closed is a state and not a federal question and since the state courts treated the proceeding as properly raising issues of federal constitutional right, we have jurisdiction and all such issues are open here. We must, then, inquire whether the statute as applied in the trial denied appellant rights safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The evidence on which the judgment rests consists of appellant's admissions and certain documents found in his possession. The appellant told the state's officers that some time prior to his arrest he joined the Communist Party in Kentucky and later came to Atlanta as a paid organizer for the party, his duties being to call meetings, to educate and disseminate information respecting the party, to distribute literature, to secure members, and to work up an organization of the party in Atlanta; and that he had held or attended three meetings called by him. He made no further admission as to what he did as an organizer, or what he said or did at the meetings. When arrested he carried a box containing documents. After he was arrested he conducted the officers to his room where additional documents and bundles of newspapers and periodicals were found, which he stated were sent him from the headquarters of the Communist Party in New York. He gave the names of persons who were members of the organization in Atlanta, and stated he had only five or six actual members at the time of his apprehension. The stubs of membership books found in the box indicated he had enrolled more members than he stated. There was no evidence that he had distributed any of the material carried on his person and found in his room, or had taken any of it to meetings, save two circulars or appeals respecting county relief which are confessedly innocuous.

The newspapers, pamphlets, periodicals, and other documents found in his room were, so he stated, intended for distribution at his meetings. These the appellee concedes were not introduced in evidence. Certain documents in his possession when he was arrested were placed in evidence. They fall into five classes: first, receipt books showing receipts of small sums of money, pads containing certificates of contributions to the Communist Party's Presidential Election Campaign Fund, receipts for rent of a post office box, and Communist Party membership books; secondly, printed matter consisting of magazines, pamphlets, and copies of the "Daily Worker," styled the "Central Organ of the Communist Party," and the "Southern Worker," also, apparently, an official newspaper of the party; thirdly, two books, one "Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers," by George Padmore, and the other "Communism and Christianism Analyzed and Contrasted from the Marxian and Darwinian Points of View" by Rt. Rev. William Montgomery Brown, D.D.; fourthly, transcripts of minutes of meetings apparently held in Atlanta; fifthly, two circulars, one of which was prepared by the appellant and both of which had been circulated by him in Fulton County. All of these may be dismissed as irrelevant except those falling within the first and second groups. No inference can be drawn from the possession of the books mentioned, either that they embodied the doctrines of the Communist Party or that they represented views advocated by the appellant. The ninutes of meetings contain nothing indicating the purposes of the organization or any intent to overthrow organized government; on the contary, they indicate merely discussion of relief for the unemployed. The two circulars, admittedly distributed by the appellant, had nothing to do with the Communist Party, its aims or purposes, and were not appeals to join the party but were concerned with unemployment relief in the county and included appeals to the white and Negro unemployed to organize and represent the need for further County aid. They were characterized by the Supreme Court of Georgia as "more or less harmless."

The documents of the first class disclose the activity of the appellant as an organizer but, in this respect, add nothing to his admissions.

The matter appearing upon the membership blanks is innocent upon its face however foolish and pernicious the aims it suggests. Under the heading "What is the Communist Party?" this appears:

The Party is the vanguard of the working class and consists of the best, most class conscious, most active, the most courageous members of that class. It incorporates the whole body of experience of the proletarian struggle, basing itself upon the revolutionary theory of Marxism and representing the general and asting interests of the whole of the working class, the Party personifies the unity of proletarian principles, of proletarian will and of proletarian revolutionary

action.

"We are the Party of the working class. Consequently, nearly the whole of that class (in time of war and civil war, the whole of that class) should work under the guidance of our Party, should create the closest contacts with our Party."

This vague declaration falls short of an attempt to bring about insurrection either immediately or within a reasonable time but amounts merely to a statement of ultimate ideals. The blanks, however, indicate more specific aims for which members of the Communist Party are to vote. They are to vote Communist for

"1. Unemployment and Social Insurance at the employers.

"2. Against Hoover's wage-cutting policy.

expense of the State and

"3. Emergency relief for the poor farmers without restrictions by the Government and banks; exemption of poor farmers from taxes and from forced collection of rents or debts.

"4. Equal rights for the Negroes and self-determination for the Black Belt. "5. Against capitalistic terror: against all forms of suppresion of the political rights of the workers.

"6. Against imperialist war; for the defense of the Chinese people and of the Soviet Union."

None of these aims is criminal upon its face. As to one, the fourth, the claim is that criminality may be found because of extrinsic facts. Those facts consist of possession by appellant of booklets and other literature of the second class illustrating the party doctrines. The state contends these show that the purposes of the Communist Party were forcible subversion of the lawful authority of Georgia. They contain, inter alia, statements to the effect that the party bases itself upon the revolutionary theory of Marxism, opposes "bosses' wars," approves of the Soviet Union, and desires the "smashing" of the National Guard, the C.M.T.C., and the R.O.T.C.

A booklet entitled "The Communist Position on the Negro Question." on the cover of which appears a map of the United States having a dark belt across certain Southern states and the [251] phrase "Self-Determination for the Black Belt." *** affirms that the source of the Communist slogan "Right of Self-Determination of the Negroes in the Black Belt" is a resolution of the Communist International on the Negro question in the United States adopted in 1930, which states that the Communist Party in the United States has been actively attemping to win increasing sympathy among the negro population, that certain things have been advocated for the benefit of the Negroes in the Northern states, but that in the Southern portion of the United States the Communist slogan must be "The right of Self-Determination of the Negroes in the Black Belt." The resolution defines the meaning of the slogan as:

(a) Confiscation of the landed property of the white landowners and capitalists for the benefit of the negro farmers *** Without this revolutionary measure, without the agrarian revolution, the right of self-determination of the Negro population would be only a Utopia or, at best, would remain only on paper without changing in any way the actual enslavement. (b) Establishment of the State Unity of the Black Belt. * * * If the right of self-determination of the Negroes is to be put into force, it is necessary wherever possible to bring together into one governmental unit all districts of the South, where the majority of the settled population consists of negroes.

(c) Right of Self-Determining. This means complete and unlimited right of the negro majority to exercise governmental authority in the entire territory of the Black Belt, as well as to decide upon the relations between their territory and other nations, particularly the United States. First of all, true right of self-determination means that the negro majority and not the white minority in the entire territory of the administratively [252] united Black Belt exercises the right of administering governmental, legislative and judicial authority. At the present time all this power is concentrated in the hands of the white bourgeoisie and landlords. It is they who appoint all officials, it is they who dispose of public property, it is they who determine the taxes, it is they who govern and make the laws. There fore, the overthrow of this class rule in the Black Belt is unconditionally necessary in the struggle for the negroes' right to self-determination. This

imperialism in the Black Belt on which the forces of the local white bourgeoisie depend. Only in this way, ony if the negro population of the Black Belt wins its freedom from American imperialism even to the point of deciding itself the relations between its country and other governments, especially the United States, will it win real and complete self-determination. One should demand from the beginning that no armed forces of American imperialism should remain on the territory of the Black Belt. [Emphasis supplied.]

Further statements appearing in the pamphlet are:

Even if the situation does not yet warrant the raising of the question of uprising, one should not limit oneself at present to propaganda for the demand "Right to Self-Determination," but should organize mass actions, such as demonstrations, strikes, boycott movements, etc. [Emphasis supplied.]

One cannot deny that it is just possible for the negro population of the Black Belt to win the right to self-determination during capitalism; but it is perfectly clear and indubitable that this is possible only through successful revolutionary struggle for power against the American bourgeoisie, through wresting the negroes' right of self-determination from American imperialism. Thus, the slogan of right to self-determination is a real slogan of National Rebellion which, to be considered as such, need not be [253] supplemented by proclaiming struggle for the complete separation of the negro zone, at least not at present.

There is more of the same purport, particularly evidence to the "revolutionary trade unions in the South," "revolutionary struggle against the ruling white bourgeoisie,” and “revolutionary program of the Communist Party."

Mr. PEREZ. Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate the opportunity of appearing before your committee. I hope I have covered the subject. I would be glad to answer any questions which members of the committee may want to put to me.

(The complete statement of Mr. Perez follows:)

BRIEF TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON S. 1564 TO PRESCRIBE VOTER QUALIFICATIONS BY JUDGE L. H. PEREZ, REPRESENTING GOV. JOHN J. MCKEITHEN, OF LOUISIANA

The purpose of this statement, I submit, is to show the unconstitutionality of this piece of legislation and to point out its dangers to our American democratic system.

"At the time the Constitution was framed, it provided for only a limited franchise," according to University of Chicago Law Professor Philip Kurland, and all legal authorities.

The first paragraph of article I, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution, reads as follows:

"The States, in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to the election for Members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for Members of Congress in that State. It adopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for Members of Congress. It is not true, therefore, that electors for Members of Congress owe their right to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exercise of the right to depend exclusively on the law of the State. Ex parte Yarborough (Ga. 1884) 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 110 U.S. 663, 28 L. Ed. 274. See also, United States v. Mosley (Okla. 1915) 35 Sup. Ct. 904, 238 U.S. 383, 59 L. Ed. 1355; Felix v. United States (C.C.A. La. 1911) 186 F. 685."

This article has universally been interpreted to mean that the subject of Foter qualifications is left entirely up to the States. The only limitation is that there shall be no discrimination because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

The 17th amendment to the Constitution repeats the language of article I, section 2, and reads:

"The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors in the most numerous branch of the State legislature."

This language of the Constitution was clearly interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 663, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884), as follows:

"The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to the election for Members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for Members of Congress in that State. It adopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for Members of Congress." The Court went on to say that the 15th amendment substantially confers upon the Negro the right to vote.

In Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 Sup. Ct. 573, 48 L. Ed. 817, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

"The simple matter to be herein determined is whether, with reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in Maryland, the legislature of that State had the legal right to provide that a person coming into the State to reside should make the declaration of intent a year before he should have the right to be registered as a voter of the State. The privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 22 L. Ed. 627. It may not be refused on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals, in violation of the Federal Constitution." [Em phasis added.]

The Court went on to say "the right of a State to legislate upon a subject of the elective franchise as to it may seem good, subject to the conditions already stated, we believe, unassailable."

In Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 88 L. Ed. 497 (1943), the Court said "the right to become a candidate for State office, like the right to vote for election for State officers, is a right or privilege of State citizenship, not of national citizenship *

More recently in the case of Lassiter v. North Hampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1072, 79 Sup. Ct. 985 (June 8, 1959), Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, said:

"We come then to the question whether a State may consistently with the 14th and 17th amendments apply a literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or color. The Court in Guinn v. United States, supra (238 U.S. at 366), disposed of the question in a few words, 'No time need be spent on the question of the validity of the literacy test considered alone since as we have seen its establishment was but the exercise by the State of a lawful power vested in it not subject to our supervision, and indeed, its validity is admitted.'

"The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633, 48 L Ed. 817, 822, 24 Sup. Ct. 573; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335, 45 L. Ed. 214, 220, 21 Sup. Ct. 125, absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns. Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution in its provision for the election of Members of the House of Representatives and the 17th amendment in its provision for the election of Senators provide that officials will be chosen 'by the people.' Each provision goes on to state that 'the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.' So while the right of suffrage is es tablished and guaranteed by the Constitution (Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 663-665, 28 L. Ed. 274, 278, 279, 4 Sup. Ct. 152; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661, 662, 88 L. Ed. 987, 995, 996, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 151 A.L.R. 1110) it is subject to the imposition of State standards which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299. 315, 85 L. Ed. 1368. 1377, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031. While section 2 of the 14th amendment, which provides for apportionment of Representatives among the States

each State (except Indians not taxed), speaks of 'the right to vote,' the right protected 'refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State.' McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39, 36 L. Ed. 869, 878, 13 Sup Ct.

3.

"We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record (Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345-347, 33 L. Ed. 637, 641, 642, 10 Sup. Ct. 299) are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards of the ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show. Literacy and intelligence are obviously not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in our society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise. Cf. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E. 2d 221, app. dismd. 339 U.S. 946, 94 L. Ed. 1361, 70 Sup. Ct. 904. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an 'independent and intelligent' exercise of the right of suffrage. Stone V. Smith, 159 Mass. 413, 414, 34 N.E. 521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, however, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional standards."

The Court concluded:

"Certainly we cannot condemn it on its face as a device unrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot."

The 10th amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

Section 1 of the 24th amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:

"The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."

According to Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, "this bill applies to every kind of election, Federal, State, and local, including primaries." The formula used is calculated to attack the States of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, and 34 counties in North Carolina. An article in Time magazine, volume 85, number 13, March 26, 1965, page 23, mentions that the formula catches "innocent fish," one county in Maine, one county in Idaho, one county in Arizona, and the State of Alaska. According to that article, Mr. Katzenbach stated "as far as I know, it may have snowed in Maine on election day, and that is why they had a low turnout." These counties and Alaska would be immediately excluded, thereby placing the full force and effect of this vindictive legislation against seven Southern States. It is not by coincidence that these States registered a large vote against the President of the United States. Time magazine, in the above article, states that it is "by no coincidence that the formula is calculated to attack" these seven Southern States.

Whenever the word registration is used in any decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, it always refers to "qualified applicants for registration." This bill is designed to place unqualified applicants on the registration rolls of the mentioned States. This, according to the bill, will be accomplished by the removal of any teracy test and the replacement of local registrars with Federal registrars, solely at the discretion of the Attorney General. The purpose and effect of this Fill is to water down the value of the qualified registrant or qualified voter in hese States. The value of the qualified voter in these States will not be equal to the value of the qualified voters in other States or in the individual States. If one unqualified voter is placed on the roll for every qualified voter, then the qualified voter has one-half of a vote.

In Reynolds v. Sims, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, decided June 15, 1964, the Court said it has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote." Again, the Court said "the concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution, visualizes no preferred class of voters but, equality