thefe two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear pofitive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and fo on, fhall as foon reach eternity, as he that adds 400,000,000 of years and fo on; or if he pleafe, doubles the increase as often as he will: the remaining abyfs being ftill as far beyond the end of all thefe progreftions, as it is from the length of a day or an hour. For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our ideas which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is alfo in our idea of extenfion, when we increase it by addition, as well as when we diminish it by divifion, and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite fpace. After a few doublings of those ideas of extenfion, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lofe the clear diftinct idea of that space: it becomes a confufedly great one, with a furplus of ftill greater; about which, when we would argue or reafon, we shall "always find ourselves at a lofs; confufed ideas in our Larguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused, always leading us into confufion."

H. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes. ESIDES what we have already mentioned concern

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Bing ideas, other confiderations belong to them,

in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be fuppofed to reprefent, and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold diftinction; and are,

First, Either real or fantaftical.
Secondly, Adequate or inadequate.
Thirdly, True or falfe.

First, By real ideas, I mean fuch as have a foundation in nature; fuch as have a conformity with the real being and existence of things, or with their archetypes. Fantaftical or Chimerical, I call fuch as have no founda

tion in nature, nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes. If we examine the feveral forts of ideas before-mentioned, we shall find that,

doenig out § 2. Simple, Ideas all real.

FIRST, Our fimple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the images or reprefentations of what does exift; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, hath been already shown. But though whitenefs and colds nefs are no more in fnow than the pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c. being in usthe effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us fuch fenfations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we diftinguish the qualities that are esreally in things themfelves. For thefe feveral appearances being defigned to be the marks whereby we are to know and diftinguish things which we have to do with, mour ideas do as well ferve us to that purpose, and are as real diftinguishing characters, whether they be only conftant effects, or elfe exact refemblances of fomething in the things themselves; the reality lying in that steady correfpondence they have with the diftinct conftitutions of real beings. But whether they answer to thefe conftitutions, as to caufes or patterns, it matters not: it fuffices that they are conftantly produced by them. And thus our fimple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to thofe powers of things which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requifite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in fimple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the opteration of things upon it, and can make to itself no fimple idea, more than what it has received.

3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Combinations. THOUGH the mind be wholly paffive in refpect of its fimple ideas yet, I think, we may fay, it is not fo in refpect of its complex ideas; for thofe being combina tions of fimple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man ufes slome kind of liberty, in forming thofe complex ideas: