banks of La Plata and in North America, where the old and sound policy of France had been sacrificed without any compensation; at Tahiti, where a queen of savages refused to receive the letter of the King of the French, and where two brave admirals were gravely debating the amount of an indemnity to be awarded to a man who had excited an insurrection against the French?

M. Duvergier, in conclusion, maintained that the policy of Ministers had been as unavailable and undignified in Spain, Africa, Mexico, Rome, and other places, and ended by saying that he would vote against the address.

M. Gasparin, who followed, said that he was not ashamed to declare himself a decided partisan of the policy pursued both at home and abroad by the Cabinet. The foreign results achieved by it were, in his opinion, its greatest title to glory, and notwithstanding the attempts of the Opposition to revive the questions of the right of search, Tahiti, &c., he maintained that those questions no longer excited any interest either in the Chamber or in the country, and that the nation was now fully aware that the cause of civilization would only prosper by peace, and that the alliance with England was its strongest bulwark. M. Gasparin admitted that corruption existed to a frightful extent; but the evil had not originated with the present Administration, which had merely followed the footsteps of its predecessors. Deputies were the actual distributors of all the favours and offices of State, and too often imposed their wishes upon Ministers. For his part, he had come to the resolution of soliciting no favours from them. He

might not be re-elected, but if he again entered that House it would be to defend the general interests of the country, and advocate doctrines and principles which no consideration should induce him to sacrifice. He then entreated his colleagues to manifest the same self-denial, and the Ministers to imitate Sir Robert Peel, who had transformed the Conservatives into quasi revolutionists.

In the course of the debate M. Ledru Rollin made a long speech, in which he attached M. Thiers, who rose the next day and spoke as follows:

"I do not rise to reply to M. Ledru Rollin, but to speak of far more important subjects than these wretched personal discussions. It is, however, incumbent on me to say a few words on the long diatribe which you heard yesterday. To hear the words of that hon. deputy, one would suppose that I was not seated on these benches, but on the Ministerial one. I might contest to a certain point the right of any one to demand explanations from me, now that I am no longer Minister, but I shall not refuse to any man the right of free discussion. Let me utter a few words on my opinions, and the political position that I occupy in the country. From the period-now tolerably remote-that I consecrated myself to the service of my country, I have never ceased to be the partisan of the constitutional monarchy, but that monarchy is not practised as, in my opinion, it ought to be. It ought to resemble, I think, more in France what it is in England. When I perceived that it departed from that model, I entered the ranks of the Opposition. But, notwithstanding this dissent, I have always remained firm in my

are aware that Texas is of great importance to the United States, and that its possession was anxiously desired by that Power; I will add, that never had an annexation been made in a more regular manner; for more than ten years Texas has been separated from Mexico, and all the Powers, including France, had recognised it. Texas considered it for its interest to become a part of a great and powerful state, it consented to its annexation, and that is now an irrevocable fact. Nevertheless, it is under these circumstances that our Cabinet has considered it its duty to oppose itself to this measure. If it be true, as stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that success should be the law of Governments, there has been a fault in this affair, for it has failed, and has caused interruption in our relations with the United States. But what good reason could have excited the opposition of the Cabinet to the annexation? Did our commercial interests demand it? It has, I know, been said that we had an interest in drawing our supply of cotton from Texas; but in the first place that state did not furnish a large quantity, and moreover it was our interest that that locality should be placed under the patronage of a powerful nation rather than abandoned to the influence of England. Permit me on this occasion to cast a rapid glance over the astonishing increase of the United States. Scarcely

fifty years ago they occupied the banks of the Mississippi, and now they touch Mexico on the side of Texas and Canada by the Oregon; they had then 3,000,000 of inhabitants, now they reckon 13 states, with 28,000,000. I can readily imagine that this extraordinary and unheard-of prosperity should give umbrage to England, but for my part, although a declared partisan of English alliance, I cannot for the sake of my country be at all uneasy at the development of the power of the United States. It has been objected that the annexation of Texas to the United States disturbed the balance of power in America; it is, I must confess, the first time I ever heard this equilibrium spoken of. I can fully comprehend a balance of power in Europe, which is nothing but the independence of all the states composing it; and whenever this equilibrium has been disturbed, it has been proper to seek to re-establish it; but I will ask, what have we to do with America in that respect? The hon. deputy, M. Guizot, is afraid that the Spanish race will be annihilated by the Anglo-American one. Oh! when that time comes, when the United States shall have, like England, 100 ships of the line and 200 frigates, when they shall no longer profess the principle that the flag covers the merchandize, then the European equilibrium may go to the assistance of that of America. If we still possessed Canada and Louisiana, I can imagine that the development of the power of the United States might give us uneasiness; I can imagine that it disturbs the English, who possess a part of the American continent; but, as we have given up Louisiana, the question no longer in any way

concerns us.

On the contrary, I see in the increase of the power of the United States what I must be permitted to call another step towards our political freedom. Since French policy represents in this world revolution, we have lost much of our freedom of action. Formerly there existed amongst the various European states opposing interests, rancorous jealousies, and in the midst of these passions France was perfectly free. But, the day that France became the representative of liberty in the world, on that day there was formed round her, amongst all the states of Europe, a concerted union, rather tacit than written down-a general concert, in fact, which impeded, and still impedes, our freedom of action. I am not one of those who perceive war at the bottom of this concert. No; but I maintain that there is amongst these European Powers, and against France, a tacit accord which constrains us-which is injurious to us. You lately had a proof of this. When events took place in Servia which appeared likely to insure to Russia too exclusive a domination, France endeavoured to excite the jealousy of Austria; but she was not listened to.

Certain words, pronounced by a man of great sagacity, perfectly well explain this indifference. 'What has occurred,' said this gentleman, is an evil; but between two evils the lesser one ought to be chosen. Well, then, what has taken place in Servia is a smaller evil than the disunion of the continent in presence of France.' In this situation they determined to draw closer to England, who from the nature of her Government was, after 1830, naturally inclined to form an alliance

with us; but in proportion as the two countries became more intimately connected we found her to be jealous of our navy, which has certainly met with great checks, but which fortunately can again recover its former position. This jealousy was the cause of much constraint to us, and exercised a disastrous effect on our policy. Two facts may remove this constraint: one the development of liberty in Europe; for whenever the spectacle which we behold passing before our eyes at Paris and London, shall be witnessed in any other capital of Europe, all our liberty of action will be restored to us, the Powers of Europe then having a sympathetic feeling towards us. The second cause which may lead to the emancipation of our policy is the augmentation of the power of the United States. The proof of the truth of this assertion is, that if, during the last two years, England has been yielding in her relations with us, we owe it to the uneasiness with which the power of America inspires her. What, then, was the motive of the conduct of the French Cabinet in the affair of Texas? I have no hesitation in declaring that this conduct was adopted to redeem the faults committed by our Cabinet during the last five years. The Cabinet, on taking the reins of power, found France and England on bad terms, from the events of 1840; France was irritated, although England was not. She could not be actuated by any other feeling than a sentiment of having done wrong, and the French Cabinet had only one line of conduct to adopt to do nothing-to wait.

The principle of the union between France and England is the maintenance of peace and the

European status quo. But for the faults committed at Tahiti and the question of the right of search, we should have been perfectly in accord with England on the affairs of Syria and of Greece, and the question of Morocco would have presented no difficulty for right was on our side, and victory in our favour. In the question of Texas we might have said to England, 'You cannot require that, in order to preserve a balance of power in America, we should renounce our oldest alliance and our friendly relations with the United States.' But the faults committed on the two questions I have mentioned have weighed in all our relations with England. After madly establishing ourselves at the Marquesas, where we could not subsist, we went to Tahiti, where the most dangerous adversary was foundthe spirit of intrigue united to religious fanaticism; hence the Pritchard indemnity, and all the concessions in the affairs of Syria, of Greece, and of Texas. This is so true, that the opinion in England as in France is, that each of the two countries has made concessions. I have said, and I repeat it, that, independently of the faults committed at Tahiti, if France has not observed diplomatic neutrality in the affairs of Texas, she has been forced to act by the necessity of not giving offence to England. The conduct of France in the affair of Texas has been the purchase-money paid for the right of search. Yes, in the relations with America you have been obliged to depart from the circumspection of sensible men. And why? To redeem your faults you have committed a fault both with a view to peace and to war. War, perhaps, will not break out. I hope it, for

I do not any longer demand grand positions; I content myself with moderate ones. For America the affair is one of true material interest; for England, one of dignity. At the outset France might hope to play the part of a useful intermediary; but the Ministry has broken the national relations which existed between America and France, and this part is taken from our country by the fault of the Cabinet. After the words of President Polk, it is impossible that France can offer herself to conciliate the difference. I shall say no more. I desire that what I have said may he heard in America; I fear not its being so in England: for what most concerns me is that every thing should be truly and clearly understood between three such great countries as England, France, and the United States."

This speech was on the following day answered by

M. Guizot, who said that M. Thiers had appealed to the impressions and instincts of the Chamber; he would appeal to its calm and reflecting judgment, and he hoped to convince it that the advice he had given the Crown, and the line of policy he had pursued, were the most conducive to the interests of the country. On the invitation of the Texan Government and of its Minister at Paris, he had advised Texas to maintain her independence, and Mexico to recognise it. He had always proclaimed that the Texans were free to adopt whatever course they pleased, and that, when once they should have pronounced, France had nothing to say. This had been the case; when the annexation was agreed to by the Texan people France entered into no pro