brand with any peculiar censure Members who had been parties to those compromises. He had expected that Mr. Roebuck would have moved some resolution, that it was desirable, in consequence of the disclosures, to adopt immediate legislative measures; now such a measure had passed through Committee only the previous night. The appointment of the Committee was the act of the House; and Sir Robert Peel could not see in the manner of their inquiry, any departure from the ordinary course of other Committees, to justify a condemnation of the mode in which they had discharged the duty assigned to them. Mr. Roebuck was not personally responsible for their proceedings; on the other hand, the Report of the Committee showed that they contemplated no such proceedings as that in which he was now engaged. But how did the resolutions meet the case? He read the first two.

"Why, that being translated, means no more than this: You have been guilty of an offence, which is a violation of the liberties and privileges of the people, and a breach of the privileges of the House; still we will not call you to the Bar and censure you; but any person who hereafter in like manner may offend, we will.' But there are several other parts of these resolutions with which I am not satisfied. The honourable Gentleman, by his resolutions, declares these practices to be a violation of the liberties of the people, and a breach of the privileges of the House: now, I do not like dealing with general terms of this kind. I think the House ought not lightly to adopt such a declaration. The honourable Gentleman does not state the particular

;

nature of the compromise which shall constitute a violation of the liberties of the people, and a breach of the privileges of the House but he refers to certain compromises, all of which differ in character; and, speaking generally, says, they are breaches of privilege, and violations of the liberties of the people. If they be so, why do you not go on, and censure the parties to them? When you talk of inefficient proceedings, is it not inefficient to pass by those guilty of these violations? Why, you abstain from censuring them, because we gave them reason to believe, that if they gave their evidence fairly, they should not be visited with censure. I wish to see a law passed which shall insure a full inquiry into, and a remedy against, such practices; but I am not quite certain that they are a breach of the privileges of the House, because, when the House passed the Elections Trial Bill, it divested itself of the charge of inquiring into bribery, and said to individuals, We leave it to you to prefer and defend charges of bribery.""

On a former occasion, Sir Robert Peel had strongly stated the danger of establishing precedents for the suspension of particular writs; but to pledge the House to suspend writs in six cases, involving the seats of twelve Members, was a course full of danger; on a nice balance of parties in the House, the majority might retain the balance of power, by thus suspending writs. He doubted whether the House had the power of suspending a writ on the vague intimation that some general measure concerning bribery was contemplated. In some cases, as that of Bridport, there was no seat

vacant; yet the resolution pledged the House to suspend the writ on the next vacancy that might occur. He should vote against the resolution, but should support Lord John Russell's Bill.

The resolutions were further opposed by Mr. Vernon Smith, Mr. Sharman Crawford, and Mr. Turner.

Mr. Roebuck briefly replied, showing that Major Beresford and Mr. Fitzroy had not disproved the substantial facts in their exceptions to the report. He had proposed his resolutions as a safeguard against the practices complained of until a Bill should be passed.

The first resolution was then negatived by 136 to 47; and after some little further discussion, the other two were negatived without a division.

Although the House of Commons thus refused to affirm Mr. Roebuck's conclusions respecting the proceedings which the Select Committee had brought to light, the investigation that had taken place proved not wholly devoid of practical result. It has been mentioned in the short summary which has been given of the disclosures contained in the report, that the acceptance of the Chiltern Hundreds within a limited time, under a pecuniary penalty, by one of the sitting Members for Reading, was one of the terms on which the petition against the return for that borough was compromised.

When, however, the time arrived for carrying this stipulation into effect, an unexpected difficulty occurred: the Chancellor of the Exchequer, now made aware by the publication of the report of the purpose for which the application was preferred, declined to grant it; and V L. LXXXIV.

the individual who had bound himself to resign his seat, found it beyond his power to do so.

The course of proceeding adopted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on this occasion, became the subject of discussion in the House of Commons, at the instance of Lord Palmerston, who moved on the 6th of August, for "Copies of any correspondence which had taken place since the 1st day of July last, between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and any Member of this House, upon the subject of the Stewardship of the Chiltern Hundreds."

He referred to Mr. Goulburn's refusal of Lord Chelsea's application for the Stewardship, on the ground that he (Mr. Goulburn) would not lend his assistance to carry out the compromises disclosed by the late Committee.

Lord Palmerston objected to that course on two grounds: It was a clear and distinct understanding, that if the parties whose proceedings were to be inquired into before Mr. Roebuck's Committee should make a full disclosure of what had taken place, and a full admission of any facts in which they were concerned, they should be completely indemnified and saved harmless from any injury, which might otherwise arise from the disclosures. The refusal of the Chiltern Hundreds by the right honourable Gentleman, must have been considered as an inconve nience or punishment to some one

either to the individual to whom the Stewardship was refused, or to the individual who expected to come to the seat when it was vacated by Lord Chelsea. Now he thought, that by retaining any person in Parliament who wished to go out of it, or by preventing [0]

another person from coming into Parliament who had an opportunity of so doing, Mr. Goulburn was violating the understanding upon which the Committee had proceeded. And it was a mistake to suppose that the refusal of the Chiltern Hundreds would defeat the terms of the compromise. One result of that refusal would be, that in consequence of the agreement entered into by Lord Chelsea, he would have to forfeit 2,000. It might be assumed, that the same rule would be followed in the cases of Harwich and Falmouth; but to those cases his objections would equally apply. By the practice of centuries, it had been an ordinary rule, that when any Member, whatever his motives might be, or to whatever party he might belong, wished to withdraw from the House of Commons, he should be enabled to do so on application to the Government of the day, by having the appointment of the Chiltern Hundreds conferred on him. If, when a Member of Parliament wished to retire from his seat, Government were to take upon itself to inquire into his motives, an entirely new principle would be introduced, and one that would give the Government a most inconvenient control over public men. An Opposition leader might, for instance, have been defeated at a general election, and another Member might be willing to vacate his seat, that his friend might be elected in his place: suppose, then, the Government chose to say, "We will not be parties to such an arrangement; and to prevent its being carried out, we will refuse the Chiltern Hundreds."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer seconded the motion: he said.

"When he was applied to for the Chiltern Hundreds, he felt that he was the individual who had it in his power to grant or withhold the appointment; and he felt that he was bound to consider how far, by complying with the application, he should be making himself a party to transactions which the House of Commons had declared to be of an improper character. He had felt, after what had passed, that it was his duty to discourage such compromises; and he had thought that the knowledge beforehand that such compromises could not be carried out, would be the most effectual check to them. The noble Lord justly concluded that the course pursued in this case must also necessarily be pursued in the other two cases, those of Harwich and Falmouth."

Mr. Hume entirely concurred with Mr. Goulburn.

Mr. Vernon Smith thought that some better means should be devised than the barbarous fiction of the Chiltern Hundreds, to enable Members of Parliament to vacate their seats.

Sir R. Peel said, that it had been the unanimous opinion of all his colleagues, that the application should not be granted. The decision had been formed without any special reference to Lord Chelsea; on the contrary, when the matter was under discussion, the expectation was that Lord Chelsea would not be the first to apply for the appointment.

Mr. R. Yorke approved of the course that the Government had taken in the particular instance.

Captain Plumridge said, that when he had publicly applied for the Chiltern Hundreds in that House, he had done so in perfect sincerity. After what had taken

place, of course it would be useless to renew the application.

The motion was then agreed to. Thus ended the proceedings arising out of the appointment of the Select Committee on Election Compromises.

With respect to those boroughs where the constituencies had been extensively implicated in charges of bribery by the reports of Committees, much incidental discussion took place. The writs for filling up vacancies created by the unseating or collusive resignation of Members at Ipswich, Southampton, Nottingham, Newcastleunder-Lyne, and Sudbury, were suspended for a considerable time, and a motion was made by Mr. Wynn, that the Attorney-General should be instructed to prosecute the parties implicated by the Reports of the Committees in the two first-mentioned cases. The mo tion, however, did not meet with the concurrence of the House, and was withdrawn.

Eventually, the writs were all ordered to be issued with the exception of that for Sudbury, where the general and systematic corruptness of the constituency, as evidenced by the disclosures before the Committee, induced Mr. Redington, the Chairman, to bring in a Bill for the disfranchisement of the borough. This Bill was supported by the Government, and passed through the House of Commons, though not without some slight opposition; and the second reading was carried in the House of Lords; but owing to the late period at which it was sent up, it was found impossible to carry it through before the termination of the Session. The writ, however, was suspended sine die.

It only remains in connection

with this subject, to give some account of a measure introduced in the House of Commons by Lord John Russell for the prevention of bribery, and remedying some of the abuses to which election proceedings were liable. The main object of this Bill, as described by the noble Mover in introducing it, was not so much to impose additional penalties on bribery, as to endeavour to bring to light by more efficacious means than had hitherto been proposed, bribery which had been actually committed instead of leaving it, as before, to the chance of exposure afforded by the proceedings of parties, who were only concerned in the pursuit of a private right, and could not be expected to carry on the investigation for public objects when that end was obtained. By the following provisions, he proposed to secure the further prosecution of such cases :

"The first part of the Bill was intended to facilitate disclosures of actual bribery before Committees. It was proposed that parties making a charge of bribery, should give in lists of the alleged bribers; the voters, not being able satisfactorily to defend their votes, to be disfranchised on the report of the Committee to that effect. Witnesses would be indemnified against the usual penalties, on making a full disclosure of acts of bribery. It was also provided that the Members, the candidates, and their agents, should be examined by the Committee. The next part of the Bill was to prevent corrupt compromises. The Committee, on being satisfied that a compromise had been made, that the proceedings had consequently come to a premature close, or that the petition had been withdrawn by a

compromise, might report to the House that such was their belief; and the House might give them authority to proceed with the case. As the private parties could not be called upon to pursue the inquiry at that stage, he proposed that the complaint should be prosecuted by a solicitor or agent, appointed by the Speaker or by the General Committee nominated by the Speaker: if it should be found that bribery had been committed by the sitting Member or Members, the Committee should have the power of declaring the election void, as at present. If the sitting Members be convicted of bribery, the costs of the petition should be borne by them; in other cases, by the petitioners. He now came to another class of cases, which did not come regularly before Election Committees-those in which petitions generally alleged extensive bribery, though there might be no person inclined to take the risk of prosecuting an opposing petition. In some old boroughs, a sitting Member might be at once sacrificed; or it might be agreed, that some particular candidate should be allowed to take his seat at the next election. In such cases, the petition making the allegation might be tried by order of the House, in the same way as an election petition; and in the same way the election might be declared void. The effect intended was, that candidates should not in future expect by large payments of four or five thousand pounds, to secure a seat in the House. It would be a great check on bribery by candidates, if it could be proved to them, that they would lose the very seat which they coveted. With the persons bribed the case was different; their object was immediate reward in

the shape of money, and the appropriate punishment was disfranchisement. The next case to be dealt with was, that of an entire borough convicted of bribery; it might be disfranchised—which would be a complete remedy in the case of small boroughs returning Members only by right of prescription; but in the case of the larger boroughs, as Liverpool or Birmingham, they could not be deprived of the right to return Members. The Bill for the disfranchisement of the Liverpool freemen, who had been convicted of bribery, was a step in the right direction."

Another important feature in the Bill would be the establishment of a new machinery for the disfranchisement of entire boroughs, in which he had copied some alterations made in a Bill of his own by the House of Lords, in 1834:

"I should propose, in adopting generally the principle of that Bill, that there should be either five Peers and four Commoners, or four Peers and five Members of the House of Commons, constituting a commission of nine Members; and that this Commission, instead of a judge as proposed by the Lords, should be presided over by one of the Peers, who should be named by the Crown for that purpose. I should propose that all the Members be named by the Crown ; thinking it better that Her Majesty, by her responsible advisers, should choose the persons for this sort of inquiry, than that either House should, by a majority, or any other mode, select Members for this purpose. However, this is a point for future consideration."

"I should propose to give to this Commission the power of seeking