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When exemptions do not apply.

Liability for delay.

Liability of marine carriers.

Id.

Perils of
Bea, what.

Consignor

of valuables to declare

their

nature.

"Inevitable accident" does not excuse the carrier, if such accident is of human origin (Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y., 431; Gocld v. Chapin, 20 id., 259; 10 Burb., 612; Merritt v Earle, 31 id., 38; McArthur v. Sears, 21 Wend., 190; Hall v. Cheney, 36 N. H., 31).

S1155. A common carrier is liable, even in the cases excepted by the last section, if his ordinary negligence exposes the property to the cause of the loss.

Read v. Spaulding. 5 Bosw., 395; Wing v. N. Y. & Erie
R. R., 1 Hilt., 235.

S 1156. A common carrier is liable for delay, only when it is the effect of his ordinary negligence.

Wibert v. N. Y. & Erie R. R., 11 N. Y., 245; Conger v
Hudson River R. R., 6 Duer, 375.

$1157. A marine carrier is liable in like manner as an inland carrier, except for loss or injury caused by the perils of the sea or fire.

S1158. The liability of a common carrier by sea is further regulated by acts of congress.

9 U. S. Stat., 635.

S1159. Perils of the sea are from:

1. Storms and waves;

2. Rocks, shoals and rapids;

3. Other obstacles, though of human origin;

4. Changes of climate;

5. The confinement necessary at sea;

6. Animals peculiar to the sea; and,
7. All other dangers peculiar to the sea.
Seo Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cow., 267.

S 1160. A common carrier of gold, silver, platina, or precious stones, or of imitations thereof, in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, of timepieces of any description, of negotiable paper or other valuable writings, of pictures, glass or china

ware, is not liable for more than fifty dollars upon
the loss or injury of any one package of such arți-
cles, unless he has notice, upon his receipt thereof, by
mark upon the package or otherwise, of the nature
of the freight.

Modified from the English Carriers' Act of 1830. The
act of congress (March 3, 1851) does not include so
many articles.

S 1161. If a common carrier accepts freight for a place beyond his usual route, he must, unless he stipulates otherwise, deliver it at the end of his route in that direction to some other competent carrier, carrying to the place of address, or connected with those who thus carry, and his liability ceases upon making such delivery.

Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; see Goold v
Chapin, 20 N. Y., 259.

S1162. If freight, addressed to a place beyond the usual route of the common carrier who first received it, is lost or injured, he must, within a reasonable time after demand, give satisfactory proof to the consignor that the loss or injury did not occur while it was in his charge, or he will be himself liable therefor.

This clause is intended to save the consignor from the
risk of mistaken actions, by compelling the carrier to
give proof that another is liable, the fair presumption
being against him.

Delivery of freight beyond the

usual route.

Proof to be

given in case of loss.

services

S1163. In respect to any service rendered by a Carriers common carrier about freight, other than its carriage

and delivery, his rights and obligations are defined by the Titles on DEPOSIT and SERVICE.

other than and deliv

carriage

ery.

ARTICLE IV.

COMMON CARRIERS OF MESSAGES.

SECTION 1164. Order of transmission of telegraphic messages.

1165. Order in other cases.

1166. Damages when message is refused or postponed.

Order of transmis

S 1164. A carrier of messages by telegraph must, sion of tele- if it is practicable, transmit every such message

graphic

messages.

Order in

other cases.

Damages when mes sage is refused or postponed.

immediately upon its receipt. But if this is not practicable, and several messages accumulate upon his hands, he must transmit them in the following order:

1. Messages from public agents of the United States or of this State, on public business;

2. Messages intended in good faith for immediate publication in newspapers, and not for any secret use,

3. Messages giving information relating to the sickness or death of any person;

4. Other messages, in the order in which they were received.

S1165. A common carrier of messages, otherwise than by telegraph, must transmit messages in the order in which he receives them, except messages from agents of the United States or of this State, on public business, to which he must always give priority. But he may fix upon certain times for the simultaneous transmission of messages previously received.

S1166. Every person whose message is refused or postponed, contrary to the provisions of this chap ter, is entitled to recover from the carrier his actual damages, and fifty dollars in addition thereto.

New. Such a provision is needed to protect the rights of parties who are seriously annoyed by delays which nevertheless cannot be shown to have caused them pecuniary damage.

TITLE VIII.

TRUST.

CHAPTER I. Trusts in general.

II. Trusts for the benefit of third persons.

CHAPTER I.

TRUSTS IN GENERAL.

ARTICLE I. Nature and creation of a trust
II. Obligations of trustees.

III. Obligations of third persons.

ARTICLE I.

NATURE AND CREATION OF A TRUST.

SECTION 1167. Trusts classified.

1168. Voluntary trust, what.

1169. Involuntary trust, what.

1170. Parties to the contract.

1171. What constitutes one a trustee.

1172. For what purpose a trust may be created.

1173. Voluntary trust, how created as to trustor.

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S1168. A voluntary trust is an obligation arising Voluntary out of a personal confidence' reposed in, and volun

tarily accepted by one, for the benefit of another.2

A trust is defined by Story as an equitable title to pro-
perty (Eq. Jur., § 964). But this is a very narrow
definition. So far as his obligations are concerned,
a technical trustee stands upon the same footing

trust, what

involuntary trust, what.

Parties to the con

tract.

What constitutes one a trustee.

with a confidential agent or adviser, a guardian, &c., and there is little difference, so far as business relations are concerned, between his position and that of a husband, wife, parent, or attorney. The confidence reposed is the essence of the relation, and it will be found, by reference to the numerous cases cited in the course of this Title, that little or no distinction is made between trustees, strictly so called, and any other persons who accept the personal confidence of another.

"No one can be a trustee for himself. But a trust created for the joint benefit of several persons may be held by one of them (see ex parte Clutton, 17 Jur., 988). And a trust has been sustained for the benefit of a horse (Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L. J. [Ch.], 176).

$1169. An involuntary trust is one which is created by operation of law.

S 1170. The person whose confidence creates a trust, is called the trustor; the person in whom the confidence is reposed, is called the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust is created, is called the beneficiary.2

Lewin, Hill, and other writers, call the creator of the
trust the "settlor," a very objectionable word.
Trustor is an English word (see Webster's Diction-
ary, where it is spelled "truster"), and is entirely
applicable to the person who creates a trust.
This word is recommended by Story (Eq. Jur., § 321),
in place of cestui que trust.

S 1171. Every one who voluntarily assumes a relation of personal confidence with another is deemed a trustee within the meaning of this chapter,' not only as to the person who reposes such confidence, but also as to all persons of whose affairs he thus acquires information which was given to such person in the like confidence, or over whose affairs he, by such confidence, obtains any control.3

1 Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y., 343; Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N. Y., 236; Moore v. Moore, 5 N. Y., 256; Blisset

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