deem it necessary to move any troops actually to Cabul, where your force will be amply sufficient to beat anything the Affghans can oppose to it. The operations, however, of the two armies, must be combined, upon their approach, so as to effect, with the least possible loss, the occupation of Cabul, and keep open the communications between Cabul and Peshawur.

One apprehension upon my mind is, that in the event of your de ciding upon moving on Jellalabad by Ghuznee and Cabul, the ac

cumulation of so great a force as that of your army, combined with Major-General Pollock's, in the narrow valley of the Cabul river, may produce material difficulties in the matter of provisions and forage; but every effort will be made from India to diminish that difficulty, should you adopt that line of retirement.

This letter remains absolutely

secret.

I have, &c.,

ELLENBOROUGH.

have, in the most emphatic manner, repeated the order before given for that withdrawal.

Some risk I deem it justifiable to incur for the recovery of the guns and of the prisoners, and with the view of exhibiting the triumphant march of a British army over the ground on which it once suffered defeat; but I consider the preservaessential to the preservation of our tion of the army in Affghanistan empire in India; and, however the

world might forgive or applaud me, I should never forgive myself, if I exposed that army to any material and serious danger, for the pos sible accomplishment of any object now to be obtained in Affghanistan.

My hope and expectations are that, without incurring such danger, I shall effect, through the instructions I have given, every object now desired by the people of England.

I have, &c.

ELLENBOROUGH.

Allahabad, July 23, 1842. General,-I am in hopes that Major-General Nott, will to-day be in possession of my letter of the 4th instant, and that you will, very soon after you receive this letter, be made acquainted with the Major-General's intentions.

My expectation is, that MajorGeneral Nott will feel himself sufficiently strong, and be sufficiently provided with carriage, to march upon Ghuznee and Cabul.

I have taken the precaution of instructing Major Outram to send up to Candahar every disposable camel, and all the treasure at Quetta, about five or six lacs; and I have likewise instructed Major Leech, who may have reached Quetta, to return to Candahar. Major Leech's local knowledge will be of much use to Major-General Nott, if he should advance on Ghuznee and Cabul.

Major-General Nott, looking forward to the difficulties of the march, and the uncertain time it may occupy, and necessarily impressed with a deep sense of the importance of terminating the whole combined operations, and bringing off the two armies into the plains before the commencement of severe weather, will hasten his preparations for leaving Candahar, and I anticipate his being able to do so by the 15th of August.

I do not apprehend that between Candahar and Ghuznee any obstacles will be offered to his march, by an enemy disheartened by repeated discomfiture, and completely taken by surprise; and I look forward to the army from Canda har being to the north of Ghuznee by the 10th of September.

I have used every exertion in my power to complete the equipment of your army with carriage. From fifteen to twenty lacs of treasure will be forwarded to you, in addition to the ten already transmitted; and the Commissariat has been directed to provide the means of carriage for provisions for 7,500 men beyond the amount of your present force, such carriage being equal to the transport of fourteen days' supply.

I am assured by Mr. Clerk, that the requisite carriage will be furnished by the time fixed-that was, originally, the 1st of October; and since, the 21st of September.

I am hardly sanguine enough to think that all I have directed to be done, will be done by that earlier day; but I certainly entertain the expectation that, leaving, as you probably will, the 2nd regiment of Native Infantry, and 200 Irregular Cavalry, in the Khyber Pass, to occupy that position, and leaving likewise a garrison in Jellalabad, you will possess sufficient carriage to move the remainder of your army in advance, to support the march of Major-General Nott upon Cabul.

Mahomed Akbar Khan will probably retire from Cabul, on the appearance of the combined army.

The expectations of its advance will revive and invigorate the factions opposed to that chief; and it is not altogether improbable, that the result may be his overthrow, and the nominal establishment of a royal government, in the person of some other chief, or of the Prince Futteh Jung.

You are already authorized to treat with a de facto government

for the exchange of prisoners; but you will avoid doing any act from which it might be inferred that the British Government recognized any authority which may be established in Cabul.

You will distinctly declare that you are not authorized to make any such recognition, and you will refer the matter to me.

The object of the combined march of your army, and MajorGeneral Nott's upon Cabul, will be to exhibit our strength where we suffered defeat; to inflict just, but not vindictive, retribution upon the Affghans; and to recover the guns and colours, as well as the prisoners, lost by our army.

The first of these objects is evidently attainable; but I cannot but entertain much doubt whether even the presence of two victorious armies at Cabul will effect the recovery of the prisoners.

The difficulty of recovering the prisoners arises from the circumstance of there being no strong established government in Cabul, which would have at once the will, and the power, to coerce individual chiefs, and to compel them to surrender the prisoners they may respectively have in their possession, for the purpose of relieving the country from the presence of a foreign army.

Our coercion of the government of Algiers in 1816 led to the restoration of slaves, the private property of individuals; but the government of Algiers was strong, and had power to compel such restitution. The apprehension of the consequences which might result from further refusal to surrender the Russian slaves, led the government of Khiva, in the last year, to compel individuals to give up their property; but the govern◄

ment of Khiva, too, was strong, and had the power to enforce obedience to its will.

There is no such government, and there is no present prospect of the establishment of any such government, at Cabul; and, most unfortunately, the early and frequent mention of ransom has led those who hold our prisoners in their power, to consider them as a valuable property.

The pressure of war may undoubtedly become so severe as to induce a somewhat general desire amongst the Affghans to terminate hostilities with us, by the surrender of all they have taken from us, and this general desire may practically compel the restitution of the prisoners; but I look to this event, as one rather to be desired than expected.

There is one other event, too, rather to be desired than expected, perhaps, but which must be deemed of not impossible occurrence, -the surrender of Mahomed Akbar Khan into your hands by the faction hostile to him.

To the possession of that chief's person, I attach very great importance. You are already authorized to give an assurance, that his life shall be spared; but you will not make any other condition, nor make that lightly. I earnestly desire that that chief, the avowed murderer of Sir William Macnaghten, and the betrayer of a British army, should come into our power without any condition what

soever.

Should Mahomed Akbar retain his authority after your advance upon Cabul, he will endeavour to protract any negotiation, in which he will involve you, so as to detain you at Cabul until the severe season shall return, when he will

expect to obtain over you the same success which he obtained over our army last year, through the same means of cold and famine.

You will, therefore, not delay any operation whatever, which military considerations would suggest to you, in consequence of any pending negotiation. You will, as long as the season permits you to remain with perfect security, rely upon your own force, and upon that alone, for the effecting of your objects, and exert that force vigorously, giving every proof of British power, which is not inconsistent with the usages of war, and the dictates of British humanity; but you will never forget that, after so exhibiting that power, you are, without allowing yourself to be diverted therefrom by any object, to obey the positive orders

of your government to withdraw your army from Affghanistan.

It will be your highest praise, after having re-established the opinion of the invincibility of the British arms upon the scene of their late misfortunes, to restore its armies to India in a perfectly efficient state, at a period, when I assure you that their presence in India is most desirable.

I trust that the last man of the two armies will have repassed the Sutlej by the 1st of January, and that I may then have the satisfaction of offering to you my personal congratulations upon your having successfully accomplished every object you have been directed to effect, and realized every reasonable wish of your country. I have, &c., ELLENBOROUGH.

Simla, September 21, 1842.

The Governor-General has this day received the reports of three victories obtained on the 30th of August, by Major-General Nott, over 12,000 Affghans thirty-eight miles south-west of Ghuznee; on the 8th of September, by MajorGeneral Pollock, over the troops of Mahomed Akbar Khan, and the Ghilzye chiefs at Jugdulluck; and on the 16th of June by the expedition on the coast of China, within the mouth of the River Yang-tse-Kiang, at the City of Woosung.

In this last operation and those immediately succeeding it, ViceAdmiral Sir W. Parker and Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough took 364 guns from the Chinese.

On the 3rd of September, Major

General Nott had advanced to Nanee, within a short march of Ghuznee.

On the 9th of September, MajorGeneral Pollock had advanced to Kutta Sung, and had experienced no opposition.

Formed as the troops under Major General Nott have mostly been, by four years of constant service, and habituated as they have been to victory under their able commander, the Governor-General had anticipated their success against any force which could be brought against them. It is to the Governor-General a subject of sincere satisfaction, that the events of this campaign should have opened a more extensive field to that brave army on which it may make manifest to the world the high qualities

which he has long known it to possess.

Major-General Pollock has, through the prudence of his arrangements, and the correctness of the movements directed by him, had the gratification of affording to his troops the opportunity of proving their superiority to the Affghans, on the very scene of the last disaster on the retreat from Cabul; and Major-General Sir R. Sale, at the head of the garrison of Jellalabad, worthily supported by the reinforcements from India, has had the glory of leading the army on its triumphant return to the capital of Affghanistan.

The Governor-General regards

with the highest admiration the noble ardour which has, in these several operations, been manifested equally by the officers and soldiers of both nations and of all arms. He sees in the successes already obtained the certain promise of other more decisive victories, calculated to impress upon all the enemies of the British Government a conviction of the futility of resistance to the forces under his direction, and tending, under the continued favour of Providence, to effect the first object of his desire, the restoration of peace to Asia.

By order, &c.,

J. H. MADDOCK.

Camp, Bootkhak, October 12, 1841. Sir, I have the honour to state to you, for the information of Major-General Elphinstone, C.B., that the task of forcing the pass of Khoord Cabul, and defeating the rebels posted within it, has, this morning, been accomplished.

After fully weighing the whole of the information brought to me at various periods in the course of yesterday, I came to the conclusion that the main body of the insurgents was posted behind a breastwork near the middle of the pass, and that they would defend it, as well as the almost inaccessibile heights on either flank of it.

My plan of attack was therefore arranged as follows. I determined to employ 200 Jezzailchees, under the well known Sirdar Jan Fishan

Khan, to create a diversion by assaulting, in flank and rear, the precipitous ridge which forms the southern side of the Durra, whilst the troops under my command entered its gorge, and attacked the enemy in front. The force left camp at 6 A. M. The advanced guard consisted of the two guns of Foot Artillery, under Lieutenant Dawes, two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, under Captain Fenwick and Lieutenant Geo. King, the flank companies of the 35th Native Infantry under Captain Younghusband, and a detachment of pioneers under Captain Broadfoot, the whole being in charge of Captain Seaton, 35th regiment of Native Infantry. The remainder of the 13th and 35th formed our main body. As we