chiamenta de placitis Coronæ vel aliis prædictis, aut aliquod aliud officium ibidem faciendum, nisi in defectum ipsius comitis et ballivorum ac ministrorum suorum in terris et feodis suis predictis." Added to this was the subsequent passage called the "ne intromittant clause which was in the following terms:-"Ita quod idem comes, per se vel per ballivos ac ministros suos, fines, amerciamenta, exitus, et foris facturos hujusmodi hominum et tenentium suorum prædictorum, et omnia quæ ad nos et hæredes nostros pertinere poterunt de anno, die, et vasto sive streppo, et murdris prædictis levare, percipere, et habere possint, sine occasione vel impedimento nostri vel heredum nostrorum, justiciariorum, exactorum, vicecomitum, coronatorum, aut aliorum ballivorum, seu ministrorum nostrorum quorumcunque." It would appear, therefore, that all other coroners were inhibited from entering the Duchy, and if so, the former passage must be taken to have included the grant of that office.

The learned gentleman then entered upon an elaborate examination of various ancient documents and charters with the view of showing, that there was no difference between a grant of attachiamenta de placitis Coronæ and that of attachiamenta placitorum, which were said to be used indifferently. The latter was frequently construed to include the office of coroner, which need not be granted co nomine, for it was enough that its duties were exercised, though under another name.

Mr. Ellis, Mr. Martin, and Mr. Robinson followed on the same side.

Mr. Wortley, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Hardy were a few days after

wards heard in reply, and urged that this charter ought to be construed strictly, as it went to deprive the Crown of a prerogative which at that time existed, though the right of electing coroners was afterwards, by the statute 25 Edward 3rd, declared to belong to the freeholders, "saving all franchises not previously granted." There had been a similar statute passed in a preceding reign with the same intent, so that it might be well doubted whether the Crown had the power of granting to the Earl of Lancaster such a right as was now sought to be founded upon this char

ter.

Where the Crown was supposed to grant such rights, however, it was submitted that the words ought to be clear and express. Great stress had been laid upon the grant of attachiamenta de placitis Corona; but it was not necessary to have a coroner in order to hold such pleas, for there were many instances known where sheriffs held them. Besides, if such was the force of those words, the effect of a grant of retorna brevium, in the same clause, must be, by implication, a grant of a right to appoint sheriffs, whose duty it was to return all writs, and that was not contended at all. This exposed the fallacy of the argument which advanced this as a grant by necessary implication. As for the indifferent use of the two expressions, it was well known that the one included the other, so that it might well be that both might appear in the same instrument. There is, however, a distinction between them, and the question is, whether attachiamenta de placitis Coronæ mean more than the attachments arising out of pleas of the Crown of a similar nature to the writs previously

granted to the Earl. As for the charter of Richard 2nd on his dispossessing Henry of Bolingbroke of his father's property, it is notorious that the charters granted to the favourites of that monarch were in blank forms, which were filled up at the pleasure of the grantees, so that their contents are no valid proof of the construction put upon the original charter in those days, and of this a strong instance is to be found in the fact that these two charters actually do confer a right of "cognizance of pleas" as having been already granted to the Duchy, which is not once mentioned in it. The whole case, therefore, must turn upon the mere words of the charter, and these are not enough to grant the right claimed eo nomine, while, if it be sought to be inferred by implication, it must be a necessary implication alone which can confer the right. Here the implication is too general, for the duties really granted may attach to other offices as well as that of coroner, and when that is so, the courts will always construe charters and grants by the Crown strictly, for the Crown cannot be allowed to divest itself of any rights, except upon the very clearest language.

At the sitting of the court today judgment was pronounced in favour of the plaintiff.

Lord Abinger said, that though the argument had been put forward by the counsel on both sides, especially for the defendant, as involving very important consequences, yet to his mind, the case involved itself into the simple question between the two coroners as to the right to the fees consequent upon holding inquests within that portion of the Duchy comprised in the honour of Pontefract.

This turned upon the meaning of the charter creating that Duchy, and particularly upon the sense to be attached to the words "altachiamenta de placitis Coronæ," between which and “attachiamenta placilorum" it had been contended by the defendant, that there was a distinction favourable to his rights. The former, however, of the two terms was the more comprehensive, and as far as the argument went which was founded on the distinction, it was favourable to the plaintiff's claim. The point first argued was, that the words of this charter were not sufficient to convey a right to the Earl of Lancaster to appoint a coroner within the Duchy; but I am of opinion that, taking into consideration the subsequent clause prohibiting the interference of any bailiff or other officer of the Crown in the Duchy, they are amply sufficient for that purpose, especially as the grant is to hold all attachments of pleas of the Crown cum quibuscunque aliis. It was next contended that, whatever might be the implication arising from the words of this charter, yet that it could not be construed into a grant of the nature claimed by the plaintiff, inasmuch as the right of appointing to the office of coroner was one which could not be granted except by express terms, and co nomine, In aid of this it was argued that the coroner's was a judicial office, and therefore one which the Crown could not grant the appointment of to a subject. There was manifestly a contradiction, therefore, in the arguments of the defendant, for if the coroner be a judicial officer, and for that reason the right to appoint him be inalienable by the Crown, what does it signify what the implica

tion may be of the contested passages? or why should the defendant argue that the Crown could only grant such a right eo nomine? As to the judicial character of the coroner, he (Lord Abinger) would by no means admit that his duties were of so solemn a nature. At all events, he discharged duties ministerial as well as those which were so called judicial, and it was enough for the construction of this charter in favour of the plaintiff, when there appeared to have been a continuous appointment in the Duchy to this office from the reign of Elizabeth, and the capability of some officer, whether a bailiff or feodary, to discharge the duties included under the terms used by the charter. The jury had found that the duties of coroner had been used and exercised by the officer of the Duchy; and that finding, coupled with the general clauses relied on in the argument of the plaintiff, was enough to warrant the court in holding that the right to appoint an officer to hold pleas of the Crown, i, e., to take inquests super visum corporis within the honour of Pontefract and other parts of the Duchy, to the exclusion of all other officers whatever, was granted by the charter in question. The rule, therefore, for a new trial must be discharged. Mr. Baron Parke had only heard a portion of the case, but, in so far as he was able to form an opinion from that portion, he was induced to agree in the judgment of the Chief Baron.

Mr. Baron Alderson.-"It is enough for us to say, that this charter granted a power to the grantee to appoint an officer of some sort, who could hold attachiamenta de placitis Corona, and if the coroner's duty was to that

extent, the charter might well be held to convey a right to the appointment of that officer. The court is not called on to say, that such a right was conveyed by this charter eo nomine, for if attachments of the pleas of the Crown have been held in the Duchy under this grant, it is clear that all others are prohibited by the latter clause from interfering with that privilege. The fact, however, is so; the county coroner has, through the negligence of the plaintiff's predecessors, interfered and assumed the discharge of duties peculiar to the officer of the Duchy, to whom such duties appertain under this charter. I therefore think that the rule must be discharged."

Rule discharged accordingly.

ARCHES COURT.

January 29.

THE OFFICE OF THE JUDGE PROMOTED BY SANDERS AGAINST HᎬᎪᎠ.

This was a proceeding under the late statute, 3rd & 4th of Vic., c. 86, against the Rev. Henry Erskine Head, Rector of Feniton, Devon, for being the author and publisher of a letter which appeared in the Western Times of August 21, 1841, addressed to his parishioners, entitled "A View of the Duplicity of the present System of Episcopal Ministration, occasioned by the Bishop of Exeter's Circular on Confirmation, by Henry Erskine Head," in which it is openly affirmed and maintained, that the catechism, the order of baptism, and the order of confirmation, contained in the "Book of Common Prayer, and adminis◄ tration of the sacraments, and

other rites and ceremonies of the Church of England," contain erroneous and strange doctrines, and wherein are also openly affirmed and maintained other positions in derogation and depravation of the said book, contrary to the statutes and to the constitutions and canons of the church. The Bishop of Exeter, in conformity with the act referred to (entitled "An Act for the better enforcing of Church Discipline"), served Mr. Head with notice of his intention to issue a commission of inquiry, in order to the institution, if need be, of further proceedings against him. The act contains a provision, that the bishop may, if he think fit, "either in the first instance, or after the commissioners shall have reported that there is sufficient prima facie ground for instituting proceedings, and before the filing of the articles, but not afterwards,' send the case by letters of request to the court of appeal of the province. The Bishop of Exeter, after serving this notice upon Mr. Head, sent letters of request to this court, whence a citation issued, to which Mr. Head appeared under protest to the jurisdiction of the court. That protest now came on for argument.

The Queen's Advocate, in support of the protest, contended that the notice served upon Mr. Head was a commencement of the proceeding, and equivalent to a citation in this court; that it not being revoked or annulled, a proceeding was actually pending before the bishop, and might be enforced; and by the suit being entertained in this court, Mr. Head might be subjected to two prosecutions for the same alleged offence, and might be cited to appear on the very same day and hour in the diocese

of Exeter and in this court. The act providing that the bishop may send the case by letters of request to the court of appeal, "in the first instance," or after the report of the commissioners, by "the first instance" could not mean after the bishop had issued a notice of his intention to proceed by a commission of inquiry.

Dr. Harding followed on the same side.

Dr. Adams, against the protest, asked cui bono this objection? If the bishop issued a commission, there was every probability that the commissioners would report that there was a prima facie case, and then letters of request could bring the cause here in the course of four or five months, at further expence. The service of the notice was not a commencement of the proceedings; it merely announced the bishop's intention to proceed.

Dr. Robinson followed on the same side.

Sir H. Jenner Fust said, that with respect to the form of the letters of request, he found no provision in the statute requiring the names of parties to be inserted, nor did it contain any schedule of forms. It had not been alleged that the omission was in any way prejudicial to the party proceeded against. The statute altered the old law, by authorizing the bishop, if he saw fit, without the agency of any other person, to send the case to this court. He was, therefore, of opinion that the letters of request were in the form and manner required by the act. With regard to the notice, he was not satisfied that it was equivalent to a citation; it was a notice of an intention to proceed, but it was no part of the proceedings; it was a preliminary step warning the party

He

to prepare to defend himself. was of opinion, that the notice was not such a commencement of the proceeding as to bar the bishop from sending the case to this court, and it was not to be supposed that the notice, after the letters of request, could be a valid and subsisting notice, so as to prejudice Mr. Head. The court must, therefore, overrule the protest and assign the party to appear absolutely.

The Queen's Advocate.-I am instructed to pray that you will grant Mr. Head permission to appeal to the Judicial Committee,

Dr. Adams could not see what end this could answer but that of delay.

Sir H. Jenner Fust thought that, as it was a question as to the jurisdiction of the court, he ought to grant permission to appeal.

VICE-CHANCELLORS'
COURT.
February 8.

A motion was made to-day on behalf of Mr. T. Campbell, the poet, for an injunction to restrain Messrs. Scott and Geary, the booksellers of Charter-house-square, from selling any more copies of the second volume of a work called "The Book of the Poets, containing the Modern Poets of the Nineteenth Century," on the ground of piracy. The entire copyright of the original poems, published at various times for Mr. Campbell's own benefit, was alleged by the bill to be vested in himself in the year 1840, and, having that right, he agreed, upon certain terms, to permit Mr. Moxon to print and publish a new edition, under the title of "The Poetical Works of

Thomas Campbell." The defendants soon after published their "Book of the Poets," in the second volume of which, containing the modern poets of the nineteenth century, they were alleged to have pirated entire from the edition published by Mr. Moxon several of the most popular and characteristic of Mr. Campbell's productions, including "Ye Mariners of England," "Lord Ullen's Daughter," "Glenara," "Song of the Greeks," and "The Turkish Lady," and also to have made copious extracts from other poems without the permission of the author. The defendants admitted the charge of taking the matter complained of, but justified the act on the ground of the custom of the trade and the bond fide character of the selections of matter they had made. They had some time before published a work entitled "The Book of the Poets, from Chaucer to Beattie," consisting of an essay on English poetry from its commencement until the end of the eighteenth century, with biographical notices of various poets, and extracts from their works, to illustrate the progress of English poetry, and the genius and characteristics of each of the poets of that period. The second volume was intended as a companion to the former, and, in executing the grand design of publishing a book of the poets of the nineteenth century, they had made selections from the plaintiff's poetry, in common with the rest of the modern poets of eminence. The defendants further alleged it to be the custom of the trade to publish works of a similar nature, containing quotations from authors whose works were copyright, and mentioned as instances the "Elegant Extracts in poetry" selected by Dr.