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Wolverton v. Lacey, 18 Bost. Law Rep., 672; The
Highlander, Sprague, 588).

'As seamen cannot have authority to make advances
for the benefit of the ship, except by order of the
master, there is no reason for giving them a peculiar
lien for such advances.

See section 1684.

lien.

S1701. An officer, who levies an attachment or officer's execution upon personal property, acquires a special lien, dependent on possession, upon such property, which authorizes him to hold it until the process is discharged or satisfied, or a judicial sale of the property is had.

Rhoads v. Woods, 41 Barb., 471.

lien.

S 1702. An attorney-at-law has a lien, which is Attorney's defined and regulated by the CODE OF CIVIL PRO

CEDURE.

See section 520 of the Code, reported complete.

S1703. The lien of a judgment is regulated by Judgment the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

See Field v. Sands, 8 Bosw., 685; Conger v. Sands, 19

How. Pr., 8; Smith v. Gage, 41 Barb., 60.

lien.

lien.

$1704. The liens of mechanics, for materials and Mechanics' services upon real property, are regulated by special statutes.

ships.

§ 1705. Debts amounting to at least fifty dollars, Lien on contracted for the benefit of ships, are liens in the cases provided by the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The reference is to the Code of Civil Procedure as
reported complete.

ment of

$ 1706. The mode of proceeding by a creditor to Enforceenforce a lien within this state, is regulated by the lien. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

As reported complete.

When con

signor may

CHAPTER VII.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSIT.

SECTION 1707. When consignor may stop goods.
1708. What is insolvency of consignee.

1709. Transit, when ended.

1710. Stoppage, how effected.

1711. Effect of stoppage.

S1707. A seller or consignor1 of property, whose stop goods. claim for its price or proceeds has not been extinguished, may, upon the insolvency of the buyer or consignee becoming known to him3 after parting with the property, stop it while on its transit to the buyer or consignee, and resume possession thereof.

1 See Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93; Kinlock v. Craig, 3 T. R., 119; Clark v. Manrau, 3 Paige, 373. The right is intended to be recognized as held by those who dispose of the thing as owners, only. A mechanic having a lien on goods for work done, but forwarding them to the owner, cannot exercise a right to stop them in transit to enforce his demand for the work. His lien is destroyed by relinquishing possession (Sweet v. Pym, 1 East, 4). And a mere surety for the price, upon whom there is no primary liability to pay for the goods, cannot stop them upon the insolvency of the vendee, merely to save himself from loss (Siffken v. Wray, 6 East, 371). But one who remits money upon a particular account or for a particular purpose, other than an antecedent debt, may stop the same on hearing of the insolvency of the consignee (Smith v. Bowles, 2 Esp., 578).

Feise v. Wray, 3 East, 93; Jenkins v. Usborne, 7 M. & 698.

G.

'It was held in Rogers v. Thomas (20 Conn., 53), that the right of stoppage in transit can only arise upon an insolvency occurring after the sale. See, however, to the contrary, Reynolds v. Railroad, 43 N. H., 580. The commissioners propose to extend the right to cases in which an insolvency of the buyer existing before the sale, but then unknown to the seller, comes to the knowledge of the latter while the goods are yet on their way. It is obvious that where one sells goods with a full knowledge of the facts affecting the buyer's credit, he should abide by his act. But no reason, founded in justice or required by the convenience of merchants, is per

ceived for distinguishing between the case of an
insolvency occurring after the sale, and one occurring
before, but unknown to the seller until afterward.

solvency of

S1708. A person is insolvent, within the meaning What is inof the last section, when he ceases to pay his debts consignee. in the manner usual with persons of his business, or when he declares his inability or unwillingness to

do so.

Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn., 53; Hays v. Mouille, 14
Penn. St., 48; Newsom v. Thornton, 6 East, 17; Vertue
v. Jewell, 4 Campb., 31; Thompson v. Thompson, 4
Cush., 134; Shone v. Lucas, 3 Dowl. & R., 218; Bayly
v. Schofield, 1 M. & Selw., 338; Secomb v. Nutt, 14 B.
Monr., 324. Compare the definition of "insolvency,"
in Herrick v. Borst, 4 Hill, 650, with that in Curtis v.
Leavitt, 15 N. Y., 9, 199.

when ended

S1709. The transit of property is at an end when Transit, it comes into the possession of the consignee,1 or into that of his agent, unless such agent is employed merely to forward the property to the consignee.

Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629; 1 id., 483; Cowasjee

v. Thompson, 5 Moore P. C., 165; Covell v. Hitch

cock, 23 Wend., 611; Buckley v. Furniss, 15 Wend.,
137.

'Harris v. Pratt, 17 N. Y., 249; Holbrook v. Vose, 6

Bosw., 76.

how

S1710. Stoppage in transit can be effected only by Stoppage, notice to the carrier or depositary of the property, or effected. by taking actual possession thereof.

Mottram v. Heyer, 5 Denio, 629; Whitehead v. Ander

son, 9 M. & W., 518.

stoppage.

S1711. Stoppage in transit does not of itself rescind Effect of a sale, but is a means of enforcing the lien of the seller.

There has been a good deal of doubt upon this question
(see Wentworth v. Outhwaite, 10 M. & W., 436; Clay v.
Harrison, 10 Barn. & Cr., 99; Bloxam v. Sanders, 4 id.,
941; Martindale v. Smith, 1 Q. B., 389); but at the pre-
sent day, and in this country, the principle may be
deemed settled as here stated (Newhall v. Vargas, 13
Maine, 93; 15 id., 314; Rogers v. Thomas, 20 Conn.,
53; see Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick., 307; Ash v. Put-
nam, 1 Hill, 302; Parsons on Contr., 5th ed., 598).

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TITLE XV.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

CHAPTER I. Negotiable instruments in general.
II. Bills of exchange.

III. Promissory notes.

IV. Cheques.

V. Bank notes and certificates of deposit.

The word "negotiable" has been so long used in its application to commercial paper, that the commissioners have not thought themselves at liberty to propose in the text a substitute for it. They would have preferred the word "circulating" as more precise and expressive, and if they had not felt bound by the present usage, they would have designated the instru ments mentioned in this Title as "CIRCULATING

INSTRUMENTS."

CHAPTER I.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE I. General definitions.

II. Interpretation.

III. Indorsement.

IV. Presentment for payment.

V. Dishonor.

VI. Excuse of presentment and notice.
VII. Extinction.

ARTICLE I.

GENERAL DEFINITIONS.

SECTION 1712. To what instruments this Title is applicable. 1713. Negotiable instrument, what.

1714. Must be for unconditional payment of money.

1715. Payee.

1716. Instrument may be in alternative.

1717. Date, seal, &c.

1718. May contain a pledge, &c.

1719. What it must not contain.

1720. Date.

1721. Different classes of negotiable instruments.

S1712. The provisions of this Title apply only to To what negotiable instruments, as defined in this article.

instruments this Title is ap

plicable.

instrument,

S1713. A negotiable instrument is a written' pro- Negotiable mise' or request for the payment of a certain sum what. of money, to order or bearer,' in conformity to the provisions of this article.

11 R. S., 768. It is not necessary that the maker's name
should be subscribed (Taylor v. Dobbins, 1 Strange,
399; Elliot v. Cooper, 2 Ld. Raym., 1376).

4

It is provided in another part of the Code that the
act of the agent is equivalent to the act of the
principal; and it is not, therefore, necessary to say
anything in this section about signature by an agent.
1 R. S., 768, § 1.

The direction may be in form a request (Wheatley v.
Strobe, 12 Cal., 92); though it must be in spirit an
order.

The amount to be paid must be fixed by the instrument
(Story on Notes, § 20; Lent v. Hodgman, 15 Barb., 274).
An obligation to pay in anything other than money is
not negotiable (Jerome v. Whitney, 7 Johns., 21;
Saxton v. Johnston, 10 id., 418; Clark v. King, 2
Mass., 524; Bunker v. Athearn, 35 Me., 364; Wingo
v. McDowell, 8 Rich. L., 446; Rhodes v. Lindley, 3
Hamm., 51; Peay v. Pickett, 1 Nott & Mc C., 254). In
Iowa such notes are made negotiable by statute (see
Riggs v. Price, 3 Greene, 334). In this state, a note
payable in current bank notes has been held to be
negotiable (Judah v. Harris, 19 Johns., 144; Keith v.
Jones, 9 Johns., 120). The same rule is followed in
some other states (Swetland v. Creigh, 15 Ohio, 118;
Williams v. Sims, 22 Ala., 512; Barnes v. Gorman,
9 Rich. L., 297) but not universally (see McCormick
v. Trotter, 10 Serg. & R., 94; London S. F. So. v.
Hagerstown Bank, 36 Penn. St., 498; Smith v.
Philadelphia Bank, 14 id., 525; Lowe v. Bliss, 24
Ill., 168; Fry v. Rousseau, 3 McLean, 106; Has-
brook v. Palmer, 2 id., 10). A note payable in the
currency of another state (Little v. Phoenix Bank,
2 Hill, 425; 7 id., 359; Lieber v. Goodrich, 5 Cow.,
186) or country (Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend., 71),
is not negotiable.

An instrument payable "to A. B." simply, without
adding "or his order," or equivalent words, is not
negotiable (Richards v. Warring, 39 Barb., 42;
Reed v. Murphy, 1 Geo., 236).

1 R. S., 768, § 1. It is essential that the instrument
should be made payable to somebody (White v. Joy,
13 N. Y., 83; Douglass v. Wilkeson, 6 Wend., 637).

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