clear a notion of brothers, as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia dug Titus out of the parfley-bed (as they ufed to tell children) and thereby became his mother; and that afterwards, in the fame manner the dug Caius out of the parfley-bed, I had aš clear a notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the fkill of a midwife; the notion that the fame woman contributed, as mother, equally to their births (though I were ignorant or mistaken in the manner of it) being that on which I grounded the relation, and that they agreed in that circumftance of birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their defcent from the fame perfon, without knowing the particular circumftances of that defcent, is enough to found my notion of their having or not having the relation of brothers. But though the ideas of particular relations are capable of being as clear and diftinét in the minds of thofe, who will duly confider them, as thofe of mixed modes, and more determinate than thofe of fubftances; yet the names belonging to relation, are often of as doubtful and uncertain fignification, as thofe of fubftances or mixed modes : and much more than those of fimple ideas; because relative words being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by men's thoughts, and is an idea only in men's minds, men frequently apply them to different comparifons of things, according to their own imaginations, which do not always corref pond with thofe of others using the fame names.

§ 20. The Notion of the Relation is the fame, whether

the Rule any Action is compared to, be true or falfe. THIRDLY, That in thefe I call moral relations, I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the action with the rule, whether the rule be true or falfe. For if I measure any thing by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or fhorter than that fuppofed yard, though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the ftandard; which indeed is another inquiry. though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it; yet the agreement or disagreement obfervable in that which I compare with it, makes me perceive the relation. Though measuring by a wrong rule, I fhall thereby be

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brought to judge amifs of its moral rectitude, because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule; yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that action bears to that rule I compare it to, which is agreement or disagreement.

CHAP. XXIX.

OF CLEAR AND OBSCURE, DISTINCT AND CONFUSED

IDEAS.

§ 1. Ideas fome clear and diftinct, others obfcure and

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confufed.

AVING fhown the original of our ideas and taken a view of their feveral forts; confidered the difference between the fimple and the complex; and obferved how the complex ones are divided into those of modes, fubftances, and relations; all which, I think, is.. neceffary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progrefs of the mind in its apprehenfion and knowledge of things: it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of ideas. I muft, neverthelefs, crave leave to offer fome few other confiderations concerning them. The first is, that fome are clear, and others obfcure; fome diftinct and others confused.

$2. Clear and obfcure, explained by Sight.

THE perception of the mind being moit aptly explained by words relating to the fight, we fhail beft understand what is meant by clear and obfcure in our ideas, by reflecting on what we call clear and obfcure in the objects. of fight. Light being that which difcovers to us vifible. objects, we give the name of obfcure to that which is not placed in a light fufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours, which are obfervable in it, and which, in a better light, would be difcernible. In like. manner our fimple ideas are clear, when they are fuch as the objects themselves, from whence they were taken, did or might, in a well ordered fenfation or perception, present them. Whilft the memory retains them thus, and can produce them to the mind, whenever it has occafion to confider them, they are clear ideas. So far as

they either want any thing of the original exactness, or have loft any of their firit freshnefs, and are, as it were faded or tarnished by time; fofar are they obfcure. Complex ideas, as they are made up of fimple ones, fo they are clear, when the ideas that go to their compofition are clear; and the number and order of those fimple ideas, that are the ingredients of any complex one, is determinate and certain."

$3. Caufes of Obfcurity.

THE caufes of obfcurity in fimple ideas, feem to be either dull organs, or very flight and tranfient impreffions made by the objects, or elfea weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible objects, to help us to apprehend this matter: if the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not receive the impreffion of the feal, from the ufual impulfe wont to imprint it; or, like wax of a temper too foft, will not hold it well when well imprinted, or elfe fuppofing the wax of a temper fit, but the feal not applied with a fufficient force to make a clear im-1 preffion in any of thefe cafes, the print left by the feal' will be obfcure. This, I fuppofe, needs no application to make it plainer.

$4. Diftinct and confufed, what.

As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has fuch a full and evident perception, as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well-difpofed organ, fo a diftinct idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other: and a confufed idea is fuch an one as is not fufficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different.

$5. Objection.

Is no idea be confused, but fuch as is not fufficiently dif tinguishable from another, from which it fhould be different; it will be hard, may any one fay, to find any where a confufed idea. For let any idea be as it will, it' can be no other but fuch as the mind perceives it to be; and that very perception fufficiently diftinguishes it from all other ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be fo. No idea therefore can be undiftinguishable from another, from which

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it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself for from all other it is evidently different. $6. Confufion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confufion ideas are at any e chargeable with, we must confider, that things rankunder diftinct names, are fuppofed different enough to be diftinguifhed, that foeach fort by its peculiar name may be marked, and difcourfed of apart upon any occafion and there is nothing more evident, than that the greateft part of different names are fuppofed to ftand for different things. Now every idea a man has, being vifibly what it is, and diftinct from all other ideas but itfelf; that which makes it confufed, is, when it is fuch,. that it may as well be called by another name, as that which itis expreffed by; the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under thofe two different names) diftinct, and makes fome of them belong rather to the one, and some of them to the other of thofe names, be ing left out; and fo the diftinction, which was intended to be kept up by thofe different names, is quite loft. 7. Defaults which make Confufion THE defaults which usually occafion this confufion, I think, are chiefly thefe following:

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Firft, complex Ideas made up of too few fimple ones. FIRST When any complex idea (for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confufion) is made up of too small a number a fimple ideas, and fuch only as are common to other things, wherebythe differences that make it deferve a different name are left out. Thus he that has an idea made up of barely the fimple ones of a beast with spots, has but a confufed idea of aleopard; it not being thereby fufficiently distinguished from a lynx, and feveral other forts of beafts that are fpotted. So that fuch an idea, though it hath the peculiar name leopard, is not diftinguishable from thofe defigned by the names lynx or panther, and may as well come under the name lynx as leopard. How much the custom of defining of words by general terms contributes to make the ideas, we would, exprefs by them, confufed and undetermined, I leave others to confider. This is evident, that confused ideas are

fuch as render the ufe of words uncertain, and takeaway the benefit of diftinct names. When the ideas, for which we ufe different terms, have nota difference anfwerable to their diftinct names, and fo cannot be diftinguifhed by them, there it is that they are truly confused. 8. Secondly, or its fimple ones jumbled diforderly to

gether.

SECONDLY, Another fault which makes our ideas confufed, is, when though the particulars that make up any idea are in number enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not eafily difcernible, whether it more belongs to the name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this confufion, than a fort of pictures ufually fhown as furprifing pieces of art, wherein the colours, as they are laid by the pencil on the table itself, mark out very odd and unusual figures, and have no difcernible order in their pofition. This draught, thus made up of parts wherein no fymmetry nor order appears, is in itfelf no more a confufed thing, than the picture of a cloudy fky: wherein though there be as little order of colours or figures to be found yet nobody thinks it a confufed picture. What is it then that makes it be thought confufed, fince the want of fymmetry does not? As it is plain it does not, for another draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confufed. Ianfwer, That which makes it be thought confufed, is, the applying it to fome name, to which it does no more difcernibly belong, than to fome other: v. g. When it is faid to be the picture of a man, or Cafar, then any one with reafon counts it confufed: becaufe it is not difcernible, in that state, to belong more to the name man, or Cafar, than to the name baboon, or Pompey; which are fuppofed to ftand for different ideas from thofe fignified by man, or Cafar. But when a cylindrical mirror, placed right, hath reduced thofe irregular lines on the tableinto their due order and proportion, then the confufion ceafes, and the eye prefently fees that it is a man, or Cafar, i. e. that it belongs to thofe names; and that it is fufficiently diftinguishable from a baboon, or Pompey, i• e.