lofophical, and where they have no other intereft but truth. For the words they have a long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them fhould not be re moved.

§ 17. 5. Setting them for what they cannot fignify. FIFTHLY, Another abuse of words, is the fetting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means fignify. We may obferve, that in the general names of fubftances, whereof the nominal effences are only known to us, when we put them into propofitions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moft commonly tacitly fuppofe, or intend they fhould ftand for the real effence of a certain fort of subftances. For when a man fays gold is malleable, he means and would infinuate fome thing more than this, that what I call gold is malleable (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, viz. that gold, i. e what has the real ef=" fence of gold is malleable: which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is infeparable from, the real effence of gold. But a man not knowing wherein that real effence confifts, the connection in his mind of malleableness, is not truly with an effence he knows not, but only with the found gold he puts for it. Thus when we say, that animal rationale is, and animal implume bipes latis unguibus is not, a good definition of a man; it is plain we fuppofe the name man in this cafe to ftand for the real effence of a fpecies, and would fignify, that a rational animal better defcribed that real effence, than as two legged animal with broad nails and without feathers. For elfe why might not Plato as properly make the word donor man ftand for his complex idea, made up of the idea of a body, distinguished from others by a certain. fhape and other outward appearances, as Ariftotle, make the complex idea, to which he gave the name agarC Cr man, of body and the faculty of reasoning joined togeik... er; unless the name or man were fuppofed to stand for fomething elfe than what it fignifies ; and to be put in the place of fome other thing than the idea a man profeffes he would exprefs by it?

§ 18. v. g. Putting them for the real Effences of Sub

ftances.

Ir is true, the names of fubftances would be much more ufeful, and propofitions made in them much more cer, tain were the real effences of fubftances the ideas in our minds which those words fignified. And it is for want of those real effences that our words convey fo little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them: and therefore the mind to remove that imperfection as much as it can, makes them, by a fecret fuppofition, to ftand for a thing having that real effence, as if thereby it made fome nearer aproaches to it. For though the word man or gold fignify nothing truly but a complex idea of properties united together in one fort of fubstances; yet there is scarce any body in the ufe of these words, but often fuppofes each of those names to ftand for a thing having the real effence on which thefe properties depend. Which is fo far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by a plain abuse it adds to it when we would make them ftand for fomething. which not being in our complex idea, the name we ufe can no ways be the fign of.

§ 19. Hence we think every change of our ideas in Subftances, not to change the Species.

THIS fhows us the reafon why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the compofition of the complex one, being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i. e. to be of another species, as is plain in chance. medley, manslaughter, murder, parricide, &c. The rea fon whereof is, becaufe the complex idea fignified by that name is the real as well as nominal effence; and there is no fecret reference of that name to any other ef fence but that. But in fubftances it is not fo. For though in that called gold one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice verfa; yet men do not ufually think that therefore the fpecies is changed: be caufe they fecretly in their minds refer that name, and fuppofe it annexed to a real immutable effence of a thing exifting, on which thofe properties depend. He that adds to his complex idea of gold that of fixednefs or fol

ubility in aq. regia, which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the fpccies; but only to have a more perfect idea, by adding another fimple idea, which is always in fact joined with those other, of which his former complex idea confifted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the idea, is fo far from helping at all, that it only ferves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real effence of that fpecies of bodies, the word gold (which by standing for a more or lefs perfect collection of fimple ideas, ferves to defign that fort of body well enough in civil difcourfe) comes to have no fignification at all, being put for fomewhat whereof wel have no idea, at all, and fo can fignify nothing at all' when the body itself is away. For however it may be thought all one; yet if well confidered, it will be found" a quite different thing to argue about gold in name, and about a parcel of the body itfelf, v. g. a piece of leafgold laid before us; though in difcourfe we are fain to fubftitute the name for the thing.

§ 20. The caufe of the Abufe, a Suppofition of Nature's working always regularly. "THAT which I think very much difpofes men to fubftitute their names for the real effences of fpecies, is the fuppofition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and fets the bounda-" ries to each of thofe fpecies, by giving exactly the fame real internal conftitution, to each individual, which we rank under one general name. Whereas any one who' obferves their different qualities, can hardly doubt, that many of the individuals, called by the fame name, are,` in their internal conftitution, as different one from anoth-" er as feveral of thofe which are ranked under different fpecifick names. This fuppofition, however, that the fame precife internal conflitution goes always with the fame fpecifick name, makes men forward to take those names for the rep refentatives of thofe real effences, though indeed they fig nify nothing but the complex ideas they have in their minds when they use them. So that, if I may fo fay, fignifying one thing, and being fuppofed for, or put in VOL. II.

X

the place of another, they cannot but in fuch a kind of ufe caufe a great deal of uncertainty in men's difcourfes; efpecially in thofe who have thoroughly imbibed the doctrine of fubftantial forms, whereby they firmly imagine the feveral fpecies of things to be determined and distinguished.

§21. This abufe contains two falle fuppofitions.

BUT however prepofterous and abfurd it be to make our names ftand for ideas we have not, or (which is all one) effences that we know not, it being in effect to make dur words the figns of nothing; yet it is evident to any one, who ever fo little reflects on the ufe men make of their words, that there is nothing more familiar. When a man asks whether this or that thing he fees, let it be a drill, or a monftrous foetus, be a man or no; it is evi dent, the question is not, whether that particular thing agree to his complex idea expréfled by the name man but whether it has in it the real effence of a fpecies of things, which he fuppofes his name man to ftand for, In which way of ufing the names of fubftances, there are thefe falfe fuppofitions contained.

Firft, That there are certain precife offences, ac cording to which nature makes all particular things, and by which they are diftinguished into /pecies. That every thing has a real conftitution, whereby it is what it is and on which its fenfible qualities depend, is pat doubt; but I think it has been proved that this makes not the diftinction of fpecies, as we rank them; nor the boundaries of their names.

Secondly, This tacitly alfo infinuates, as if we had ideas of thefe propofed effences. For to what purpose elfe is it to inquire whether this or that thing have the real effence of the fpecies man, if we did not suppose that there were such a specifick effence known? which yet is utterly falfe: and therefore fuch application of names, as would make them ftand for ideas which we have not, muft needs caufe great diforder in difcourfes and reasonings about them, and be a great inconven ience in our communication by werds.

22. 6. A Suppofition that Words have a certain and evident Signification.

SIXTHLY There remains yet another more general, though perhaps lefs obferved abuse of words; andthat is, that men have by a long and familiar ufe annexed to them certain ideas, they are apt to imagine fo near and neceffary a connection between the names and the fignification they use them in, that they forwardly fuppofe one cannot but understand what their meaning is; and therefore one ought to acquiefce in the word's delivered, as if it were pait doubt, that in the use of those common received founds, the fpeaker and hearer had neceffarily the fame precife ideas whence prefuming, that when they have in difcourfe ufed any term, they have thereby, as it were, fet before others, the very thing they talk of. And fo likewife taking the words of others, as naturally tanding for juft what they themselves have been accuf tomed to apply them to, they never trouble themfelves to explain their own, or understand clearly others' meaning. From whence commonly proceed noife and wrangling without improvement or information; whilft men take words to be the conftant regular marks of agreed notions, which in truth are no more but the vol untary and unfteady figns of their own ideas. And yet men think it ftrange, if, in difcourfe, or (where it is of ten abfolutely necellary) in difpute, one fometimes afks the meaning of their terms: though the arguings one: may every day obferve in converfation, make it evident that there are few names of complex ideas which any two men ufe for the fame juft precife collection. It is hard to name a word which will not be a clear inftance of this. Life is a term, none more familiar. Any one almost would take it for an affrout to be afked what he meant by it. And yet if it comes in question, wheth er a plant, that lies ready formed in the feed, have life; whether the embryo in an egg before incubation, or a man in a fwoon without fenfe or motion, be: alive or no, it is eafy to perceive that a clear dif tinet fettled idea does not always acompany the ufe of fo known a word as that of life is. Some grofs and