confufed conceptions men, indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common words of their language; and fuch a loofe ufe of their words ferves them well enough in their ordinary difcourfes of affairs. But this is not fufficient for philofophical inquiries. Knowledge and reafoning require precife determined ideas. And though men will not be fo importunately dull, as not to understand what others fay, without demanding an ex plication of their terms; nor fo trouble fomely critical, as to correct others in the ufe of the words they receive from them: yet where truth and knowledge are concern, ed in the cafe, I know not what fault it can be to defire the explication of words, whofe fenfe feems dubious; or why a man fhould be afhamed to own his ignorance in what fenfe another man ufes his words, fince he has no other way of certainly knowing it, but by being informed. This abufe of taking words upon truft, has no where fpread fo far, nor with fo ill effects, as amongst men of letters. The multiplication and obftinacy of difputes, which has fo laid waste the intellectual world is owing to nothing more, than to this ill ufe of words. For though it be generally believed that there is great diverfity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controverfies the world is distracted with; yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they fpeak different languages. For I am apt to imagine, that when any of them quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think, all the fame; though perhaps what they would have, be different.

$23. The ends of Language; 1. To convey our Ideas. Toconclude this confideration of the imperfection and abuse of language; the ends of language in our difcourfe with others, being chiefly thefe three: First, To make know one man's thoughts or ideas to another Secondly, To do it with as much eafe and quickness as is poflible; and thirdly, Thereby to convey, the knowledge, of things: language is either abufed or deficient, when it fails of any of thefe three,

First, Words fail in the first of thefe ends, and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view: 1. When men have names in their mouths without any determined ideas in their minds, whereof they are the figns: or, 2. When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas, to which the common ufe of that language does not apply them: or, 3 Whenthey ap ply them very unsteadily, making them stand now for one, and by and by for another idea.

§ 24. 2. To do it with quickness.

SECONDLY, men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quicknefs and eafe that may be, when they have complex ideas without having distinct names for them: This is fometimes the fault of the language itself, which has not in it a found yet applied to fuch a fignification; and fonetimes the fault of the man, who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would how another.

25. 3. Therewith to convey the Knowledge of things. THIRDLY, There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words, when their ideas agree not to the reali ty of things. Though it be a defect, that has its original in our ideas, which are not fo conformable to the nature of things, as attention, ftudy, and application might make them: yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too, when we ufe them as figns of real beings, which yet never had any reality or exiftence.

$26. How Men's Words fail in all thefe. FIRST, He that hath words of any language, without diftinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them, does, fo far as he ufes them in difcourfe, only make a noife without any fenfe or fignification; and how learned foever he may feem by the ufe of hard words or learned terms, is not much more advanced thereby in knowledge, than he would be in learning, who had nothing in his ftudy but the bare titles of books, without poffeffing the contents of them. For all fuch words, how

ever put into difcourfe, according to the right conftruction of grammatical rules, or the harmony of well-turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare founds,, and nothing elfe.

$27.

SECONDLY, He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them, would be in no better a cafe than a bookfeller who had in his warehouse volumes that Jay there unbound, and without titles; which he could therefore make known to others, only by thowing the loofe fheets, and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse, for want of words to communicate his complex ideas which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the fimple ones that compofe them; and fo is fain often, to afe twenty words, to exprefs what another man fignifies in

one,

$ 28.

THIRDLY, He that puts not conftantly the fame fign for the fame idea, but uses the fame words fometimes in one, and fometimes in another fignification, ought to pafs in the fchools and converfation for as fair a man, as he does in the market and exchange, who fells feveral things under the fame name.

29.

FOURTHLY, He that applies the word of any language to ideas different from thofe to which the common ufe of that country applies them, however his own underftanding may be filled with truth and light, will not by fuch words be able to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the founds are fuch as are familiarly known, and eafily enter the ears of thofe who are accustomed to them; yet ftanding for other ideas than thofe they ufually are annexed to, and are wont to excite in the mind of the hearers, they cannot make known the thoughts of him who thus ufes them. $30.

FIFTHLY, He that hath imagined to himfelf fubftances fuch as never have been, and filled his head with ideas. which have not any correspondence with the real nature of things, to which yet he gives fettled and defined names, may fill his difcourfe, and perhaps another man's head, with the fantastical imaginations of his own

brain, but will be very far from advancing thereby one jot in real and true knowledge.

$ 31.

He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and fpeaks only empty founds. He that hath complex ideas, without names for them, wants lib erty and difpatch in his expreffions, and is neceffitated to ule periphrafes. He that ufes his words loofely and unteadily, will either be not minded, or not underftood. He that applies his names to ideas different from their common ufe, wants propriety in his language, and fpeaks gibberish, And he that hath ideas of fubftances difagreeing with the real existence of things, fo. far wants the materials of true knowledge in his underftanding, and hath inftead thereof chimeras.

$32. How in Subftances.

IN our notions concerning fubftances, we are liable to all the former inconveniences; v. g. He that uses the word tarantula, without having any imagination or idea of what it ftands for, pronounces a good word; but fo long means nothing at all by it. 2. He that in a newdifcovered country fhall fee feveral forts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horse or a ftag; but can speak of them only by a defcription, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himfelf. 3. He that uses the word body fometimes for pure extenfion, and fometimes for extension and folidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4. He that gives the name horse to that idea which common ufage calls mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5. He that thinks the name centaur ftands for fome real being, impofes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

$33. How in Modes and Relations.

IN modes and relations generally we are liable only to the four firft of these inconveniences; viz. 1. I may have in my memory the names of modes, as gratitude, or charity, and yet not have any precife ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names. 2. I may have ideas, and not know

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the names that belong to them; v. g. I may have the idea of a man's drinking, till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him ; and yet not know, that it is to be call ed drunkenness. 3. I may have the ideas of virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amifs; v. g. when I apply the name frugality to that idea which others call and fignify by this found, covetousness. 4. I may ufe any of thofe names with inconftancy. 5. But in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas difagreeing to the existence of things: for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure; and relation being but my way of confidering or comparing two things together, and fo alfo an idea of my own making; thefe ideas can scarce be found to difagree with any thing ex ifting, fince they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties infep-arably flowing from the internal conftitution or effence of any fubftance; but as it were patterns lodged in my memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate actions and relations by, as they come to exift. But the mistake is commonly in my giving a wrong name to my conceptions; and fo ufing words in a different fenfe from other people, I am not understood, but am thought to have wrong ideas of them, when I give wrong names to them. Only if I put in my ideas of mixed modes or relations, any inconfiftent ideas together, I fill my head alfo with chimeras; fince fuch ideas, if well examined, cannot fo much as exift in the mind, much lefs any real. being be ever denominated from them.

$34. 7. Figurative Speech alfo an Abufe of Language. SINCE wit and fancy find eafier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative Speeches and allufion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confefs, in difcourfes where we feek rather pleasure and delight than inforination and improvement, fuch ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pafs for faults. But yet if we would fpeak of things as they are, we must allow thatall he art of rhetorick, befides order and clearness, all the