Colonel Palmer, if he is enabled to hold out till the return of spring, and resolves to attempt retiring by that route. Mr. Clerk will not have failed to take advantage of the return of some of the

Lohanee merchants from Hindoostan, to open through them a communication with Colonel Palmer. I have, &c.,

T. H. MADDOCK.

Fort William, March 15, 1842. Sir, It appears to us that it would be convenient at this period to lay fully before your Excellency the deliberate views we entertain with respect to the measures now be pursued in Affghanistan; and we, therefore, transmit to your Excellency this letter, in continuation of those already addressed to your Excellency upon this subject.

2. The insurrection which has existed in parts of Affghanistan almost from the time of our obtaining possession of Cabul, which, in the summer of last year, led to more than one serious conflict with considerable bodies of men in the vicinity of Candahar; and, extending itself in October to the vicinity of Cabul impeded the march of Major-Gen. Sir R. Sale's brigade to Jellalabad; still more the revolution, rather than insurrection which commenced at Cabul on the 2nd of November, and which, after many disastrous and lamentable events, led to the ultimate destruction of a numerous division of the British army, a calamity wholly without parallel in our history in India; all these circumstances, followed as they have been by the universal hostility of the whole people of Affghanistan, united at the present moment against us in a war which has assumed a religious, as well as na

tional, character, compel us to adopt the conclusion, that the possession of Affghanistan, could we recover it, would be a source of weakness, rather than of strength, in resistfrom ing the invasion of an army the west, and, therefore, that the ground upon which the policy of the advance of our troops to that country mainly rested, has altogether ceased to exist.

3. The information received with respect to the conduct of Shah Shooja during the late transactions, is necessarily imperfect, and moreover, of a somewhat contradictory character. It is not probable that the insurrection against our troops should have originated with him. It is most probable, and it is almost proved, that he has adopted it, and, powerless in himself, is prepared to side with either party by which he may hope to be maintained upon his precarious throne.

4. Certainly, as we are at present informed, the conduct of Shah Shooja has not been such as to compel the British Government, in blind and solitary observance of the Tripartite Treaty, of which the ground has ceased to exist, to peril its armies, and, with its armies, its Indian Empire, in his support.

5. Whatever course we may hereafter take, must rest solely upon military considerations, and

have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuznee, at Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and Candahar, to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk, and, finally, to the re-establishment of our military reputation by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Aff ghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the king we have set up, has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed.

6. But, while the facts before us justify the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan, and the refusal of all further assistance to Shah Shooja, they are yet not such as to make it consistent with our reputation, to give our future support, as is suggested by Major Rawlinson, to Shah Kamran, and to make over Candahar to that nominal ruler of Herat, even were it consistent with prudence to engage in a new speculative enterprise beyond the Indus, which might render it necessary for us to retain, at an enormous cost, a large body of troops in the difficult country between that river and Candahar, for the purpose of maintaining in the country so made over to him, a sovereign personally incapable, and for many years unknown to its inhabitants, other wise than by the fame of his de grading vices.

7. We are of opinion that it

would be erroneous to suppose that a forward position in Upper Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Sikhs, or that a forward position above the passes of Lower Affghanistan would have the effect of controlling the Beloochees, and the Sindians, by the appearance of confidence and of strength. That which will really, and will alone controul the Sikhs, the Beloochees, and the Sindians, and all the other nations beyond and within the Indus, is the knowledge that we possess an army, perfect in its equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure in its communications with the country from which its supplies and its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with vigour and effect against any enemy.

8. In war, reputation is strength; but reputation is lost by the rash exposure of the most gallant troops under circumstances which render defeat more probable than victory; and a succession of reverses will dishearten any soldiers, and, most of all, those whose courage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence that they were always led to certain success. We would, therefore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employed in Affghanistan and Sinde the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of strikingade. cisive blow at the Affghans, more especially if such blow could be

struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee, a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impression of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success.

9. The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will, in the first instance, endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan, which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their country; but to make a rash attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into, our possession; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of MajorGeneral Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the

country below the Khyber Pass or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul.

10. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the re-occupation of Cabul, the scene of our great disaster and of so much crime, even for a week, of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired as solemn as that which accompanied our advance; and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power; but we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can, without depending upon the forbearance of the tribes near the Pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must, under all circumstances, be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops, upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed, -feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus; and we would caution Major-General Pollock, and all the officers commanding the troops in the field, not to place reliance upon, or to be biassed by, the representations of native chiefs who may have been expelled from their country, in consequence of their adherence to us, and who

will naturally be ready to lead us into any danger by operations which may have the possible effect of restoring them to their former possessions.

11. We have been informed that Major-General Pollock does not consider himself strong enough to force, and to keep, the Khyber Pass, without the first reserve brigade, which was not known to have crossed the Ravee on the 2nd of this month, and which can hardly join him before the second week in April; and being informed likewise that Major-General Sir Robert Sale had, on the 21st of last month, only forage sufficient to last about thirty days, we cannot but expect that those officers will have endeavoured to effect their junction before the arrival of the first reserve brigade, and that they will, when that junction shall have been effected, occupy a secure position near the Khyber.

12. In such a position they will, under all circumstances, be better enabled to assist any operations of Major-General Nott on the side of Ghuznee, by the moral effect of their concentrated strength, than they would be in a more advanced position of extreme hazard to the troops under their command.

13. We look, further, to the effect which the concentration of a large force under your Excellency's command upon the Sutlej would have upon the policy of the Sikhs, and of all Indian States, exhibiting the British Government in an attitude of imposing strength, and giving confidence to its army and to its subjects.

14. The operations of the large force under Major-General Nott and Brigadier England, -a force numerous enough to overcome all resistance whenever it might march,

if its numbers comprised a due proportion of cavalry, and if it possessed the perfect equipment and ample means of movement, without which numbers of the bravest and best disciplined men have not the character of an army, -are necessarily so crippled by the want of cavalry and of animals of burden and draught, that we cannot safely rely upon those officers being able to effect any object beyond that of withdrawing the gar. rison of Kelat-i-Ghilzye, and securing their own retreat at the proper season, and their communications, in the mean time, with the Indus.

15. We cannot review all the circumstances of the present crisis without being deeply impressed with a sense of the danger arising from the dissemination of troops in an enemy's country, having difficult communication, and of the further danger of leaving any force intended for operations in the field, and at any time liable to be called into action, so composed in the several arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and so supplied with ammunition, provisions, and the means of movement, as to be in fact incapable of executing with promptitude and effect, and even of attempting, without peril to itself, any important operations with which it may be entrusted.

16. We subjoin, for the convenience of reference, a memorandum, showing the position and strength of the several corps of the army beyond the Indus, and moving towards that river at the latest period up to which we have information.

17. We have, by this post, transmitted a copy of this letter to Major-Generals Pollock and Nott, for their information and guidance.

Copies will also be forwarded to the Lieutenant-Governor and Mr. Clerk; and the despatch to MajorGeneral Nott will pass under a flying seal through the hands of

Major Outram and Brigadier Eng. land. ELLENBOROUGH. W. W. BIRD. W. CASEMENT. H. T. PRINsep.

Candahar, March 6, 1842.

Sir, I had the honour to receive yesterday at this place copy of your letter to my address, under date December 24th, 1841. In explanation of my apparent neglect in not communicating direct with Calcutta on the affairs of Candahar, I have the honor to observe that, up to the 12th of November, I had no reason to believe the communication between Cabul and Jellalabad to be otherwise than partially interrupted; that, subsequent to this date, I had the honour to forward to you direct duplicates of all despatches of importance; that during the month of November, I also regularly corresponded demi-officially with Major Outram, with a view to the information of that officer, and the transmission of all intelligence of importance to Calcutta ; that from the commencement of December, until the southern road became finally closed, I likewise addressed letters repeatedly to the Private Secretary to the Right Honourable the Governor-General as the least intrusive way of communicating with Government, and that since that period, December 17th, debarred from the possibility of transmitting any bulky papers, and obliged to depend on the secret conveyance of foot messengers, I have still exerted myself to the utmost to keep Government duly informed of all affairs of conse

quence at this place through Lieutenant Hammersley, in political charge at Quetta, and through Major Outram, Political Agent in Sinde and Beloochistan. The difficulty of communicating still continues, and I have thus no alternative but to adhere for a time to my demi-official correspondence with Major Outram ; but immediately that any safe channel is opened for the transmission of our dawks, I shall avail myself of it, to forward to Government duplicates of all my official letters, and to send a copy of the detailed political diary which I have kept since the commencement of our difficulties at Candahar in the end of last December. In the meantime, I have the honour to submit, in as concise and portable a form as possible, an abstract of all matters of consequence that have occurred at this place since the breaking out of the Cabul insurrection in the beginning of November.

At that period affairs wore a more tranquil and promising ap pearance in the Candahar province than I had ever witnessed since my assumption of the charge of the agency.

Akram Khan, the leader of the Dehrawat rebellion, captured by Lieutenant Conolly, had been executed at this place by his Majesty's orders. Eight of the most influential of his colleagues in rebellion had been sent by me,