And

$ 39. Genera and Species are in order to naming. How much the making of fpecies and genera is in order togeneral names, and how much general names are neceffary, if not to the being, yet at least to the completing of a fpecies, and making, it pafs for fuch, will appear, befides what has been faid above concerning ice and water, in a very familiar example. A filent and a ftriking quatch are but one fpecies to those who have but one name for them; but he that has the name watch for one, and clock for the other, and diftinct complex ideas to which thofe names belong, to him they are different fpecies. It will be faid, perhaps, that the inward contrivance and conftitution is different between thefe two, which the watchmaker has a clear idea of. yet, it is plain, they are but one fpecies to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is fufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new fpecies? There are fome watches that are made with four wheels, others with five is this a fpecifick difference to the workman? Some have ftrings and phyfies, and others none; fome have the balance loofe, and others regulated by a fpiral fpring, and others by hog's briftles are any or all of thefe enough to make a specifick difference to the workman, that knows each of thefe, and feveral other different contrivances, in the internal conftitution of watches? It is certain each of these hath a real difference from the reft: but whether it be an effential, a specifick difference or no relates only to the complex idea, to which the name watch is given as long as they all agree in the idea which that name ftands for and that name does not as a generical name comprehend different fpecies under it, they are not effentially nor fpecifically different. But if any one will make minuter divifions from differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to fuch precife complex ideas, give names that shall vail; they will then be new fpecies to them who have thofe ideas with names to them; and can, by those differences, diftinguifh watches into thefe feveral forts, and then watch will be a generical name. But yet they would be no diftinct Species to men ignorant of clock

pre

work and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward fhape and bulk, with the marking of the hours by the hand. For to them all thofe other names would be but fynonymous terms for the fame idea, and fignify no more, nor no other thing but a watch. Juft thus, I think, it is in natural things. Nobody will doubt that the wheels or fprings (if I may fo fay) within, are different in a rational man and a changeling, no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a drill and a changeling. But whether one or both thefe differences be effential or fpecifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or difagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for for by that alone can it be determined, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a man or no.

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$40. Species of artificial things lefs confused than natural. FROM what has been before faid, we may fee the reafon why, in the fpecies of artificial things, there is generally lefs confufion and uncertainty, than in natural. Becaufe an ar tificial thing being a production of man, which the artifiicer defigned, and therefore well knows the idea of, the name of it is fuppofed to ftand for no other idea, nor toimport any other effence than what is certainly to be: known, and easy enough to be apprehended. For the idea or effence of the feveral forts of artificial things con fifting, for the most part, in nothing but the determinate figure of fenfible parts; and fometimes motion de-pending thereon, which the artificer fashions in matter, fuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain a certain idea thereof, and to fettle the fignification of the names, whereby the fpecies of artificial things are diftinguished with lefs doubt, obfcurity, and equivocation, than we can in things natural whofe differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries.

$41. Artifical things of diftinct Species.

I MUST be excufed here if I think artificial things are of diftinct species as well as natural: fince I find they are as plainly and orderly ranked into forts, by different abftract ideas, with general names annexed to them, as diftinc

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one from another as thofe of natural fubftances. For why should we not think a watch and pistol, as diftinct fpecies one from another, as a horse and a dog, they being expreffed in our minds by diftin&t ideas, and to others by diftinct appellations?

$42. Subflances alone have proper Names.

THIS is farther to be obferved concerning fubftances, that they alone of all our feveral forts of ideas have particular or proper names, whereby one only particular thing is fignified. Because in fimple ideas, modes, and relations, it seldom happens that men have occafion to mention often this or that particular when it is abfent. Befides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of a lafting duration as fubftances, which are the actors: and wherein the fimple ideas that make up the complex ideas defigned by the name, have a lafting union.

$43. Difficulty to treat of Words.

I MUST beg pardon of my reader, for having dwelt fo long upon this subject, and perhaps with fome obfcurity. But I defire it may be confidered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things fripped of thofe fpecifick differences we give them: which things, if I name not, I fay nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into fome fort or other, and fuggeft to the mind the ufual abftract idea of that fpecies, and fo crofs my purpofe. For to talk of a man, and to lay by, at the fame time, the ordinary fignification of the name man, which is our complex idea ufually annexed to it; and bid the reader confider man as he is in himself, and as he is really diftinguished from others in his internal conftitution, or real effence, that is, by fomething he knows not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one muft do who would speak of the fuppofed real effences and fpecies, of things, as thought to be made by nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no fuch thing fignified by the general names, which fubstances are called by, but because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different confideration the mind

has of specifick names and ideas a little more clear; and to fhow how the complex ideas of modes are referred fometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings; or, which is the fame, to the fignification annexed by others to their received names; and fometimes to no archetypes at all. Give me leave also to fhow how the mind always refers its ideas of fubftances, either to the fubftances themselves, or to the fignifica tion of their names as to the archetypes and affo to make plain the nature of fpecies, or forting of things, as apprehended, and made ufe of by us; and of the effences belonging to those fpecies, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the extent and certainty of our knowl edge than we at first imagine.

$44. Inftance of Mixed Modes in Kinneah and Ni

ouph.

LET us fuppofé Adam in the state of a grown man, with a good understanding, but in a strange country, with all things new and unknown about him; and no other fac ulties, to attain the knowledge of them, but what one of this age has now. He obferves Lamech more melancholy than ufual, and imagines it to be from a fufpicion he has of his wife Adah (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for another man. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve, and defires her to take care that Adab commit not folly. and in these difcourses with Eve he makes use of these two new words,. Kinneah and Niouph. In time Adam's mistake appears, for he finds Lamech's trouble proceeded from having killed a man but yet the two names, Kinneab and Niouph; the one standing for fufpicion, in a husband, of his wife's difloyalty to him, and the other for the act of committing difloyalty, loft not their diftinct fignifica tions. It is plain then that here were two diftinct complex ideas of mixed modes, with names to them, two diftinct fpecies of actions effentially different; I af wherein confifted the effences of these two diftinct fpecies of action? And it is plain it confifted in a precife combination of fimple ideas, different in one from the other. Iafk, whether the complex idea in Adam's mind,

which he called Kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a combinaton of fimple ideas, which he, without any regard to any archetype, without respect to any thing as a pattern, voluntarily put together, abftracted and gave the name Kinneah to, to exprefs in fhort to others, by that one found, all the fimple ideas contained and united in that complex one; it must neceffarily follow, that was an adequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it he intended it should, and fo could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being referred to no other archetype which it was fuppofed to reprefent.

$ 45.

THESE words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common ufe ; and then the cafe was fomewhat altered. Adam's children had the fame faculties, and thereby the fame power that he had to make what complex ideas of mixed modes they pleafed in their own minds; to abftract them, and make what founds they pleafed the figns of them: but the use of names being to make our ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the fame fign ftands for the fame idea in two who would communicate their thoughts, and dif courfe together. Those therefore of Adam's children, that found these two words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar ufe, could not take them for infignificant founds; but muft needs conclude, they ftood for fomething, for certain ideas, abftract ideas, they being general names, which abftract ideas where the effences of the fpecies dif tinguished by thofe names If, therefore, they would ufe thefe words, as names of fpecies already established and agreed on, they were obliged to conform the ideas, in their minds fignified by thefe names, to the ideas, that they flood for in other men's minds, as to their patterns and archetypes; and then indeed their ideas of thefe complex modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (efpecially thofe that confifted of combinations of many fimple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas, in other men's minds, using the fame names; though for this there be ufually a remedy at hand, which is to afk