald Co.-(Lyon, J.)--Filed is tainted with fraud in its inception which Dec. 16, 1884. renders it null and void.-Copper v. Jersey City (Van Syckel, J.)-15 Vroom's Re

ESTATE OF Decedent-DowER-QUES- ports. TION OF VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE OF DECE

MINNESOTA.

December Term, 1884.

Niskern v. C. M. & St. P. Railway Co. NEGLIGENCE-SPARKS FROM A LOCOMOTIVE

DENT ON APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO SELL. U. S. CIRCUIT COURT, DISTRICT OF Where an administrator of an estate files a bill quia timet to clear the title to real estate of a claim of dower by the widow of decedent, on the ground that the said claimant was not the lawful wife of the decedent, a general demurrer to the bill will be sustained. The question of the validity of such a marriage might be raised under an application by the administrator for license to sell real estate for the purpose of paying the debts against the estate.—Paige, Adm'r. v. Fagan -(Cole, C. J.)-Filed Dec. 16, 1884.

DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY BY FIRE—

LIABILITY OF RAILWAY COMPANY.

Charge to jury orally.-Nelson, J.: This case of one of considerable importance. The questions presented are those peculiarly and eminently the province of a jury to decide. They are issues of fact. The law ap

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. plicable to the facts of this case, I think is

92,

BOUNDARY PRACTICE- DETERMINATION OF BOUNDARY. Where no monuments are named in the grant and none are intended to be afterward designated as evidence of the extent the distance stated in the grant must govern. See Tyler on Boundaries, 29. In Chenoweth 7. Haskell's, Lessee 3, Pet. 96. Justice Marshall said: "If a grant be made which describes the land granted by course and distance only, or by natural objects not distinguishable from others of the same kind, course and distance, though not safe guides, are the only guides given, and must be used.-L. V. Railroad Co. v. McFarland (Depue, J.)—15 Vroom's Reports.

quite simple. I am satisfied you will investigate these issues without prejudice or sympathy, and solely with a view of arriving at the truth. The case is an important one, and I have given both parties full opportunity in the examination of their witnesses to present all the facts so as to enable you to arrive at the truth. You have patiently and attentively listened to all of the evidence, and I have no doubt you will be able to give a satisfactory and conscientious verdict.

The plaintiff, Martin Niskern, in 1879, owned a hotel in which he resided, and outbuildings, including a livery stable and barn situated in the village of Farmington in the State of Minnesota. On the night of November 22d of that year all the buildings and MUNICIPAL BONDS SOLD BY TREASUER contents, valued at $6,408, were destroyed AND THE FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO HIS OWN by fire. The plaintiff brings this action USE RIGHTS OF A BONA-FIDE HOLDER FOR against the defendant, the railroad company,