or approval, as it is of the Supreme Judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve."

With these authoritative words of Andrew Jackson I dismiss this topic. The early legislation of Congress, and the decisions of the Supreme Court cannot stand in our way. I advance to the argument.

(1.) Now, first, of the power of Congress over this subject. The Constitution contains powers granted to Congress, compacts between the States, and prohibitions addressed to the Nation and to the States. A compact or prohibition may be accompanied by a power; but not necessarily, for it is essentially distinct in its nature. And here the single question arises, Whether the Constitution, by grant, general or special, confers upon Congress any power to legislate on the subject of fugitives from labor.

The whole legislative power of Congress is derived from two sources; first, from the general grant of power, attached to the long catalogue of powers, "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for the carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof;" and secondly, from special grants in other parts of the Constitution. As the provision in question does not appear in the catalogue of powers, and does not purport to vest any power in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof, no power to legislate on this subject can be derived from the general grant. Nor can any such power be derived from any special grant in any other part of the Constitution; for none such exists. The conclusion must be, that no power is delegated to Congress over the surrender of fugitives from labor.

In all contemporary discussions and comments, the Constitution was constantly justified and recommended, on the ground that the powers not given to the Government were withheld from it. If under its original provisions any doubt

could have existed on this head, it was removed, so far as language could remove it, by the Tenth Amendment, which, as we have already seen, expressly declares, that "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." Here on the simple text of the Constitution I might leave this question. But its importance justifies a more extended examination in a two-fold light; first, in the history of the Convention, revealing the unmistakeable intention of its members; and secondly, in the true principles of our Political System, by which the powers of the Nation and of the States are respectively guarded.

Look first at the history of the Convention. The articles of the old Confederation, adopted by the Continental Congress, 15th of November, 1777, though containing no reference to fugitives from labor, had provisions substantially like those in our present Constitution, touching the privileges of citizens in the several States, the surrender of fugitives from justice, and the credit due to the public records of States. But, since the Confederation had no powers not "expressly delegated," and as no power was delegated to legislate on these matters, they were nothing more than articles of treaty or compact. Afterwards, at the National Convention, these three provisions found a place in the first reported draft of a Constitution, and they were arranged in the very order which they occupied in the Articles of Confederation. The clause relating to public

records stood last. Mark this fact.

When this clause, being in form merely a compact, came up for consideration in the Convention, various efforts were made to graft upon it a power. This was on the very day of the adoption of the clause relating to fugitives from labor. Charles Pinckney moved to commit it with a proposition for a power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy and foreign bills of exchange. Mr. Madison was in favor of a power for the execution of judgments in other States. Gouverneur Morris on the same day moved to commit a further proposition for a power "to determine the proof and effect of such acts, records, and proceedings." Amidst all these efforts to

associate a power with this compact, it is clear that nobody supposed that any such already existed. This narrative places the views of the Convention beyond question.

The compact regarding public records, together with these various propositions, was referred to a committee, on which were Mr. Randolph and Mr. Wilson, with John Rutledge, of South Carolina, as chairman. After several days, they reported the compact, with a power in Congress to prescribe by general laws the manner in which such records shall be proved. A discussion ensued, in which Mr. Randolph complained that the "definition of the powers of the Government was so loose as to give it opportunities of usurping all the State powers. He was for not going further than the report, which enables the Legislature to provide for the effect of judgments." The clause of compact with the power attached was then adopted, and is now a part of the Constitution. In presence of this solicitude for the preservation of "State powers," even while considering a proposition for an express power, and also of the distinct statement of Mr. Randolph, that he "was not for going further than the report," it is evident that the idea could not then have occurred, that a power was coupled with the naked clause of compact on fugitives from labor.

At a later day, the various clauses and articles severally adopted from time to time in Convention, were referred to a committee of revision and arrangement, that they might be reduced to form as a connected whole. Here another change was made. The clause relating to public records, with the power attached, was taken from its original place at the bottom of the clauses of compact, and promoted to stand first in the article, as a distinct section, while the other clauses of compact concerning citizens, fugitives from justice, and fugitives from labor, each and all without any power attached, by a natural association compose but a single section, thus:

"ARTICLE IV.

"SECTION 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

"SECTION 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

"A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

SECTION 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

"The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

"SECTION 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive, (when the Legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence."

Here is the whole article. It will be observed that the third section immediately following the triad section of compacts, contains two specific powers, one with regard to new States, and the other with regard to the Public Treasury. These are naturally grouped together, while the fourth section of this same article, which is distinct in its character, is placed by itself. In the absence of all specific information, reason alone can determine why this arrangement was made. But the conclusion is obvious, that, in the view of the Committee and of the Convention, each of these sections differs from the others. The first contains a compact with a grant of power. The second contains provisions, all of which are simple conpacts, and two of which were confessedly simple compacts in the old Articles of Confederation, from which, unchanged in letter or spirit, they were borrowed. The third is a two-fold grant of power to Congress, without any compact. The fourth is neither power nor compact merely, nor both united, but a solemn injunction upon the National Government to perform an important duty.

The framers of the Constitution were wise and careful men, who had a reason for what they did, and who understood the language which they employed. They did not, after discussion, incorporate into their work any superfluous provision; nor did they without design adopt the peculiar arrangement in which it appears. In adding to the record compact the express grant of power, they testified not only their desire for such power in Congress; but their conviction, that, without an express grant, it would not exist. But if an express grant was necessary in this case, it was equally necessary in all the other cases. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Especially, in view of its odious character, was it necessary in the case of fugitives from labor. In abstaining from any such grant, and then, in grouping the bare compact with other similar compacts, separate from every grant of power, they have most significantly testified their purpose. They not only decline all addition of any such power to the compact, but, to render misapprehension impossible, to make assurance doubly sure, to exclude any contrary conclusion, they punctiliously arrange the clauses, on the principle of noscitur a sociis, so as to distinguish all the grants of power, but especially to make the new grant of power, in the case of public records, stand forth in the front by itself, severed from the mere naked compacts with which it was originally associated.

Thus the records of the Convention show that the founders understood the necessity of powers in certain cases, and, on consideration, most jealously granted them. A closing example will strengthen the argument. Congress is expressly empowered "to establish an uniform rule of Naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies, throughout the United States." Without this provision these two subjects would have been within the control of the States, the Nation having no power to establish an uniform rule thereupon. Now, instead of the existing compact on fugitives from labor, it would have been easy, had any such desire prevailed, to add this case to the clause on Naturalization and Bankruptcies, and to empower Congress TO ESTABLISH AN UNiform rule for

THE SURRENDER OF FUGITIVES FROM LABOR THROUGHOUT THE