form, was with those who thought it wrong. Nevertheless, the government being advised that the larger and more favorable view was the right view, always acted upon it. He mentioned this because the rule which was now adopted, even though it might not coincide with the view some lawyers took, did coincide with the view the government took of the measure of our own obligations. We stopped altogether five ships, and it was a total mistake to suppose that in the case of the two rams there was any assumption of power beyond the law, because the government acted on evidence which they thought to be sufficient. In the cases of the Georgia and Shenandoah, nothing was done within this jurisdiction, and no information was given to the gov ernment. The Shenandoah was not even suspected by any one in this country, and it was not until she got into Portuguese waters that she received her armament. As to the Alabama, she was officered by Americans and was armed at the Azores, but here she was equipped as a ship destined for the merchant service. On the 23d of June, 1862, Mr. Adams gave Earl Russell information, unaccompanied with evidence, and the gov ernment made inquiries and could learn nothing. Without proof of the destination of the belligerent, there was no case which could be acted upon. Mr. Adams then obtained a considerable body of evidence, which he sent to Earl Russell, who submitted it to the law officers of the Crown on the Saturday evening, so that they did not get it until Monday morning; their opinion that it was sufficient was not received until Tuesday morning, and that morning the vessel went away. Of course the law officers of the Crown would attend to urgent business on Sundays, but in this case the papers were not sent to their offices until late on Saturday evening, and, in the ordinary course, Sunday intervened before they received them; but there was as much diligence as was ordinarily exercised in legal matters for the government, as well as for private persons, and there was sufficient to show that the government acted with good faith. As to what followed, when ships were in the, hands of belligerents, we did exactly what the United States would have done under similar circumstances, and we did not allow the ships to enter any of our ports.

While the arbitration was pending it would not become him to enter into detail so much as he otherwise might have done as to the concurrence of the authorities of the United States themselves in the principles upon which hitherto we had acted. It could not be wondered that, if we thought it a matter of national honor to act when we were neutrals on the principles we evinced as belligerents, we should expect the United States when they were belligerents to act on the principles they avowed as neutrals; and had they done so this controversy would not have been so long kept alive. All their authorities on jurisprudence, notably Wheaton, had held that the fitting out of armed ships in neutral territory for a belligerent was lawful, and during the French revolutionary war no one thought of holding the United States responsi ble for captures on the high seas, not brought into their own ports, of privateers which the French had fitted out in the most remarkable manner in the ports of the United States, most openly, and in defiance of the legal sovereignty of the United States themselves. The idea of holding them responsible for the prizes brought into the ports of the United States was never advocated; and even as to them they declined to be responsible for their restitution, when they had been brought in before a particular day in 1793, on which notice was given to the French minister that he was not to be permitted to use the ports of the United States any longer. As to all brought in before, they declined responsibility, and our government did not press it; as to all after, they undertook to restore them; and in cases in which it was admitted proper diligence had not been used, it was afterward agreed by treaty to make compensation. Between 1815 and 1818 there was a controversy, between Spain and the United States with respect to ships fitted out in the ports of the United States which had committed depredations on the ships of Spain during her wars with her colonies, and uniformly the United States maintained that they were not responsible for the captures made by those ships, that their obligation was to enforce their own law upon sufficient evidence, and that failing the production of it they were not responsible. The controversy closed in 1819 with a treaty which involved the cession of Florida, and by which all claims on both sides were waived without prejudice to the attitude the United States had assumed. A similar controversy between the United States and Portugal was carried on from 1816 to 1850, and over and over again the United States refused to refer any such claims to commissioners, saying that there was no responsibility for acts done beyond their jurisdiction, even by their own citizens, and although the ships had been armed in their own ports. Surely this country could not be considered as acting otherwise than in a spirit of bona fide neutrality when it uniformly professed to adhere to that measure of obligation which the United States had laid down for themselves. He maintained that Lords Russell and Clarendon were perfectly justified, in the first instance, in declining to go into arbitration; they were only doing the very thing which had been done by the United States in the controversy with Portugal as recently as 1850. The real truth of the matter was that this country did not like to be at variance with the United States. Whatever might be the measure of our obligation, whatever the legal view of it, this country most deeply regretted that ships had

GREAT BRITAIN.

escaped from our shores and committed depredations on the commerce of the United States, [hear,] and we preferred to waive a strict examination of the question on legal and international grounds in order to get a settlement of it which should bring security for the present and peace and good will for the future. Those were the feelings with which Lord Stanley negotiated the treaty with Mr. Reverdy Johnson; and when that step had been taken it became manifestly impossible to go back. While he did not wish to say a word against the treaty which Lord Stanley negotiated, which fairly expressed the sentiments and wishes of the country, he had no hesitation in saying that he greatly preferred the present proceeding. ["Order, order."]

It was now turned 10 minutes to 7 o'clock, when, by the standing orders, the debate could not proceed, and

Colonel Wilson Patten rose to suggest that, considering the importance of the subject and of the speech, and that it was so desirable to preserve the continuity of both, the debate should be resumed at 9 o'clock.

Mr. Baillie Cochrane had no objection to postpone the motion which stood first in his name if he were promised one hour on Tuesday at 2 o'clock.

Mr. Gladstone could not give the desired pledge, and

The Speaker made the order for resuming the debate the first after supply.

Mr. Gladstone moved that the house, at its rising, should adjourn to 12 o'clock on Saturday, which was agreed to, and it was stated that no supply would be taken, but that the bill relating to the judicial committee of the privy council would be considered.

The sitting was suspended at 7 o'clock.

The house re-assembled at 9 o'clock.

THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

On the order of the day for going into committee of supply, Mr. Eastwick, Mr. Baillie Cochrane, and Sir W. Lawson, who had notices on the paper which were entitled to precedence, yielded to an appeal of Mr. Cardwell and Mr. Gladstone, and allowed the debate, which had been interrupted at 10 minutes to 7 o'clock, to be resumed, on condition that an opportunity would be afforded next week for bringing on their respective motions.

Sir Roundell Palmer said that when the sitting was suspended he was endeavoring to express what he felt on the subject of the arrangements between Lord Stanley, then secretary for foreign affairs, and Mr. Reverdy Johnson for a general arbitration of the questions in dispute between the two countries. He confessed that Lord Russell, the illustrious man under whom he had the honor to serve, and on whom fell a great part of the responsibility for the affairs to which reference had been made, was, in his opinion, perfectly justified in declining to go to arbitration at all. That was a course exactly similar to that which had been taken by the United States when a similar question arose between the United States and Portugal. He did not, therefore, himself share in the prevalent feeling of satisfaction at the arrangement made by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. It appeared to him to be attended with such considerable risk of unsatisfactory results that, as far as he was concerned, he would have preferred that matters should remain in the position in which they stood under the previous administrations of Lord Russell and Lord Palmerston. His reasons were these: In the first place, he would never have been a willing party to any arbitration whatever of any point which seemed to him to involve the honor of this country or the good faith of the government. [Hear, hear.] There were matters fit for arbitration, but this was not one. Every country was answerable for its own honor, and no referee whatever ought to be called in to determine questions of that kind. That was equally true with regard to questions of good faith. Of course it was not the intention of Lord Stanley to refer any question of honor to arbitration. But in such a reference as that to which he and Mr. Reverdy Johnson agreed, it was manifest that if there had been an unfavorable award against this country, it would have been capable of being represented as affecting the honor and good faith of this country. [Hear.] All matters were left entirely at large; there was no question, from the proclamation downward, which had been in difference between the two countries which was not involved in that reference, and whatever award might have been made either party would have been at liberty to place its own construction upon it. Arbitration between nations was a very good thing, and certainly we, as a nation, were bound to take that view, seeing that at the time of the declaration of Paris we concurred in a proposition that it was desirable to refer to arbitration all international disputes which would admit that kind of solution. But such international references had their disadvantages as well as their advantages. It was extremely difficult to find an arbitrator or arbitrators of whose absolute, rigid, judicial impartiality there could be no reasonable degree of doubt. He did not at all decline to follow his right honorable friend opposite in some observations he had made as to the particular powers chosen as arbitrators in the present case. He was perfectly ready to admit that they were as trustworthy, honorable, and capable as

any arbitrators that could be chosen in the whole civilized world. [Hear, hear.] But of all such high arbitrators this must be said, that they could not enter without a certain degree of bias upon the consideration of certain great public questions. We and the United States were the two great maritime powers of the world; we could not possibly find as arbitrators any power like ourselves. In one respect that would tend to impartiality of decision, but in other respects there would be a risk of encountering a current of opinion different from that which has prevailed between the two countries parties to the arbitration, and possibly there might be an unconscious bias of political interest arising from the point of view which the powers called in to arbitrate might naturally regard similar questions. Bearing that in mind, he would never have been a willing party to making any reference whatever to a form of international arbitration which could possibly result in an award which might be regarded by the world at large, or by the other party, as affecting the honor and the good faith of this country. That appeared to him a great objection to an arbitration simply at large, such as that agreed upon by Lord Stanley and Mr. Reverdy Johnson. There was another consideration of less importance, which, however, deserved to be mentioned. The elements

of the question then proposed to be referred to arbitration were not at all limited or defined. It would have been competent for the arbitrators to have awarded against us upon any of the numerous grounds vaguely involved in the whole matters in dispute. For instance, if they thought that we ought not to have issued any neutrality proclamation, and they were not bound to give their reasons for the award. He did not fear on that point, because his impression had always been that while we were really clear on the main points we were a thousand times more clear on that. [Hear, hear.]

But the matter would have been attended with this inconvenience, that whichever way the award was given, whether for us or against us, nobody would have known the principles upon which it was founded. Suppose the award were in our favor, what might have followed? How would that party in the United States which had been irritated themselves, and had constantly fomented irritation against Great Britain, have regarded an award unfavorable to them? They might have said: "The arbitrators have determined that what was done in Great Britain was right in international law. Very well; then it is not necessary to use due diligence to prevent ships of war from being fitted out and armed to operate against the commerce of a belligerent power, for we assert that Great Britain did not use due diligence." The result, therefore, might have been to exonerate us from responsibility and pecuniary liability, but at the same time to establish it as a rule among nations that whether they had neutrality laws, such as the United States, and we had or not, governments were not under any sort of obligation towards each other to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out and armament of ships of that description. Such a view as that would not have tended to satisfactory relations between the two countries, for if in the case of a war in which Great Britain was involved, those who had participated in the irritation against us wished to connive at ships like the Alabama being fitted ont against our commerce, the award would not in the least have stood in the way of such a disposition; nay, it would rather have led to its more open indulgence. It seemed to him that this country, if it were to have its own will and its own way, would never go to war at all, feeling that war was a great crime and a great wickedness. [Hear, hear.1 That being so, he did not look forward to frequent wars on the part of this country. But that very feeling was likely to involve us in the disagreeable alternative either of having to go to war or of submitting to such affronts and insults that our most honorable men and wisest statesmen would consider that war was the lesser evil. Suppose that in the background, then, that great country, the United States, which ought to be our friend, was in such a frame of mind as to be inclined to ally itself with our opponents, or not to be very active in enforcing the neutrality laws against its own citizeus, what would be the result? We knew what it had been in the case of Spain and Portugal, to which he had already referred. Therefore a decision favorable to us might leave us in no respect better off with regard to security than we were before. By that mode of arbitration, it should be observed that no rule as to the future would be agreed upon between the two countries. Whatever was vague and disputable in international law before would remain so still. On the other hand, if the award were against us, it would have laid down no rules whatever, and the United States would have been quite entitled, if it suited their convenience, to stand on the letter of their laws and say in our case, as they did in that of Spain and Portugal before: "We shall put the laws in force whenever we have sufficient information and proof of the facts, but we are not obliged to make a better or stronger law than we have already." This country became irrevocably committed to the principle of arbitration on this subject, both by the action of Lord Stanley and the subsequent action of Lord Clarendon, members of two successive governments representing both the great parties in this country. He expressed no opinion whether the course they adopted was wise or unwise. But when that course was adopted it was totally impossible for the government to avoid repeating the offer of arbitration which they had made on the subject before. Mr. Fish said a removal of the differences which arose during the rebellion in America was essential

to the restoration of cordial and amicable relations between the two governments. It would have been mere mockery to deal with the fishery question and other things and to omit to include this when we were told we never could have a restoration of amicable relations unless this was included.

The first question was whether Her Majesty's government should have insisted on the renewal of the Reverdy Johnson treaty. Was it reasonably possible for them to do so? Could it be supposed that the United States would, without modification, agree to the very thing which they had rejected? He apprehended the house would agree with him that it was desirable that arrangements should be made to give the greatest possible amount of security for a good understanding for the future, to insure us against acts of retaliation in case we should be at war, and thereby prevent other countries from supposing that in case of war between us and them the United States would commit acts of retaliation on our commerce. If we had obtained that for the future we had got a very excellent thing, which we should not have got under the arrangement made by Lord Stanley with Mr. Reverdy Johnson. The manner in which these rules were worded had the appearance of a thing which in point of fact was impossible—namely, the creating for the future by an agreement between two nations of new rules of international law. We might make rules binding between the two nations which, in case the world adopted them, would no doubt become established rules of international law, but so long as they rested on a contract only between the two nations, they would be binding only on the two nations. He should have liked the phraseology of these rules if it had been different from what it was. But it should be remembered that to negotiate a treaty at Washington was a different thing from negotiating a treaty at London. With regard to forms of expression, the American commissioners had an advantage, because they were at home and could at once communicate with their government, whereas the British commissioners, owning to the delay which would occur in communicating by letter with Her Majesty's government, would not think it worth while to oppose the introduction of forms of expression insisted upon by the American commissioners. The first rule was that a "neutral government is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a power with which it is at peace, and also to use like due diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use." That appeared to him to be a very good rule. What was meant by "due diligence?" He supposed it was meant that a neutral should use all the means in its power. It had been objected that the latter part of the rule departed from the former because it did not repeat the words "has reasonable grounds to believe;" but that, he thought, was a very ill-grounded criticism. "Like due diligence" implied the words "has reasonable ground to believe" used in the former part of the rule, and there was no necessity to repeat those words. We, by our present foreign enlistment act, had ample powers to prevent the fitting out, &c., of such a vessel as was referred to in this rule, and the United States must pass a bill as stringent as that which we passed last session. He had no doubt they would. With regard to the second rule, he confessed when he first read it he was somewhat alarmed. He thought it was expressed with a degree of vagueness which might be dangerous, and which might be extended to things which he did not think it possible the commissioners could have meant. The second rule is this, that "a neutral government is bound not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms or the recruitment of men." On this point he had been fortunate enough to elicit from the right honorable gentleman at the head of the government, in reply to a question he put to him on the 13th of June last, a most satisfactory answer, to the effect that this second rule was understood by Her Majesty's government and by the British and American commissioners as applying solely to vessels cruising or carrying war against a belligerent, and not to the case of military supplies or arms exported for the use of a belligerent from neutral ports or waters in the ordinary course of commerce. The right honorable gentleman had proceeded further to state that the President of the United States himself understood the rule in that sense, and would be the first not only to admit and allow, but to contend for, that construction of it. In the face of such an assurance on the part of the great states which were parties to this treaty it would be unbecoming for him to criticise the vagueness of the language in which the rule was couched, and without doubt this construction of it would be clearly laid before those foreign powers who were to be asked to accede to it. The third rule, being a mere corollary of the other two, required no separate comment. As far as these rules applied to the future, therefore, we had gained the assurance of a good and useful understanding between the two nations, which would go far toward repaying us for any pecuniary loss which we might possibly sustain in consequence of the award being founded upon these rules, instead of upon the principles of international law which

were actually in existence at the time of the escape of the Alabama. The future observance of these rules to which foreign nations were to be asked to accede would tend to promote a good understanding between all the powers, and to preserve the peace of the world. In dealing with the question of the retrospective application of these rules to the matter in dispute he apprehended that it was to be expected that the United States would not have agreed to be bound by them in the future unless we had assented to their operation being made retrospective, and, therefore, in his judgment it was worth our while to run the risk of having to undergo a pecuniary sacrifice in order to insure their adhesion to these rules. The terms of the treaty gave us this further advantage, that they distinctly set forth that for the sake of securing a good understanding between the two countries we agreed to be bound by conditions that were not in existence at the time when the cause of dispute arose. But, after all, the United States had a right to call upon us to execute in good faith our municipal law, and there was not such a very great difference between our municipal law and the language of these rules. The language of the first rule only differed from that of the 7th section of our own foreign enlistment act, which was in force at the time, by introducing the words to the effect that vessels which come within the ban were those which had been specially adapted in neutral ports in whole or in part to warlike uses. It was perfectly true that Lord Chief Baron Pollock and Baron Bramwell, as well as other great legal authorities, had thought that these words did not convey the true meaning of our foreign enlistment act, which, in their opinion, was intended to apply only to those vessels which should be armed completely and which left our waters in a condition to commence hostilities. But this had never been the opinion of the government, who, following the view taken by Barons Channell and Pigott, thought that the act would apply in cases in which vessels might not be completely armed and equipped, but merely adapted for war. Therefore, the application of this rule retrospectively was not so violent a change in our obligations as might have been supposed at first sight.

The other rule, as interpreted by the right honorable gentleman at the head of Her Majesty's government and by the minister of the United States, corresponded in like manner with the 8th section of our foreign enlistment act. It dealt with the renewal or augmentation of warlike equipments of belligerent vessels. The clause in the old foreign enlistment act applied only to ships actually in the war service of a belligerent power at the time when their equipment was augmented, whereas this rule extended also to ships intended to be used for the purpose of war service. Indeed, he maintained that these rules corresponded with each other, and did not go beyond the obligation we imposed on ourselves by our municipal law. Looking at all the circumstauces, he was well content to acquiesce in and accept the recent arrangement with all its imperfections. [Hear.] He did not propose to go into all those matters which his right honorable friend opposite had touched upon with much more authority in regard to the colonial aspect of the question, but he might remark that he agreed with his right honorable friend that it was a blemish that the demands of Canada against the United States for the damage done by Fenian raiders should not have been included in the treaty. [Hear.] He was the more anxious to say this because the demands of the United States against Canada in reference to the landing of certain confederates at St. Albans were not only complied with, but anticipated by the spontaneous action of the Canadian legislature, which at once voted the money necessary to make good the losses. The United States might, he thought, feel on calm consideration that the principle of the reference we agreed to make applied at least as forcibly to the Fenian raids. Nevertheless, if from the arrangement which had been entered into permanent peace and good will were brought about between two great countries, he was willing to pay a greater price for such a result than we should have to pay under this treaty. [Hear, hear.]

Sir S. Northcote felt it was impossible for him to add anything to the arguments advanced by his honorable and learned friend the member for Richmond in favor of the general principle and provisions of the treaty, and with regard to other questions raised by his right honorable friend, (Sir C. Adderly,) it might appear more proper that he should leave it to Her Majesty's government to answer questions and dispose of objections which came rather within their cognizance than within the cognizance of an individual member of the late high commission. Still, there were two considerations which induced him to trespass for a short time on the attention of the house. First of all, he desired to express a hope that his right honorable friend would not press the motion, because he could say, from his own experience in the conduct of the negotiations, that although there existed a not inconsiderable amount of correspondence between Her Majesty's government and the commissioners, it would not in his opinion be advantageous to any one that that correspondence should be given to the world. It was thought desirable on all accounts that the negotiations should be conducted with that freedom which was only possible among those who knew that their communications with one another would be private. The questions the commissioners had to deal with were of the most delicate character. They affected the good rela