takes in thinking and reafoning, we fhall find, I fuppofe, that when we make any propofitions within our own thoughts about white or black, fweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, without reflecting on the names. But when we would confider, or make prop. ofitions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we ufually put the name for the idea because the ideas thefe names ftand for, being for the most part imperfect, confufed, and undetermined, we reflect on the names themfelves, becaufe they are more clear, certain and diftinct, and readier occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas and fo we make use of these words inftead of the ideas themfelves, even when we would meditate and reafon within ourselves, and make tacit mental propofitions. In fubftances, as has been already noted, this is occa fioned by the imperfection of our ideas; we making the name stand for the real effence, of which we have no idea at all. In modes, it is occafioned by the great number of fimple ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being compounded, the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and exactly represented to the mind, even in thofe men who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impoffible to be done by thofe, who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of their language, yet perhaps never trouble themfelves in all their lives to confider what precife ideas the most of them ftood for. Some confused or obfcure notions have ferved their turns; and many who talk very much of religion and conla Science, of church and faith, of power and right, of obftructions and humours, of melancholy and choler, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations, if one fhould defire them to think only of the things themfelves, and lay by thofe words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom them felves alfo. CHAP. XI. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses. 14. Firft, In fimple Ideas by fynonymous Terms, or showing, 15. Secondly, In mixed Modes by Definition. 16. Morality capable of Demonftration. 19. Thirdly, In Subftances by fhowing and defining. 20, 21. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Subftances, are 22. The Ideas of their Powers beft by Definition. 23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits. 24. Ideas alfo of Substances must be conformable to things, OF KNOWLEDGE AND OPINION. Of Knowledge in general. 1. Our Knowledge converfant about our Ideas. 3. This Agreement fourfold. 4. Firft, Of Identity or Diverfity, b 5. Secondly, Relation. SECT. CHAP. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge. I. Intuitive. 2. Demonstrative. 3. Depends on Proofs. 4. But not fo easy. 5. Not without precedent Doubt. 6. Not fo clear. 7. Each step must have intuitive Evidence. 14. Senfitive Knowledge of particular Existence. SECT. Of the Extent of Human Knowledge. 1, First, No farther than we have Ideas. 2. Secondly, No farther than we can perceive the Agree ment or Difagreement. 3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge extends itfelf not to all the Relations of all our Ideas. 4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative Knowledge. 5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledge narrower than either. 6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge therefore narrower than our Ideas. 7. How far our Knowledge reaches. 8. First, Our Knowledge of Identity and Diversity, as far as our Ideas. 9. Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way. 10. Because the Connection between moft fimple Ideas is unknown 11. Efpecially of fecondary Qualities. 12-14. And farther, Because all Connection between any fecondary and primary Qualities is undiscoverable. 15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger. 16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little Way. 17. Of Spirits yet narrower. 18. Thirdly, Of other Relations, it is not eafy to fay how far. Morality capable of demonftration. 19. Two Things have made moral Ideas thought incapable of demonstration. Their Complexedness and Want of fenfible Reprefentations. 20. Remedies of thofe difficulties. 21. Fourthly, Of real Exiftence, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, fenfible of fome few other Things. 22. Our Ignorance great. 23. First, One Caufe of its Want of Ideas, either fuch as we have no Conception of, or fuch as particularly we have not. 24. Because of their Remotenefs, or, 25. Because of their Minuteness. 25. Hence no Science of Bodies. 27. Much lefs of Spirits. 28. Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connection between Ideas we have. 29. Inftances. 30. Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas. 31. Extent in refpect of Univerfality. SECT. CHAP. IV. Of the Reality of our Knowledge. 1. Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vifion. 2. 3. Anfwer, Not fo, where Ideas agree with Things. 4. As, First, All fimple Ideas do. 5. Secondly, All complex Ideas excepted. 6. Hence the Reality of Mathematical Knowledge. 7. And of Moral. 8. Existence not required to make it real. 9. Nor will it be lefs true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming. 10. Mifnaming disturbs not the certainty of the Knowl edge. 11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us. 12. So far as they agree with thofe, fo far our Knowledge concerning them is real. 13. In our Inquiries about Subftances, we must confider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species fuppofed fet out by Names. 14-17. Objection against a Changeling being fomething between Man and Beaft, anfwered. 18. Recapitulation. SECT. CHAP. V. Of Truth in general. 1. What Truth is. 2. A right joining or feparating of Signs ; i. e. Ideas or Words. 3. Which make mental or verbal Propofitions. 4. Mental Propofitions are hard to be treated of 5. Being nothing but the joining, or feparating Ideas without words. 6. When mental Propofitions contain real Truth, and when verbal. 7. Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus all chimerical. 8. Answered, Real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things. 9. Falfehood is the joining of Names otherwife than their Ideas agree. 10. General Propofitions to be treated of more at large, 11. Moral and metaphyfical Truth. |