whole body yesterday, as making part of it felf, whofe actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Though if the fame body should still live, and immediately from the feparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar confcioufnefs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

$19.

THIS may how us wherein perfonal identity confifts, not in the identity of fubftance, but, as I have faid, in the identity of confcioufnefs; wherein, if Socrates and the prefent mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the fame perfon: if the fame Socrates waking and fleeping do not partake of the fame confcioufness, Socrates waking and fleeping is not the fame perfon. And to punish Socrates waking for what fleeping Socrates thought and waking Socrates was never confcious of, would be no more of right, than to punifh one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outfides were fo alike, that they could not be diftinguished; for fuch twins have been seen.

$ 20.

Buryet poffibly it will ftill be objected, fuppofe I whol
ly lofe the memory of fome parts of my life, beyond a
poffibility of retrieving them, fo that perhaps I fhall
never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the fame
person that did thofe actions, had thofe thoughts that I
once was confcious of, though I have now forgot them?
To which I anfwer, That we must here take notice what
the word I is applied to; which, in this cafe, is the
man only. And the fame man being prefumed to be
the fame perfon Iis eafily here fuppofed to stand alfo
for the fame perfon. But if it be poffible for the fame
man to have diftinct, incommunicable confcioufnefs at
different times, it is paft doubt the fame man would at
different times make different perfons; which, we fee,
is the fenfe of mankind in the folemneft declaration of
their opinions; human laws not punishing the mad man
for the fober man's actions, nor the fober man for what the

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mad man did, thereby making them two perfons: which is fomewhat explained by our way of speaking in English, when we say such an one is not himself, or is befide himSelf; in which phrases it is infinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that felf was changed, the self-fame perfon was no longer in that man. $21. Difference between Identity of Man and Perfon. BUT yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the fame individual man, fhould be two perfons. To help us a little in this, we muft confider what is meant by Socrates, or the fame individual man.

First, It must be either the fame individual, immaterial, thinking substance; in fhort, the fame numerical foul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the fame animal, without any regard to an immaterial foul.

Thirdly, Or the fame immaterial fpirit united to the fame animal.

Now take which of these fuppofitions you please, it is impoffible to make perfonal identity to confift in any thing but consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allowed poffible, that a man born of different women, and in diftant times, may be the fame man. A way of fpeaking, which whoever admits, muft allow it poffible for the fame man to be two distinct perfons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the fecond and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the fame man any way, but by the fame consciousnefs; and fo making human identity to confift in the fame thing wherein we place perfonal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the fame man to be the fame perfon. But then they who place human identity in consciousness only, and not in fomething else, must confider how they will make the infant Socrates the fame man with Socrates after the refurrection. But whatsoever to fome men makes a man, and confequently the fame individual man, wherein perhaps few are

agreed, perfonal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call felf) without involving us in great abfurdities.

§ 22.

BUT is not a man drunk and fober the fame perfon, why elfe is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk, though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Juft as much the fame perfon, as a man that walks, and does other things in his fleep, is the fame person, and is anfwerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punith both, with a juftice fuitable to their way of knowledge; becaufe, in thefe cafes, they cannot diftinguish certainly what is real, what counterfeit ; and fo the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to perfonality, and perfonality to confcioufnefs, and the drunkard perhaps be not confcious of what he did; yet human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the fercets of all hearts fhall be laid open, it may be reafonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but fhall receive his doom, his confcience accufing or excufing him.

§ 23. Confciousness alone makes Self.

NOTHING but consciousness can unite remote existences into the fame perfon, the identity of fubftance will not do it. For whatever fubftance there is, however framed, without consciousness there is no perfon; and a carcass may be a perfon, as well as any fort of fubftance be fo without confciousness.

Could we fuppofe two distinct, incommunicable confcioufneffes acting the fame body, the one conftantly by day, the other by night; and, on the other fide, the fame consciousness acting by intervals two distinct bodies: I afk in the firft cafe, whether the day and the night-man would not be two as diftinct perfons, as Socrates and Plato? And whether, in the fecond cafe, there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as

much as one man is the fame in two diftinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this fame, and this diftinct confcioufnefs, in the cafes above mentioned, is owing to the fame and diftinct, immaterial fubftances, bringing it with them to thofe bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the cafe; fince it is evident the perfonal identity would equally be determined by the confcioufnefs, whether that confciousness were annexed to fome individual, immaterial fubftance or no. For granting, that the thinking fubftance in manmust be neceffarily fuppofed immaterial, it is evident that immaterial, thinking thing may fometimes part with its paft consciousness, and be restored to it again, as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions: and the mind many times recovers the memory of a paft consciousness, which it had loft for twenty years together. Make thefe intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two perfons with the fame immaterial fpirit, as much as in the former inftance two perfons with the fame body. So that felf is not determined by identity or diverfity of fubftance, which it cannot be fure of, but only by identity of consciousness.

24.

INDEED it may conceive the fubftance, whereof it is. now made up, to have exifted formerly, united in the fame confcious being: but confcioufnefs removed, that fubstance is no more it felf, or makes no more a part of it, than any other fubftance ; as is evident in the inftance we have already given of a limb cut off, of whose heat, or cold, or other affections, having no longer any consciousness, it is no more of a man's felf, than any other matter of the universe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial substance, which is void of that consciousness whereby I am my self to my self : if there be any part of its existence, which I cannot upon recollection join with that prefent consciousness whereby I am now my felf, it is in that part of its existence no more my felf, than any other immaterial being. For whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I

cannot recollect, and by my confciousness make my thought and action, it will no more belong to me, whether a part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being any where exifting.

$25.

I AGREE, the more probable opinion is, that this confcioufnefs is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual, immaterial fubftance.

In all

But let men, according to their diverfe hypothefis, refoive of that as they please. This every intelligent being, fenfible of happiness, or mifery, muft grant, that there is fomething that is himself that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has existed in a continued duration more than one instant, and therefore it is poffible may exift, as it has done, months and years to come, without any certain bounds to be fet to its duration; and may be the fame felf, by the fame consciousness continued on for the future. And thus, by this confcioufnefs, he finds himself to be the fame felf which did fuch or such an action fome years fince, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. which account of self, the fame numerical fubftance is not confidered as making the fame felf: but the fame continued confcioufnefs, in which feveral fubftances may have been united, and again feparated from it, which, whilst they continued in a vital union with that, wherein this confciouinefs then refided, made a part of that fame felf. Thus, any part of our bodies, vitally united to that which is confcious in us, makes a part of our felves but on feparation from the vital union, by which that confcioufnefs is communicated, that which a moment fince was part of our felves, is now no more fo, than a part of another man's felf is a part of me; and it is not impoffible, but in a little time may become a real part of another person. And fo we have the fame numerical fubftance become a part of two different perfons; and the fame perfon preferved under the change of various fubftances. Could we fuppofe any fpirit wholly stripped of all its memory or consciousnefs

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