compelled us daily to fight at disadvantage for forage for our cattle. The most remarkable of these affairs were those of the cavalry under Lieutenant Mayne, commanding a detachment of Shah Shooja's 2nd cavalry, and Jemadar Deena Singh, 5th Light Cavalry, already reported; a sally under Colonel Dennie, C.B., to defeat a suspected attempt of the enemy to drive a mind, on the 11th March; the repulse of an assault upon the transverse walls to the northward of the place, on the 24th of the same month, by detachments under Captain Broadfoot (who was severely wounded) and Captain Fenwick, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry; the capture of bullocks and sheep by Lieutenant Mayne on the 30th and 31st of January; and the seizure of large flocks of the latter, in the face of Mahomed Akbar's army, by a force of infantry under Captain Pattison, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and and of cavalry under Captain Oldfield, on the 1st instant. These successes were crowned by Providence by the issue of the brilliant and decisive attack on the camp of the Sirdar, on the 7th instant.

I have to notice, as a measure of defence, my having enrolled as a provisional battalion a large body of our camp followers, and armed them with pikes and other wea pons. On all occasions of assault and sally, these men were available to make a show upon our curtains, and I have pledged my self to them to reccommend to Government that they should enjoy all the pecuniary advantages of the native soldiers beyond the Indus. I at the same time held forth to the troops of Shah Shooja's force, the expectation that they would be put, during the especial

service, on the same footing with their comrades of the Bengal army.

From the time that the Brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops have been on half, and the followers on quarter, rations, and for many weeks they have been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars to eke out this scanty provision. I will not mention, as a privation, the European troops from the same period having been without their allowance of spirits, because I verily believe this circumstance and their constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline. Crime has been almost unknown amongst them, but they have felt severely, although they have never murmured, the diminution of their quantity of animal food, and the total want of ghee, flour, tea, coffee and sugar; these may seem small matters to those who read them at a distance, but they are serious reductions in the scale of comfort of the hard-working and fighting soldier in Asia. The troops have also been greatly in arrears of pay, besides their severe duties in heat and cold, wind and rain, on the guards of the gates and bastions. The troops, officers and men, British and Hindoo stanee, of every Arm, remained fully accoutred on their alarmposts every night from the 1st of March to the 7th of April. The losses of officers and men, in carriage and cattle, camp equipage and baggage, between Cabul and Jellalabad, were heavy; and their expenditure, during the siege and blockade, in obtaining articles of mere subsistence and necessity, has been exorbitant.

I feel assured that Major-Ge

neral Pollock will consider it a most pleasing duty, to bring the series of labours, privations and conflicts, imperfectly sketched in the foregoing details, to the notice of the head of the Supreme Government in India, and through his Lordship to that of the Court of Directors and of our Sovereign, as a claim for public acknowledgment and substantial reimbursement and reward.

:

The report of Captain Broadfoot, in his capacity of Garrison Engineer, will meet with attentive perusal I have already stated how much I have been indebted to his scientific attainments, as well as his distinguished activity and resolution during the siege. His fertility in resource obviated great difficulties, in procuring iron, timber, and charcoal; and to the foresight of his arrangements we owe our having had a very ample supply of tools. The corps under his command performed, from Bootkhak, the duties equally of good sappers and bold light infantry soldiers, and the Affghan Huzaree and Eusifyze portion of it have been singularly faithful in time of general defection. The two Infantry Regiments, under the lamented Colonel Dennie, and LieutenantColonel Monteath, have vied with each other in the steady performance of the duties of that Arm; and it would be impossible for me to discriminate in favour of either, in awarding praise to the squadron of 5th Light Cavalry under Captain Oldfield, and the Rissalah 2nd Shah Soojah's Cavalry, under Lieutenant Mayne; Lieutenant Plowden, of the former, has been distinguished on several occasions. The artillery practice of No. 6, Light Field Battery has ever been

excellent, and has been equalled by that of the Mountain Train. Captains Abbott and Backhouse, and Lieutenant Dawes, have proved themselves excellent officers of Ordnance. I have more than once brought it to notice that Captain Macgregor, Political Agent, has cheerfully rendered very able assistance in serving the guns in every crisis of pressing danger. Of his labours in his own department, I ought not, perhaps to attempt to constitute myself a judge; but I know that they have been unremitting; and their result in obtaining for my force supplies and information, and keeping up our communication with India and with Cabul, and securing for us Affghan co-operation, I may be allowed to appreciate, and am bound to point out to Government.

The medical duties of the garrison have been ably fulfilled by Surgeon Forsyth, Superintending Surgeon Shah Shooja's force, and Assistant-Surgeons Robertson and Barnes, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, Hare, 35th Regiment and Brown, late in charge of the Irregulars.

Captain Mainwaring, Commissariat Officer to the force, has been indefatigable in his efforts to keep the garrison well supplied, and his arrangements in very difficult times have merited my highest praise. Captain Moorhouse, 35th Regiment Native Infantry, has satisfactorily discharged his duties as Brigade Quarter Master; he was severely wounded on the 7th instant.

It is gratifying to me to forward the opinion of my second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Monteath, C.B., placed on record without solicitation, of the merits of

the safety of my troops, it would be consonant with the views and wishes of Government that I should do so.

I had a considerable body of troops; and, with much pains, had collected a reserve of upwards of six months' provisions. I felt assured of support, and of the receipt of the ammunition and stores I stood in need of, from Sinde or India; I knew that Jellalabad was in our possession, and that it was the resolution of Government to maintain it; that large reinforcements were preparing for its support; I could not over-estimate the value of this powerful diversion in my favour, nor could I shut my eyes to the fact, that the abandonment of Candahar by me, must have an unfavourable effect upon the measures in progress for the retention of our position at Jellalabad. Under these circumstances, I never had a moment's hesitation as to the course I ought to pursue, so long as discretionary power was left to me; and all my arrangements have, consequently, been made with a view to the present maintenance and future extension, should such prove desirable, of our power in this country.

But, could I have foreseen that so immediately following their proclamation of the 31st of January, Government would have determined on withdrawing their troops from Jellalabad, excepting on the occurrence of "unforeseen circumstances," I should most probably have regarded this resolution of theirs, as distinctly pointing to their intention of evacuating the country altogether, and have taken measures accordingly.

Now, however, the position of the troops at Candahar is so far fixed, that I consider retirement

would not only be disadvantageous, but almost impracticable, until the autumn; and I trust that my having determined on remaining may ultimately prove fortunate; but the state of uncertainty into which I am now thrown, regarding our present position at Jellalabad, and the probable future policy of Government, must preclude my acting with full confidence in measures calculated to restore British influence in the country, by force of arms. I am also become doubtful of the propriety of retaining Kelat-i-Ghilzye as a separate garrison; for there is but too much reason to fear, that the sacrifice of the garrison at Ghuznee must closely follow on the abandonment of our position at Jellalabad.

As long as both the positions of Candahar and Jellalabad are occupied by us, the attention of the insurgents in Affghanistan is distracted. No general or combined movement can be made by the Affghans while they are threatened from both these points; but if one source of apprehension be removed by the withdrawal of our troops from Jellalabad, the undivided force of the people, backed by success, and inflamed by religious enthusiasm, will be at liberty to concentrate its energy against our position at Candahar.

I believe that many people have been prevented from joining the rebel chiefs, now in arms against us near Candahar, from a feeling that we meditate the re-occupation of Cabul from the side of Jellalabad, an impression that has been confirmed by the non-arrival of succour from Cabul, since the deputation of Atta Mahomed, on the first outbreak of the insurrection in that city. While we maintain an imposing attitude at Jellalabad,

even supposing no advance takes place beyond that post, it is my opinion that but few troops and no artillery will be sent from Cabul in aid of the rebel cause at Candahar; but if Jellalabad be abandoned, I not only look forward to having to contend with a force from Cabul, much better equipped than is ordinarily the case with Affghan troops, but I anticipate a general movement against us from every part of the country.

If Government intend to recover, even temporarily, and for the saving of our national honour, their lost position in this country, even if doubtful of the policy that it may be deemed expedient to pursue, I earnestly hope that, before any immediate retrograde step is made in either direction, our whole position in Affghanistan will be attentively viewed; and that the effect which a hasty retirement would certainly and instantly have on the whole of Beloochistan, and even on the navigation of the Indus, will be taken into consideration. At the present time, the impression of our military strength among the people of this country, though weakened by the occurrences at Cabul, is not destroyed; but if we now retire, and it should again become necessary to advance, we shall labour under many disadvantages, the most serious of which, in my opinion, will be a distrust of their strength among our soldiers, which any admission of weakness is so well calculated to induce; and in what

other light could a withdrawal from Jellalabad or Candahar be viewed?

If retirement should become necessary, it should take place simultaneously, and at a proper season. If Government should select Candahar as the point whence future operations against Cabul are to be directed, still the retention of a position at Jellalabad in considerable force, will be of the most essential service in all future contemplated operations. In the sanguine hope that some unforeseen circumstance may have occurred to postpone the execution of the Government order for the evacuation of Jellalabad, I have thought it incumbent on me to address this letter to you.

Before closing my letter, I may mention that I am now in expectation of the march of Brigadier England from Quetta, with supplies for Candahar. I have no correct information regarding the probable date of his quitting that post, nor of the strength of his force; but there is room for apprehension that the convoy he has to escort will be but weakly guarded, and every probability that it may be attacked. I am at present, therefore, compelled to remain at Candahar, prepared to move with a sufficient body of troops to the Brigadier's support, whenever I may receive certain intelligence of his movements.

I have, &c.

W. NOTT.

ship's letter of the 4th instant; having looked at the difficulties in every point of view, and reflected