Brigadier Wild, commanding the four regiments of native infantry, in regard to the circumstances under which he was to venture into the Khyber Pass, previously to the arrival of Major-General Pollock, with the strong reinforce ment accompanying him, appear to us to have been in all respects suitable and judicious. These instructions were forwarded to your honourable Committee, with our dispatches of the 22nd ultimo. 18. Major-General Pollock, with a fresh brigade, will have reached Peshawur in the first week of this month, and we expect daily to hear from him respecting his first views and intentions. 19. Meanwhile we have to lament that the post of Ali Musjid has been for the present necessarily abandoned to the Khyberees, and that the difficulties of the garrison of Jellalabad have been much increased by the retirement of the friendly Mamund Chief Turabaz Khan, from Lalpoora, the other line of communication between Jellalabad and Peshawur, in consequence of apprehensions arising from the approach of Mohamed Akhbar Khan. 20. There are circumstances represented in a letter from Captain Mackeson, of the 27th January, regarding the absence of proper precautions for taking on with the two regiments, which penetrated to Ali Musjid, the supplies of grain prepared for their support there, which will be made a subject of separate and full inquiry in the military department. Most injurious consequences may arise from the retreat, which was unavoidable, when from their supplies not having arrived with the detachment, and from the subsequent failure of the two remain ing corps to force their way to Ali Musjid with a convoy, the means of subsistence at that post no longer remained. 21. Our instructions for the guidance of Major-General Pollock and Sir Robert Sale have been adapted by us from time to time to the exigencies of circumstances, as these have gradually been disclosed. We entirely approve the answer of Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor to the injunction sent to them from Cabul, for a retirement from Jellalabad, which answer was to the effect, that they must first learn what security could be given to them for the safety of that movement, for we felt that the chiefs with whom the engagements were formed at Cabul were in no condition to stipulate for a state of things, or for the protection of our troops in other parts of the country. We have regarded the proceedings generally of Major-General Elphinstone, as far as we are aware of them, with the keenest disappointment and displeasure, and we have requested the Commander-in-Chief to institute, when circumstances may admit of it, a full military inquiry into the Major-General's conduct, and desired. that the authority of the MajorGeneral over the troops serving in or near Affghanistan should wholly cease. 22. The successive instructions which we have issued for the guidance of Major-General Pollock will be found in our letters of December 15, January 31, and February 10th and 16th. 23. The original direction to Major-General Pollock was, that the safety of the force under Sir Robert Sale should be the prominent object of his care, and that, otherwise, the situation of the force under his command was mainly that of a strong demonstration on the Peshawur frontier; it resting in his military discretion to determine whether he could with safety hold the advanced post of Jellalabad, in dependence on a secure command of the Khyber, and other passes, between Jellalabad and Peshawur. We should have been glad, had it appeared likely to be in Major-General Pollock's power to maintain the post of Jellalabad for some period, as giving advantages in any communication with the adverse chiefs in Affghanistan, or in any ulterior movement, or course of policy that might be thought proper by the Government here or in England. But on the 31st January, we expressly informed Major-General Pollock, that Jellalabad was not a place which we desired to retain at all hazards, and that after securing Sir Robert Sale's brigade there, and giving every practicable relief to parties from Cabul, we would wish him, rather than run extreme risks at Jellalabad, to arrange for withdrawal from it, and the assemblage of all his force at or near Peshawur. 24. Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khyber Pass, and have become convinced that with the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our preparations, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jellala bad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive, and we shall rejoice to learn that MajorGen. Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the same object. 25. We have attentively considered the question of remaining in force at or near Peshawur during the present year, and upon strengthening the division under Major-General Pollock, by the other complete brigade, which your honourable Committee has before learned had been warned to march from Ferozepore, and we have given the full instructions, which will be found in our letters to the Commander-in-Chief and Mr. Clerk, of the 10th instant, upon these subjects. 26. While there may be a hope of contributing to the safety of the Jellalabad garrison, the advance of the fresh brigade will, of course, be most desirable and necessary, for the purpose also of supporting the division under Major-General Pollock, whether it remain for the year at Peshawur, or other place, in the Lahore territory, or be drawn back gradually to the British frontier. The advance of the brigade is likely to be of much advantage; but there are questions of much delicacy and difficulty connected with the position of the Sikh government, and with the temper and feeling of the most powerful of the Sikh chiefs, and of the body of the Sikh soldiery, which may make the retention of a British force for a long period at any advanced point of the Sikh dominions, far from politic and safe. We have in our instructions to Mr. Clerk dwelt upon these considerations, and given to him a large discretion in respect to the position and movement of our forces in the Punjab. We trust that your honourable Committee will be satisfied, that upon a matter of this nature, the proper determination of which depends so entirely upon local circumstances, we have adopted the best course in giving extensive powers to Mr. Clerk, who is an officer deserving of our high confidence. We have, it will be observed, given a general discretion to Mr. Clerk to act in unforeseen emergencies, as he may think best for the national interest and honor, on the general principles which have uniformly been prescribed to him in regard to our relations with the Sikh government, and we have intimated to him that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the commanders of the British forces within the Punjab, will be prepared to give attention to his wishes, as far as they may feel themselves able to do so, consistently with military considerations, and with the arrangements judged necessary by his Excellency for the protection of our own provinces. 27. We have been careful in our letters to the Commander-inChief, to advert to all those points, which have appeared indispensable for the due support and equipment, in all respects, of a British force, while employed within the Punjab. 28. The dispatch from Mr. Clerk, of the 15th ultimo, conveyed some general observations on the condition of the Sikh government and troops, with reference to the altered and unsettled aspect of affairs in Affghanistan, and we stated to Mr. Clerk in reply, our continued desire to give strength to the existing administration in the Punjab. We have been happy to perceive, from the tenor of different communications from Mr. Clerk, which have extended to the 8th instant, that he appears to rest with some confidence upon the stability of that government, and the prevention of any general disorder in the country or army, as a con sequence of the more intimate intercourse, which has now been established between the Durbar and Mr. Clerk, as the agent and representative of the British Govern ment. 29. On the 31st of January, upon receiving the intelligence of the disasters which had happened to our troops in the retreat from Cabul, we thought it proper to issue a brief notification, which we caused also to be officially communicated to the several political residents and agents, expressed in very general terms with regard to the intentions of the Government; but also, in a tone of confidence and firmness, such as is suitable to the power and resources of the British empire in India, and was calculated to allay any impressions of apprehension or mistrust, which might possibly be created by so great a calamity as that which has now been sustained by a portion of the British army. We are happy to state that we have no information, which could lead us to suppose that impressions of this kind have been any where diffused. 30. In our dispatch of the 22nd ultimo, we communicated the grounds upon which it appeared that Sir William Macnaghten had been murdered by Mahomed Akbar Khan. With a letter from Mr. Clerk, of 20th January, your honourable Com. mittee will find the translation of a letter, purporting to be from Mahomed Akbar to a chief near Jellalabad, named Meer Alfyed Khan, which, if it can be assumed as genuine, as there appeared at first to be no reason to doubt that it was, would show that Mahomed Akbar openly avowed and gloried in the horrible outrage. In the letter, however, from Mr. Clerk, of the 6th instant, and that of Captain Lawrence to his brother, which has been before referred to in this dispatch,, there seem to be grounds for at least suspending an opinion upon this point. The entire uncertainty which at present attends the most important circumstances connected with the conduct and purposes of the principal actors in the scenes which have passed, and are passing at Cabul, precludes for the present from forming any clear view, or giving any defined instrcutions in regard to communications with any of those parties. We can, for the moment, do little else than await and watch the development of events and factions; we hope to receive shortly the two letters from Major Pottinger, of which the arrival at Jellalabad has been announced to us. We may, however, state, that it is not our intention on such information as we yet have, to authorise any advances of money to Shah Shooja, for we could have no confidence that such advances would not be employed by individuals who, in his name, exercise real authority at Cabul, in hostility against ourselves. 31. We have to mention that bills upon our treasuries, drawn by Major Pottinger from Cabul, on the 28th of December, the day on which he appears to have made his final arrangement with the hostile chiefs, have been presented, some with, and others without letters of advice, to an amount of about fifteen lacs of rupees. The authorities in the north-western provinces, after giving assurances to the shroffs who hold the bills, that their claims connected with them shall receive a full and just consideration, have referred the question of paying the bills to the supreme Government. We have stated that such payment must be deferred until a distinct and satisfactory explanation shall be received from Major Pottinger of the circumstances under which they were drawn; and Mr. Clerk has been instructed to endeavour to obtain such explanation without delay. 32. We need not assure your honourable Committee that the painful situation of the officers, families, and European and native soldiers, who are prisoners in Affghanistan, engages our most anxious thought, and that any measures which we can adopt with fair and honourable prospect of advantage for their comfort or release, will be eagerly adopted by us. 33. With respect to the other posts in Affghanistan, it will be seen, that in the letter from Lieutenant Conolly of the 17th of January, it is stated that the garrison of Ghuznee still maintained possession of the citadel, though the town was in the occupation of the enemy. 34. From Kelat-i-Ghilzye we have no direct tidings, but it is believed that no disaster can have have happened to that stronglyfortified post. 35. The latest date of a private letter from Candahar is of the 9th of January, when Major Rawlinson reported that the Prince Sufter-Jung, a son of Shah Sooja, who had at one time been governor of that province, and who had been dispossessed in favour of the Shahsada Timor, had fled from the city, and joined the camp of the insurgents at a place some thirty or forty miles distant. 36. Collision appeared then, to Major Rawlinson, to be unavoidable; and from letters received from Lieutenant Hammersley, the political Assistant at Quetta, it would appear probable that some engagement had actually occurred, in which the insurgents had been defeated; but the communication between Candahar and Quetta has, for some time, been effectually closed, and we are without any authentic information of events, of which, however, we trust that you may be apprised to a later period, through Bombay. 37. Major-General Nott had under his orders, and concentrated in strength at Candahar, a force of about 8,700 men, with at least eighteen pieces of artillery. This force is believed to be well supplied, and defective only in having but a small body of trustworthy cavalry, and very scanty means of carriage for any distant move ment. 38. Your honourable Committee is already aware, that upon first hearing of the serious difficulties that threatened our troops at Cabul, we sent instructions to Major Rawlinson and General Nott at Candahar, preparing them, in the event of extreme disaster at Cabul, for the ultimate result of a withdrawal from Affghanistan, with the least possible amount of dis. credit: but so also as to make the union and safety of our troops a paramount object of attention. These instructions, we know, reached Candahar towards the end of December. Upon learning the order given by Major Pottinger and Major-General Elphinstone, for the evacuation of Jellalabad, and assuming that similar orders would also have been issued in regard to Candahar, we stated to the Commander-in-Chief that we did not doubt that Major-General Nott would have rejected the authority VOL. LXXXIV. of these orders, and we requested his Excellency to instruct the MajorGeneral to act for himself, independently of such orders, upon his own distinct military responsibility. 39. We desired, also, that his Excellency would communicate to Major-General Nott, that it was of the highest importance that he should maintain his position at Candahar, in concentrated strength, until he should receive the further instructions of the Government. This last intimation was made in the same view as that with which we have before said that we looked to the retention, if possible, of the post of Jellalabad, and it was dispatched to the Commander-inChief on the 28th of January. But having on the 31st of January received information in regard to the actual state of affairs at Candahar, we addressed Major Outram, instructing him to communicate with Major-General Nott, and to arrange in concert with Brigadier England; and if the condition of the tracts under his immediate charge should admit of it, for having the disposable part of the troops under the orders of that officer moved above the Bolan Pass as early as possible, in order that if Major-General Nott should decide upon withdrawing from Candahar, the troops in question might be marched forwards to the foot of the Kojuck Pass on the Quetta side, so as to facilitate and support such withdrawal. We have since, on the 10th instant, issued the instructions to Major-General Nott, which your honourable Committee will find in our secretary's letter to him of that date. He has there been distinctly informed that it is our desire that he should act solely so as may best, in his judgment, 2 E |