Nor is fashion; and so they do that which keeps them in rep. utation with their company, little regard the laws of God, or the magiftrate. The penalties that attend the breach of God's laws, fome, nay perhaps most men, feldom feriously reflect on; and amongst those that do, many, whilft they break that law, entertain thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their peace for fuch breaches. And as to the punishments due from the laws of the commonwealth, they frequently flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity. But no man escapes the punishment of their cenfure and diflike, who offends against the fafhion and opinion of the company he keeps, and would recommend himfelf to. there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own club. He must be of a strange and un ufual conftitution, who can content himself to live in conftant difgrace and difrepute with his own particular fociety. Solitude many men have fought, and been reconciled to: but nobody, that has the least thought orfense of a man about him, can live in fociety under the conftant diflike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converfes with. This is a burden too heavy for human fufferance: and he must be made up of irreconcilable contradictions, who can take pleasure in company, and yet be infenfible of contempt and difgrace from his companions. 3. These three Laws the Rules of Moral Good and Evil. THESE three then, Firft, The law of God; Secondly, The law of politick focieties; Thirdly The law of fath ion, or private cenfure, are thofe to which men varioully compare their actions and it is by their conformity to one of thefe laws, that they take their meafures, when they would judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate their actions good or bad. § 14. Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules. WHETHER the rule, to which, as to a touchitone, we bring our voluntary actions, to examine them by, and try their goodnefs, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the mark of the value we fet upon them: whether, I fay, we take that rule from the fathion of the country, or the will of a lawmaker, the mind is cafily able to obferve the relation any action hath to it, and to judge whether the action agrees or disagrees with the rule; and fo hath a notion of morál goodness or evil, which is either conformity or not conformity of any action to that rule and therefore is often called moral rectitude. This rule being nothing but a collection of feveral fimple ideas, the conformity thereto is but fo or dering the action, that the fimple ideas belonging to it may correfpond to thofe which the law requires. And thus we fee how moral beings and notions are founded on, and terminated in, thefe fimple ideas we have received from fenfation or reflection. For example, let us confider the complex idea we fignify by the word murder; and when we have taken it afunder, and examine ed all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a collection of fimple ideas derived from reflection or fenfation, viz. First, From reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, confidering, purpofing before hand, malice, or wifhing ill to another; and alfo of life, or perception, and felf-motion. Secondly, From fenfation we have the collection of thofe imple fenfible ideas which are to be found in a man, and of fome action, whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man; all which fimple ideas are comprehended in the word murder. This collection of fimple ideas being found by me to agree or difagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in, and to be held by moft men there worthy praife or blame, I call the action virtuous or vicious: if I have the will of a fupreme invifible lawmaker for my rule; then, as I fuppofed the action commanded or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, fin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law, the rule made by the legiflative power of the country, I call it lawful or unlawful, a crime or no crime. So that whencefoever we take the rule of moral actions, or by what standard foever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices, they confit only, and are made up of collections of fimple ideas, which we originally received from fenfe or reflection, and their rectitude or obliquity confifts in the agreement or difagreement with those patterns prescribed by fome law. $15. " To conceive rightly of moral actions we must take notice of them under this twofold confideration. First, As they are in themselves each made up of fuch a collection of fimple ideas. Thus drunkenness, or lying, fignify fuch or fuch a collection of fimple ideas, which I calf mixed modes: and in this fenfe they are as much pofitive abfolute ideas, as the drinking of a horse, or fpeaking of a parrot. Secondly, Our actions are confidered as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this respect they are relative, it being their conformity to, or difagreement with, fome rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: and so, as far as they are compared with a rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a man, as it is a certain politive mode, or particular fort of action, by particular ideas, diftinguished from all others, is called duelling which, when confidered, in relation to the law of God, will deferve the name fin; to the law of fashion, in fome countries, valour and virtue; and to the municipal laws of fome governments, a capital crime. In this cafe, when the pofitive mode has one name, and another name as it ftands in relation to the law, the diftinction may as easily be observed, as it is in fubftances, where one name, v. g. man, is ufed to fignify the thing; another, v. g. father, to fignify the relation. 16. The Denominations of actions often mislead us. But because very frequently the positive idea of the action, and its moral relation, are comprehended together under one name, and the fame word made use of to exprefs both the mode or action, and its moral rectitude or obliquity; therefore the relation itself is lefs taken notice of, and there is often no diftinction made between the pofitive idea of the action, and the reference it has to a rule. By which confusion of these two distinct confiderations under one term, thofe who yield too easily to the impreffions of founds, and are forward to take names for things, are often milled in their judgment of actions. Thus, the taking from another what is his, without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called fealing; but that name being commonly understood to fignify alfo the moral pravity of the action, and to denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called ftealing, as an ill action, difagreeing with the rule of right. And yet the private taking away his fword from a madman, to prevent his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated tealing, as the name of fuch a mixed mode; yet when compared to the law of God, and confidered in its relation to that fupreme rule, it is no fin or tranfgreffion, though the name ftealing ordinarily carries fuch an intimation with it. 17. Relations innumerable. AND thus much for the relations of human actions to a law, which therefore I call moral relations. It would make avolume to go over all forts of relations it is not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It fuffices to our prefent purpose, to how by thefe, what the ideas are we have of this comprehenfive confideration, called relation: which is fo various, and the occafions of it fo many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eafy to reduce it to rules, or under juft heads. Thofe I have mentioned, I think, are fome of the moft confiderable, and fuch as may ferve to let us fee from whence we get our ideas of relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this argument, from what has been faid, give me leave to obferve; 18. All Relations terminate in fimple Ideas. FIRST, That it is evident, that all relation terminates in,and is ultimately founded on, thofe fimple ideas we have got from fenfation or reflection: fo that all we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning) or would fignify to others, when we use words ftanding for relations, is nothing but fome fimple ideas, or collections of fimple ideas, compared one with another. This is fo manifeft in that fort called propor tional, that nothing can be more for when a man fays, honey is sweeter than wax, it is plain that his thoughts in this relation terminate in this fimple idea, fweetness, which is equally true of all the reft: though where they are compounded or decompounded, the fimple ideas they are made up of are, perhaps, feldom taken notice of. V. g. when the word father is mentioned: first, There is meant that particular species, or collective idea, fignified by the word man. Secondly, Thofe fenfible fimple ideas fignified by the word generation: and, thirdly, The effects of it, and all the fimple ideas fignified by the word child. So the word friend being taken for a man, who loves and is ready to do good to another, has all these following ideas to the making of it up; first, All the fimple ideas comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being. Secondly, The idea of love. Thirdly, The idea of readiness or difpofition. Fourthly, The idea, of action, which is any kind of thought or motion. Fifthly, The idea of good, which fignifies any thing that may advance his happinefs, and terminates at laft, if examined, in particular fimple ideas; of which the word good in general fignifies any one, but, if removed from all fimple ideas quite, it fignifies nothing at all. And thus alfo all moral words terminate at last, though perhaps more remotely, in a collection of fimple ideas: the immediate fignification of relative words, being very often other fuppofed known relations; which, if traced one to another, still end in fimple ideas. § 19. We have ordinarily as clear (or clearer) a Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation. SECONDLY, That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a notion of the relation, as we have of thofe fimple ideas wherein it is founded. Agreement or difagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas, as of any other whatsoever; it being but the diftinguishing fimple ideas, or their degrees one from another, without which we could have no diftinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of fweetnefs, light or extenfion, I have too, of equal, or more or lefs of each of these if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another man to be born of the fame woman, Sempronia and fo have as : |