according to the orders of the Envoy, under charge of Lieutenant Crawford, to Cabul, that officer having my written instructions to destroy his prisoners in the event of an attempt at rescue. The Hazareh and Belooch tribes had been effectually conciliated; the Dooranees of the northern and western districts had been humbled and overawed. On the 7th of November, Colonel McLaren's brigade marched for India; and upon the same evening we heard of the disaster which had befallen Captain Woodburn and his detachment, between Ghuznee and Cabul. I immediately applied to Major-General Nott to halt the Brigade. Upon the 14th, letters from the Envoy and Major-General Elphinstone arrived, announcing the Cabul insurrection, and calling on General Nott to reinforce the capital with the brigade under orders for India. Colonel McLaren accordingly returned to Candahar, and strengthened with a troop of horse artillery, started for Cabul upon the 17th. In the meantime, Captain Hart's corps of Jaunbaz had been called in from Tireen, agreeably to the Envoy's wishes, and followed in the rear of Colonel McLaren's Brigade, en route to Cabul. Two of the Shah's corps that had been left in Neesh and Dehrawat, after the return of the regular troops, were likewise summoned to Candahar, and nothing remained out but the 1st corps of Jaunbaz, the 1st Shah's regiment, and two guns in Zamin Dawur. Having experienced much embarrassment from the presence of two Princes in this province during the summer and autumn, who regarded each other with the greatest jealousy, I judged the present I to be a favourable opportunity for deputing Sufter Jung to Cabul, thus leaving Prince Timour in the immediate exercise of supreme authority in the Candahar government. Prince Sufter Jung accordingly returned from Zamin Dawur, and prepared to accompany the Jaunbaz to Cabul; but previous to the departure of the corps, had reason to suspect the fidelity of the Affghan horse; and having come to an explanation with the Prince upon the subject, he signified to me that he would prefer remaining at Candahar during the winter, without employment, to running the risk of being disgraced by any treacherous conduct on the part of the horse to which he was attached. About the same time we learnt that Lieutenant Crawford had been attacked near Ghuznee, and had allowed the Dooranee prisoners under his charge to escape; and this intelligence was followed by an account of the Ghilzyes' attack upon Guddoo Khan, on his return from Ghuznee, in which that gallan: Affghan officer, whose services to us throughout had been of such extreme value, was overpowered by numbers and slain, with seventeen of his best men, losing at the same time forty-five horses, and all the arms and baggage of the Rissalah. The province of Candahar itself, however, still continued tranquil ; and it was not until we learnt, upon the 9rd of December, that Colonel McLaren had been forced by the inclemency of the weather to give up his advance on Cabul, that we were led to anticipate disturbances in this government. General Nott then judged it advisable to concentrate all his troops at Candahar, and accordingly or dered in the regiment and guns from Zamin Dawur. I wished to keep the Jaunbaz at Giriskh, as the best chance of obliging them to adhere to us, from their enmity to the surrounding tribes, but my letters miscarried, and, unfortunately the Affghan horse returned to Candahar with the infantry. Colonel McLaren reached Candahar upon the 8th of December, and the Zamin Dawur detachment came in the following day. Lieutenant Hammersley was at this time about to dispatch treasure to Candahar from Quetta, but judging that the temptation of securing this booty would induce the tribes about the Kojuck to rise, I suggested its detention till a more favourable opportunity offered. It is fortunate that this detention occurred, or the treasure would certainly have been sacrificed; for intelligence having reached the Candahar frontier of the dispatch of Mahomed Atta Khan from Cabul to excite the rebellion in this province, the tribes to the south east, who are particularly under the influence of that chief, assembled and came down upon the Quetta road, with the hope of plundering the convoy. Disappointed of their booty they returned to their homes; but an impetus had been given to insurrection by their movement, which led to many further evils. Lieutenant Bosanquet, on the 17th of December, reported to me that all was quiet in the neighbourhood of Killa Abdoolla; but on the following day he received orders from Quetta to evacuate his post, and this abandonment taking place immediately after the émeute north of the Kojuck, was construed into an admission of weakness, and was the signal for the Atchukzye tribe to rise, cutting off at once our communication with the south. I had no resource in this emergency but to send Saloo Khan, the Atchukzye chief, with the Candahar Jaunbaz, to reoccupy Killa Abdoolla, taking the precaution at the same time to withdraw the European Superintendent of the corps. The men on approaching the Kojuck were infected with the rebellion of the Atchukzye tribe, and the greater part of them deserted. Saloo Khan, however, remained firm, and has from that time steadily adhered to our interests, and has exerted himself to the utmost in our service, thus justifying, in the most satisfactory manner, the selection I had made of him for the important post of Sirdar of Jaunbaz, and proving, moreover, that I employed the best means at my disposal for preserving the communication with India. I must now note a few particulars regarding affairs in the city of Candahar. When I became aware of the names of the leaders who headed the Cabul insurrection, and found that they were principally Dooranee noblemen of rank, I could not but be suspicious of the chiefs of Candahar, who are all of the same tribe. I temporised with them, however, during the whole month of November, keeping them in good humour, and leading them to believe that the Cabul rebellion was nothing more than a partial and temporary disturbance. When Colonel McLaren's retirement, however, became known, and Mahomed Atta Khan also approached the Candahar fron tier as the champion of Islam, it was no longer possible to treat the Dooranee chiefs with the sort of half confidence that I had hitherto shown them. I had but three courses open to me; 1st arresting the chiefs and expelling their followers from the city; 2nd obliging them to leave the city, which was equivalent to throwing them into the arms of Mahomed Atta Khan; and 3rd affecting to trust them with the execution and direction of a popular movement in favour of his Majesty the Shah, and against Mahomed Atta Khan, who approached Candahar as the representative of the Baruckzye Sirdars, -the acknowledged enemies of the Dooranee power; either of the two former courses appeared to me calculated to increase and precipi tate our difficulties, whilst the latter secured a comparative safety to the city, and, in the event of the restoration of order at Cabool, to which I confidently looked forward, promised to relieve the Candahar province altogether of the troubles or the expenses of war. After the most mature deliberation, I accordingly adopted the latter course, persuaded his Royal Highness Prince Timour to depute his eldest son with the Dooranee chiefs, and advanced on account of the local government the sum of one lac of rupees to Meerza Ahmed, the revenue manager, to maintain the Dooranee troops in the field. I also obtained a Futwa from the priesthood of Candahar, declaring the Cabul conspirators, and their adherents, rebels and traitors, and deserving of punishment in this world and the next. The Dooranees quitted Candahar in the middle of December, delayed for a considerable time the advance of Atta Khan, prevented to the utmost of their power the spread of religious fanaticism among the tribes, and acted in apparent good faith until their accounts from Cabul impressed them with a conviction that his Majesty the Shah had ranged himself in the ranks of our enemies. I am induced, therefore, to hope that Government will not consider me to have acted inconsiderately or prejudicially to our interests in the game which I have played with the Dooranees. The expenditure of the lac of rupees answered the temporising purpose at which it was chiefly aimed, and the funds have been exhausted long ere this when we are about to be brought into collision with the Dooranees. To return, however, to the occurrences of the month of December. After the deputation of Prince Sekunder with the Dooranee chiefs, my attention was chiefly directed to the disposition of the Jaunbaz. A part of them accompanied the Prince, the remainder I judged it best to endeavour to station upon the Helmund, as well with a view to the protection of the fort of Giriskh, as to place them in a situation where they would be cut off from communication with Cabul, and surrounded with their blood enemies. They were to have started for Giriskh accordingly upon the 27th of December; but on the previous night, supposing from a mere accident that their intention to desert had been discovered, they broke into open mutiny, murdered Lieutenant Golding, wounded Lieutenant Patterson so severely that he now lies in danger of his life, and took the field, hoping to raise the country. It is worthy of remark, that they did not attempt to join the Dooranee camp, proving thereby that the chiefs were then understood to be friendly to us. Captain Leeson's cavalry, and a party of the Parsewan Jaunbaz, who remained firm under Lieuten, ant Wilson, although in the same camp with the mutineers, were immediately detached in pursuit, and coming up with the Jaunbaz in the afternoon, at a village about twelve miles distant from Candahar, they attacked and dispersed them, killing the ringleaders of the mutiny, and inflicting a severe loss on the whole body. It had been my wish, with General Nott's concurrence, to send out two of the guns belonging to the local government, for the better protection of the fortress of Girishk. No escort, however, could be now spared, and I had no better means therefore of providing for the safety of that important post than by authorising Bulwent Sing, the Hindostanee Killadar, to increase his garrison to 400 men; and by obtaining from his Royal Highness Prince Timour the nomination to the government of the Helmund of a Baruckzye chief, the son of the famous Vizier Futteh Khan, who is possessed of an extensive influence in the tribe, and who is equally at enmity with the members of his own family, and with the other Dooranee chiefs who put his father to death. soon, however, as he took the field, the rebel cause rapidly gained strength. The Jaunbaz, who had fled from Candahar and from Saloo Khan, collected round the standard of Mahomed Atta Khan, and the Sirdar fixed his headquarters at Dehla, distant about forty miles from the city. General Nott was deterred by the unfavourable state of the season from attacking the rebels at that place: and our inactivity being considered a proof of weakness, Mahomed Atta, with about 3,000 horse and foot, proceeded leisurely down the valley of the Arghundab to the vicinity of the town of Candahar; and having been joined by a considerable number of people from the surrounding villages, upon the 12th of January he took post on the river, distant five miles west of the city. General Nott attacked the enemy in this position, and dispersed them after a brief skirmish. The Dooranees, up to this time, had avoided committing themselves in any open hostility with us, though, I believe, that the Cabul advices, describing the increasing difficulties of our position, and affording a prospect of the Shah's being able, subsequently to our departure, to supersede the authority of the Baruckzyes, had rendered them ripe for declaring against us. Be this, however, as it may, when the Dooranees found that we were engaged with Ma An important occurrence took place on the 29th of December, two days subsequent to the Jaunbaz mutiny. Prince Sufter Jung, jealous of his brother, and disgusted at his own removal from authority, was won over by the persuasions of a dissolute and in-homed Atta Khan, their camp triguing chief, the son of Shah Pussund, Khan of Laush, to fly from the city, and place himself at the head of the insurgents whom Mahomed Atta Khan was assembling on our eastern frontier. As the prince was subjected to no restrant, it was impossible to have provided against this flight. As broke up tumultuously, and the entire force marched apparently to the support of their countrymen. They did not arrive in our vicinity, however, till the evening, when Mahomed Atta's followers were scattered in flight and disorder, and they then prudently retired to a sufficient distance to escape the risk of being exposed to any immediate collision with us. From this time the Dooranee camp became the nucleus for rebellion. Sufter Jung, Mahomed Atta Khan, and the other fugitives from the field of the 12th, sought the protection of the Dooranees, and were honourably received. Prince Sekunder had been carried away by the Dooranee chiefs; but we succeeded in relasing him from their hands, and bringing him back into the city before Sufter Jung arrived in their camp. During all this period I had kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Sufter Jung, with Meerza Ahmed, and with the Dooranees. The Prince, I believe, regretted the step he had taken, and would have returned to Candahar before the affair of the 12th, had I considered my self authorised to guarantee to him a definite reward for so doing, but, besides the inexpediency of thus putting a premium upon rebellion, it was altogether out of my power to promise him what he required, namely, the future government of Candahar. That I have been deceived with regard to Meerza Ahmed I candidly admit, as he is a man of first rate talent for an Affghan, and must, I supposed, appreciate the difference between the power of his countrymen and that of the British Government. I judged that from motives of selfinterest he would adhere cordially to our cause. He appears, how ever from the breaking out of the Cabul insurrection, to have guessed that the contest would terminate in our compulsory abandonment of the country; and, thus while he honestly played for a season the temporising game that I enjoined upon him, he still took care so to strengthen his position with his own party, that in the event of our adversity, he might keep the lead in the Affghan cause which had been entrusted to him whilst acting under our own auspices. I was so sensible of the danger of this man as an enemy, that long after I had evidence of his duplicity, I affected to trust him, in the hope of his reclamation, and I might possibly, to the present day, have retained some hold upon him, had I not been necessitated, in order to carry on the business of local administration and to consolidate some party in the state as a counterpoise to the weight of the Dooranees, to bring his rival Meerza Wulee Mahomed into power, as revenue manager of Candahar. This arrangement took place, with his Royal Highness Prince Timour's approval, upon the 18th of January; and since that time, Meerza Ahmed has been actively employed as minister to Sufter Jung, in directing the councils of the Dooranees, and concerting measures to place them out of the danger of a surprise, and yet sufficiently near to have an appearance of menacing Candahar; and in this camp they remained from the 20th of January to the last day of February. Meerza Ahmed alone could have so long preserved union among the discordant elements of which this camp was composed; he alone could have managed, by the most careful revenue arrangements to have supported the concourse which was assembled round the standard of Sufter Jung; he alone, perhaps, could have prevented the Dooranees from risking an action in which they were certain to have been defeated-his measures throughout have been most skilful and well |