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BUT next as to the first part of the question, "whether "if the fame thinking fubftance (fuppofing immaterial "fubftances only to think) be changed, it can be the "fame perfon ?" I answer, That cannot be refolved but by those who know what kind of fubitances they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking fubftance to another. I grant, were the fame confcioufnefs the fame individual action, it could not; but it being but a prefent representation of a paft action, why it may not be poffible that that may be reprefented to the mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be fhown. And therefore, how far the confcioufness of past actions is annexed to any individual agent, so that another cannot poffibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of action it is that cannot be done without a reflex act of perception accompanying it, and how performed by thinking fubftances, who cannot think without being confcious of it. But that which we call the fame confcioufnefs, not being the fame individual act, why one intellectual substance may not have reprefented to it, as done by itfelf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by fome other agent; why, I fay, fuch a reprefentation may not poffibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well as feveral representations in dreams are, which yet, whilft dreaming, we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is fo, will, by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of thinking fubftances, be beft refolved into the goodnefs of God, who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his fenfible creatures is concerned in it, will not by a fatal errour of their's transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a fyftem of fleeting animal fpirits, I leave to be confidered. yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed, that if the fame confciousness (which, as has

But

been shown, is quite a different thing from the fame numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking fubftance to another, it will be poffible that two thinking fubftances may make but one perfon. For the fame conciou nefs being preferved, whether in the fame or different fubftances, the perfonal identity is preferved.

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As to the fecond part of the question, "whether the
"fame immaterial fubftance remaining, there may be
"two diftinct perfons ?" which queftion feems to me
to be built on this, whether the fame immaterial being,
being confcious of the actions of its paft duration,
may
be wholly ftripped of all the consciousness of its past ex-
iftence, and lofe it beyond the power of ever retrieving
again; and fo as it were beginning a new account from
a new period, have a confciousness that cannot reach be-
yond this new state. All thofe who hold pre-existence
are evidently of this mind, fince they allow the foul to
have no remaining confcioufnefs of what it did in that
pre-exiftent ftate, either wholly feparate from body, or
informing any other body; and if they should not, it is
plain experience would be against them. So that per-
fonal identity reaching no farther than consciousness
reaches, a pre-exiftent fpirit not having continued fo
many ages in a state of filence, muft needs make dif-
ferent perfons. Suppose a Chriflian Platonift or Pytha-
gorean fhould, upon God's having ended all his works-
of creation the feventh day, think his foul hath exifted
ever fince; and fhould imagine it has revolved in feveral
human bodies, as I once met with one, who was per-
fuaded his had been the foul of Socrates (how reafonably
I will not difpute; this I know, that in the poft he
filled, which was no inconfiderable one, he paffed for a
very rational man, and the prefs has fhown that he
wanted not parts or learning) would any one fay that
he, being not conscious' of any of Socrates's actions or
thoughts, bould be the fame perfon with Socrates ? let
any one reflect upon himfelf, and conclude that he has
in himself an immaterial fpirit, which is that which
VOL. II.

D

1

thinks in him, and in the conftant change of his body keeps him the fame ; and is that which he calls himself : let him alfo fuppofe it to be the fame foul that was in Neftor or Therfites, at the fiege of Troy (for fouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the fuppofition has no apparent abfurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the foul. of any other man: but he now having no confcioufnefs of any of the actions either of Neftor or Therfites, does or can he conceive himself the fame person with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever exifted? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men, he is no more one self with either of them, than if the foul or immaterial spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exift, when it be gan to inform his prefent body; though it were ever fo true, that the fame fpirit that informed Neftor's or Therfites's body, were numerically the fame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the fame person with Neftor, than if fome of the particles of matter that were once a part of Neftor, were now a part of this man ; the fame immaterial substance, without the fame confcioufnefs, no more making the fame perfon by being united to any body, than the fame particle of matter, without consciousness united to any body, makes the fame perion. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Neftor, he then finds himself the fame perfon with Neftor..

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AND thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the fame perfon at the refurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the fame which het had here, the fame consciousness going along with the foul that inhabits it. But yet the foul alone, in the change of bodies, would fcarce to any one, but to him that makes the foul the man, be enough to make the fame man. For should the foul of a prince, carrying

with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as foon as deferted by his own foul, every one fees he would be the fame perfon with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it was the fame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guefs, to every body determine the man in this cafe; wherein the foul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the fame cobler to every one befides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the fame perfon, and the fame man, ftand for one and the fame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleafes, and to apply what articulate founds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleafes. But yet when we will inquire what makes the fame fpirit, man, or perfun, we must fix the ideas of Spirit, man, or perfon, in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the fame, and when not.

§ 16. Consciousness makes the fame Perfon. BUT though the fame immaterial fubftance or foul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the fame man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended, fhould it be to ages past, unites existences and actions very remote in time, into the fame perfon, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediate preceding moment: fo that whatever has the conscioufnefs of prefent and past actions, is the fame perfon to, whom they both belong. Had I the fame confcioufnefs that I faw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I faw an overflowing of the Thames laft winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that faw the Thames overflowed laft winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the fame felf, place that felf in what fubftance you pleafe, than that I who write this am the fame myfelf now whilst I write (whether I confift of all the fame fubftances, material or imma

terial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the fame self, it matters not whether this prefent felf be made up of the fame or other fubftances; I being as much concerned, and as juftly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years fince, appropriated to me now by this felf-confcioufnefs, as I am for what I did the laft moment.

§ 17. Self depends on Confcioufnefs.

SELF is that confcious, thinking thing (whatever fubftance made up of, whether spiritual or material, fimple or compound, it matters not) which is fenfible, or confcious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or mifery, and fo is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that confcioufnefs, the little finger is as much a part of himself, as what is most fo. Upon feparation of this little finger, fhould this confciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the perfon, the fame perfon; and felf then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body. As in this cafe it is the consciousness that goes along with the fubftance, when one part is feparate from another, which makes the fame perfon, and conftitutes this infeparable felf; fo it is in reference to fubftances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this present, thinking thing can join itself, makes the fame perfon, and is one felf with it, and with nothing elfe; and fo attributes to it felf, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that confcioufnefs reaches, and no farther; as every one who reflects will perceive.

18. Objects of Reward and Punishment. In this perfonal identity is founded.allthe right and justice of reward and punishment; happinefs and mifery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, and not mattering what becomes of any fubftance, not joined to or affected with that consciousness. For as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, if the confciousness went along with the little finger, when it was cut off, that would be the fame felf which was concerned for the