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CHAP. X.

OF THE ABUSE OF WORDS.

§ 1. Abuse of Words.

ESIDES the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obfcurity and confufion that is fo hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are feveral wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render thefe figns lefs clear and diftinct in their fignification, than naturally they need to be.

2. 1. Words without any, or without clear Ideas. FIRST, In this kind, the first and most palpable abufe is, the ufing of words without clear and diftinct ideas : or, which is worse, figns without any thing fignified. Of these there are two forts:

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I. One may obferve, in all languages, certain words, that if they be examined, will be found, in their first original and their appropriated ufe, not to stand for any clear and diftinct ideas. Thefe, for the most part, the feveral feds of philofophy and religion have introduced.. For their authors, or promoters, either affecting fomething fingular and out of the way of common apprehenfions, or to fupport fome strange opinions, or cover fome weakness of their hypothefis, feldom fail to coin new words, and fuch as when they come to be examined may justly be called infignificant terms. For having either had nodeterminate collection of ideas annexed to them, when they were first invented; or at least fuch as, if well examined, will be found inconfiftent; it is no wonder if afterwards, in the vulgar ufe of the fame party, they remain empty founds, with little or no fignification, amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the diftinguishing characters of their church, or school, without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precife ideas they stand for. I fhall, not need here to heap up inftances: every one's reading and converfation will fufficiently furnish him : or if he wants to be better stored, the great mint-mafVOL. II.

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ters of these kind of terms, I mean the schoolmen and metaphyficians (under which, I think, the difputing natural and moral philofophers of thefe latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

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II: OTHERS there be, who extend this abuse yet farther, who take fo little care to lay by words, which in their primary notation have fearce any clear and diftinct ideas which they are annexed to, that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly use zuords, which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas, without any diftinct meaning at all. Wifdem, glory, grace,. &e. are words frequent enough in every man's mouth; but if a great many of those who use them, fhould be afked what they mean by them, they would be at a Atand, and not know what to anfwer: a plain proof, that though they have learned those sounds, and have them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expreffed to others by them.

$4. Occafioned by learning Names before the Ideas they

belong to.

MEN having been accufamed from their cradles to learn words, which are easily got and retained, before they knew or had framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were thought to fland for, they usually continue to do so alt · their lives; and without taking the pains neceffary to fettle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they drave, contenting themfelves with the fame words other people ufe: as if their very found neceffarily carried with it conftantly the fame meaning. This, though men make a fhift with, in the ordinary occurrences of life, where they find it neceffary to be understood, and there fere they make figns till they are fo; yet this infignif cancy in their words, when they come to reafon con cerning either their tenets or intereft, manifeftly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible

noife and jargon, especially in moral matters, where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas, not regularly and permanentJy united in nature, their bare founds are often only thought on, or at least very obfcure and uncertain notions annexed to them. Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours, and that they may not feem ignorant what they stand for, ufe them confidently, without much troubling their heads about a certain fixedl meaning: whereby, befides the cafe of it, they obtain this advantage, that as in fuch difcourfes they feldom are in the right, fo they are as feldom to be convince,t that they are in the wrong it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no fsettled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no fettled abode. This I guess to be fo; and every one may obferve in himafelf and others, whether it be or not

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1152 Unfteady Appliastion of them. SECONDLY, Another great abufe of words, is, imonfancy in the use of them. It is hard to find a difcourfe written of any fubject, especially of controverfy, wherein one shall not observe, if he read with attention, the fame words (and thofe commonly the most material in the difcourfe, and upon which the argument turps) ufad fometimes for one collection of simple ideas, and fome#times for another; which is a perfect abuse of language. Words being intended for figns of my idees, to make them known to others, not by any natural fignification, but by a voluntary imposition, it is plain cheat antabufe, when I make them ftand fometimes for one thing, and fometimes for another; the wilful doing whereof, can be imputed to nothing but great folly, or greater difhonefty. And a man, in his accounts with another, may, with as much fairness, make the characters of numbers -ftand fometimes for one, and sometimes for another colJection of units (v. g. this character 3 and sometimes for three, fometimes for four, and fometimes for eight) as in his difcourfe, or reafoning, make the fame words ftand for different collections of fimple ideas. If men.

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fhould do fo in their reckonings, I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would fpeak thus, in the affairs and bufinefs of the world, and call eight fometimes feven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would prefently have clapped upon him one of the two names men commonly are difgufted with. And yet in arguings and learned contefts, the fame fort of proceeding paffes commonly for wit and learning: but to me it appears a greater dishonesty, than the mifplacing of counters in the cafting up a debt; and the cheat the greater, by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

§ 6. 3. Affected Obfcurity by wrong Application. THIRDLY, Another abufe of language is, an affected ob fcurity, by either applying old words to new and unusual fignifications, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, without defining either; or elfe putting them fo together, as may confound their ordinary meaning. Though the peripatetick philofophy has been moft eminent in this way, yet other fects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them that are not cumbered with fome difficulties (fuch is the imperfection of human knowledge) which they have been fain to cover with obfcurity of terms, and to confound the fignification of words, which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their weak parts from being difcovered. That body and extenfion, in common use, stand for two diftinct ideas is plain to any one that will but reflect a little. For were their fignification precisely the fame, it would be proper, and as intelligible to fay, the body of an extenfion, as the extenfion of a body; and yet there are those who find it neceffary to confound their fignification. To this abuse, and the mischiefs of confounding the fignification of words,logick and the liberal fciences, as they have been handled in the schools, have given reputation; and the admired art of difputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of languages, whilft it has been made ufe of and fitted to perplex the fignification of words, more than to discover the knowledge and truth of things: and he that will look into that fort of learned writings,

will find the words there much more obfcure, uncertain and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary converfation.

§ 7. Logick and dispute have much contributed to this. This is unavoidably to be fo, where men's parts and learning are estimated by their skill in difputing. And if reputation and reward fhall attend thefe conquefts, which depend moftly on the finenefs and niceties of words, it is no wonder if the wit of man fo employed fhould perplex; involve and fubtilize the fignification of founds, fo as never to want fomething to fay, in op poling or defending any question; the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his fide, but the laft word in the difpute.

§ & Calling it Subtilty..

THIS, though a very ufelefs fkill, and that which I think the direct oppofite to the ways of knowledge, hath yer paffed hitherto under the laudable and efteemed names of fubtilty and deuteness; and has had the applaufe of the fchools, and encouragement of one part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder, fince the philof ophers of old (the difputing and wrangling philofophers I mean, fuch as Lucian wittily and with reafon taxes). and the schoolmen fince, aiming at glory and esteem for their great and univerfal knowledge, eafter a great deal to be pretended to, than really acquired, found this a good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themfelves the admiration of others by unintelligible terms, the apter to produce wonder, because they could Hot be understood whilft it appears in all hiftory, that thefe profound doctors were no wiser, nor more useful than their neighbours ; and brought but fmall advan tage to human life, or the focieties wherein they lived : unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or the perplexing or obfcuring the fignification of old ones, and fo bringing. all things into question and dispute, were a thing prof itable to the life of man, or worthy commendation and reward.