queftions like a reasonable creature: fo that thofe of "his train there generally concluded it to be witchery "or poffeffion; and one of his chaplains, who lived "long afterwards in Holland, would never, from that "time, endure a parrot, but faid they all had a devil in "them. I had heard many particulars in this ftory, and affevered by people hard to be difcredited, which "made me afk Prince Maurice what there was of it. He faid with his ufual plainnefs and drynefs in talk, "there was fomething true, but a great deal falfe, of what had been reported. I defired to know of him what there was of the firft? He told me fhort and coldly, that he had heard of fuch an old parrot "when he came to Brafil; and though he believed "nothing of it, and it was a good way off, yet he "had fo much curiofity as to fend for it; that it was a very great and a very old one; and when it came "first into the room where the prince was, with a great many Dutchmen about him, it faid presently, "What a company of white men are here! They afked bit, what it thought that man was, pointing to the prince? It anfwered, Some general or other. When they brought it clofe to him, he asked it, D'ou venez vous? It anfwered, De Marinnan. The Prince, "A qui efes vous ? The parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, "Que fais tu la? Parrot, Je garde les poulles. "prince laughed, and faid, Vous gardes les poulles? "The parrot anfwered, Ouy moy, & je fcai bien faire; "and made the chuck four or five times that people Infufe to make to chickens when they call them. I fet

The

down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, la juft as Prince Maurice faid them to me. I asked "him in what language the parrot fpoke, and he faid, Join Brafilian; I asked whether he understood Brafilbian? He faid, no; but he had taken care to have

"Whence come ye ?" It anfwered," From Marinnan" The prince," To whom do you belong?" The parrot, "To a Portuguese." Prince, "What do you there?" Parrot, "I look after the chickens." The Prince laughed and faid, "You look after the chickens!" The parrot answered," Yes I, and I know well enough how to do it,”

ま

"two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that "fpoke Brafilian, and the other a Brafilian that fpoke "Dutch; that he afked them feparately and pri "vately, and both of them agreed in telling him just "the fame thing that the parrot had faid. I could

"not but tell this odd ftory, because it is fo much "out of the way, and from the firft hand, and what "may pass for a good one: for, I dare fay, this "prince at least believed himself in all he told me, "having ever paffed for a very honeft and pious man: "I leave it to naturalifts to reason, and to other men "to believe as they please upon it. However, it is "not, perhaps, amifs to relieve or enliven a bufy scene "fometimes with fuch digreffions, whether to the pur"pose or no.'

Same Man.

I HAVE taken care that the reader fhould have the story at large, in the author's own words, becaufe he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagined that so able a man as he, who had sufficiency enough to warrant all the teftimonies he gives of himself, fhould take fo much pains in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin so close not only on a man whom he mentions as his friend, but on a prince, in whom he acknowledges very great honefty and piety, a ftory which, if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The prince, it is plain, who vouches this ftory, and our author, who relates it from him, both of them call this talker a parrot ; and I alk any one elfe, who thinks fuch a ftory fit to be told, whether if this parrot, and all of its kind, had always talked, as we have a prince's word for it, as this one did, whether, I fay, they would not have paffed for a race of rational animals: but yet whether, for all that, they would have been allowed to be men, and not par-} rots? For I prefume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in ↑ most people's fenfe, but of a body, fo and fo fhaped, joined to it; and if that be the idea of a man, fame fucceffive body not shifted all at once, must, as

the

well as the fame immaterial fpirit, go to the making of the fame man.

§ 9. Perfonal Identity.

THIS being premifed, to find wherein perfonal identity confifts, we must confider what perfon stands for; which I think, is a thinking, intelligeht being, that has reason and reflection, and can confider itself as itself, the fame thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness which is infeparable from thinking, and, as it feems to me, effential to it it being impoffible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we fee, hear, fmell, tafte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do fo. Thus it is always as to our present senfations and perceptions and by this every one is to himfelf that which he calls felf; it not being confidered in this cafe, whether the fame felf be continued in the fame or divers fubftances. For, fince consciousnefs always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls felf, and thereby diftinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone confifts perfonal identity, i. e. the famenefs of a rational being and as far as this confciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that perfon; it is the fame felf now it was then; and it is by the fame felf with this prefent one that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

§ 10. Confcioufness makes Perfonal Identity. Bor it is farther inquired, whether it be the fame identical fubftance? This few would think they had reafon to doubt of, if thefe perceptions, with their confeioufnefs, always remained present in the mind, whereby the fame thinking thing would be always confcioufly prefent, and as would be thought evidently the fame to itself. But that which feems to make the dif ficulty is this, that this conscioufnefs being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions, before our eyes in one view, but even the bek

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memories losing the fight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we fometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past felves, being intent on our prefent thoughts, and in found fleep, having no thoughts at all, or at leaft none with that confcioufnefs which remarks our waking thoughts: I fay, in all these cafes, our confcioufnels being interrupted, and we lofing the fight of our past felves, doubts are raised whether we are the fame thinking thing, i. e. the same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not perfonal identity at all the question being, what makes the fame perfon, and not whether it be the fame identical fubstance, which always thinks in the fame perfon; which in this cafe matters not at all: different fubftances by the fame confcioufnefs (where they do partake in it) being united into one perfon, as well as different bodies by the fame life are united into one animal, whofe identity is preserved, in that change of fubftances, by the unity of one continued life. For it being the fame consciousness that makes a man be himself, to himself, perfonal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed folely to one individual fubftance, or can be continued in a fucceffion of feveral substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the fame consciousness it had of it at first, and with the fame confcioufnefs it has of any present action; fo far it is the fame perfonal felf. For it is by the confcioufnefs it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is felf to itself now, and fo will be the fame felf, as far as the fame confcioufnefs can extend to actions paft or to come and would be by distance of time, or change of fubftance, no more two perfons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes to-daythan he did yesterday, with a long or a short fleep between the fame confcioufnefs uniting thofe diftant actions into the fame perfon, whatever fubftances contributed to their production.

$11. Perfonal Identity in Change of Subftances. THAT this is fo, we have fome kind of evidence in our

very bodies, all whofe particles, whilst vitally united to this fame thinking, confcious felf, so that we feel when they are touched, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that happens to them, are a part of our felves; i. e. of our thinking, confcious felf. Thus the limbs of his body are to every one a part of himself; he fympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off an hand, and thereby feparate it from that confcioufnefs he had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himfelf, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus we fee the fubftance whereof perfonal felf confifted at one time, may be varied at another, without the change of perfonal identity; there being no question about the fame perfon though the limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

12. Whether in the Change of thinking Subftances. BUT the question is, whether, if the fame fub"ftance which thinks be changed, it can be the fame "perfon; or remaining the fame, it can be different "perfons ?"

And to this I anfwer, firft, This can be no queftion at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal conftitution, void of an immaterial fubftance. For whether their fuppofition be true or no, it is plain they conceive perfonal identity preferved in fomething elfe than identity of fubftance; as animal identity is preferved in identity of life, and not of fubftance. And therefore thofe who place thinking in an immaterial fubftance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why perfonal identity cannot be preferved in the change of immaterial fubftances or variety of particular immaterial fubftances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material fubftances, or variety of particular bodies; unless they will fay, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the fame life in brutes, as it is one immaterial fpirit that makes the fame perfon in men; which the Cartefians, at leaft, will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.