CHAP. XXVIII.

OF OTHER RELATIONS.

1. Proportional.

ESIDES the before-mentioned occafions of time,

B place, and cafualty of comparing, or referring

things one to another, there are, as I have faid, infinite others, fome whereof I fhall mention.

FIRST, The firft I fhall name, is fome one fimple idea; which being capable of parts or degrees, afford an occafion of comparing the fubject, wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple idea, v. g. whiter, fweeter, bigger, equal, more, &c. Thefe relations deperding on the equality and excefs of the fame fimple idea, in feveral fubjects, may be called, if one will, proportional; and that these are only conversant about thofe fimple ideas received from fenfation or reflection, is fo evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§ 2. Natural.

SECONDLY, Another occafion of comparing things together, or confidering one thing, fo as to include in that confideration fome other thing, is the circumstances of their origin or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the relations depending thereon as lafting as the subjects to which they belong; v. g. father and fon, brothers, coufin-germans, &c. which have their relations by one community of blood, wherein they partake in feveral degrees; countrymen, i. e. those who were born in the fame country, or tract of ground; and thefe I call natural relations; wherein we may obferve, that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the ufe of common life, and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain, that in reality the relation is the fame betwixt the begetter and the begotten, in the feveral races of other animals as well as men; but yet it is feldom faid, this bull is the grandfather of fuch a calf; or that two pigeons are coufin-germans. It is very convenient, that by distinct names these relations fhould be

:

obferved, and marked out in mankind; there being occa-
fion, both in laws, and other communications one with
another, to mention and take notice of men under these
relations from whence arife alfo the obligations of fev-
eral duties amongst men.
Whereas in brutes, men
having very little or no caufe to mind these relations,
they have not thought fit to give them diftinct and pe-
culiar names. This, by the way, may give us fome
light into the different ftate and growth of languages;.
which, being fuited only to the convenience of commu-
nication, are proportioned to the notions men have, and
the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them; and
not to the reality or extent of things, nor to the various.
refpects might be found among them, nor the different
abstract confiderations might be framed about them.
Where they had no philofophical notions, there they had
no terms to exprefs them and it is no wonder men
fhould have framed no names for thofe things they found
no occafion to discourse of. From whence it is eafy to
imagine, why, as in fome countries, they may have not
fo much as the name for a horfe; and in others, where
they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horfes
than of their own, that there they may have not only.
names for particular horfes, but also of their feveral re
lations of kindred one to another.

§ 3. Infituted.

THIRDLY, Sometimes the foundation of confidering
things, with reference to one another, is fome act where-
by any one comes by a moral right, power, or obligation
to do fomething. Thus a general is one that hath power
to command an army and an army under a general is
a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man. A
citizen, or a burgher, is one who has a right to certain
privileges in this or that place. All this fort depending
upon men's wills, or agreement in fociety, I call infli
tuted or voluntary; and may be diftinguished from the
natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, fome
way or other alterable, and feparable from the perfons to
whom they have fometimes belonged, though neither of
the fubftances, fo related, be deftroyed. Now, though

thefe are all reciprocal, as well as the reft, and contain in them a reference of two things one to the other; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative name, importing that reference, men ufually take no potice of it, and the relation is commonly overlooked: v. g. a patron and client are easily allowed to be relations, bu. a conflable or dictator are not fo readily, at first hearing, confidered as fuch; because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator, or conftable, expreffing a relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain power over fome others; and fo is fo far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

§4. Moral.

FOURTHLY, There is another fort of relation, which is the conformity, or disagreement, men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called Moral relation, as being that which denominates our moral actions, and deferves well to be examined; there being no part of knowledge wherein we fhould be more careful to get determined ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, obfcurity and confufion. Human actions, when with their various ends, objects, manners, and circumftances, they are framed into distinct complex ideas, are, as has been shown, so many mixed modes, a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, fuppofing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received, polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once; when we frame these notions thus, in our minds, we have there fo many determined ideas of mixed modes. But this is not all that concerns our actions; it is not enough to have determined ideas of them, and to know what names belong to fuch and fuch combinations of ideas. We have a farther and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether fuch actions fo made up are morally good or bad.

$5. Moral Good and Evil.

Coop and evil, as hath been flown, B. II. Ch. 2o. § 2.

and Ch. 21. § 42. are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occafions, or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to fome law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the lawmaker; which good and evil, pleasure or pain, attending our obfervance, or breach of the law, by the decree of the lawmaker, is that we call reward and punishment.

$6. Moral Rules.

Or thefe moral rules, or laws, to which men generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there feems to me to be three forts, with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For fince it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule fet to the free actions of men, without annexing to it fome enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we muft, wherever we fuppofe a law, fuppofe alfo fome reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to fet a rule to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the compliance with, and punish deviation from his rule, by fome good and evil, that is not the natural product and confequence of the action itfelf. For that being a natural convenience, or inconvenience, would operate of itself without a law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law, properly fo called.

$7. Larvs.

THE laws that men generally refer their actions to, to judge of their rectitude, or obliquity, feem to me to be thefe three. 1. The Divine law. 2. The civil law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may fo call it. By the relation they hear to the first of thefe, men judge whether their actions are fins or duties; by the fecond, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices.

§ 8. Divine Law, the Measure of Sin and Duty. FIRST, The Divine law, whereby I mean that law which God has fet to the actions of men, whether pro

mulgated to them by the light of nature, or the voice of revelation. That God has given a rule whereby men fhould govern themselves, I think there is nobody fo brutish as to deny. He has a right to do it; we are, his creatures: he has goodnefs and wifdom to direct our actions to that which is beft; and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands. This is the only true touchftone of moral rectitude, and by comparing them to this law, it is that men judge of the most confiderable morali good or evil of their actions; that is, whether as duties or fins, they are like to procure them happiness or mifcry from the hands of the Almighty.

$9 Civil Law, the Meafure of Crimes and Innocence. SECONDLY, The civil law, the rule fet by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it, is anoth er rufe to which men refer their actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This law nobody overlooks; the rewards and punishments that enforce it be ing ready at hand, and fuitable to the power that makes it; which is the force of the commonwealth, engaged to protect the lives, liberties, and poffeffions of thofe who live according to its laws, and has power to take away life, liberty, or goods from him who difobeys: which is the punishment of offences committed against this law. § 10. Philosophical Law, the Measure of Virtue and

Vice.

THIRDLY, The law of opinion or reputation. Virtue and vice are names pretended and fuppofed every where to ftand for actions in their own na ure right or wrong; and as far as they really are fo applied, they fo far are coincident with the Divine law above mentioned. But yet whatever is pretended, this is vifible, that these names Virtue and Vice, in the particular instances of their application, through the feveral nations and focieties of men in the world, are conftantly attributed only to fuch actions, as in each country and fociety are in reputation or difcredit. Nor is it to be thought ftrange, that men every where fhould give the name of Virtue to