one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that fort.

§ 7.

BUT to deduce this a little more diftinctly, it will not perhaps be amifs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obferve by what degrees we proeeed, and by what fteps we enlarge our ideas from our firft infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the perfons children converfe with (to inftance in them alone) are like the perfons themfelves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse, and the mother, are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, reprefent only thofe individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to thefe individ uals; and the names of nurse and mama, the child uses, determine themselves to thofe perfons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance have made them obferve, that there are a great many other things in the world that in fome common agreements of fhape, and feveral other qualities, refemble their father and mother, and thofe perfons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find thofe many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name man for example. And thus they came to have a general name, and a general idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea, they had of Peter, and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

$8.

By the fame way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they easily advance to more general names. and notions. For obferving that feveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only thofe qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and more general idea; to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenfive extenfion: which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the hape

and fome other properties fignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

§ 9. General natures are nothing but abftract Ideas. THAT this is the way whereby men firft formed general· ideas, and general names to them, I think, is fo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the confider ing of a man's felf or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge: and he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing else but fuch abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at fitft from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Pea ter and Paul, or his idea of horfe from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out fomething that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining fo much of thofe particular complex ideas of feveral particular exiftences, as they are found to agree in ? Of the complex ideas fignified by the names man and horse, leaving out but thofe particu lars wherein they differ, and retaining only thofe wherein they agree, and of thofe making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name animal to it; one has a more general term, that comprehends with man feveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal,↓ fenfe and fpontaneous motion; and the remaining come. plex idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenfive term vivens. And not to dwell longer on this particular, fo evident in itself, by the fame way the mind proceeds to body, fubftance, and at laft to being, thing, and fuch univerfal terms, which ftand for any of our ideas whatfoever. To conclude, this whole mytery of genera and Species, which make fuch a noife in the fchools, and are with juftice fo little regardell out of them, is nothing elfe but abstract ideas, more or lefs comprehenfive, with names annexed to them. In all which, this is conftant and unvariable, that every more general term ftands for fuch an idea, as is but a part of any of thofe contained under it.

$10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in defi-.

nitions.

THIS may show us the reafon, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing, but declaring their fignifica tion, we make use of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceffity, but only to fave the labour of enumerating the feveral fimple ideas, which the next general word or genus ftands for: or, perhaps, fometimes the fhame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, fince they moft properly fuit thofe notions they are applied to) I fay, though defining by the genus be the fhorteft way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beft. This I am fure, it is not the only, and fo not abfolutely neceffary. For definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what idea the term defined ftands for, a def inition is best made by enumerating thofe fimple ideas that are combined in the fignification of the term defined and if inftead of fuch an enumeration, men have accustomed themfelves to ufe the next general term; it has not been out of neceflity, or for greater learness, but for quicknefs and difpatch fake. For, I think, that to one who defired to know what idea the word man ftood for, if it fhould be, faid, that man was a folid extended fubftance, having life, fenfe, fpontaneous motion, and the faculty of reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea it ftands for be at leaft as clearly. made known as when it is defined to be a rational animal: which by the feveral definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, refolves itself into those enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the fchools: which though, per-, haps, not the most exact, yet serves well enough to my prefent purpose. And one may, in this inftance, fee what gave occafion to the rule, that a definition must, confift of genus and differentia: and it fuffices to fhow us the little neceffity there is of fuch a rule, or advantage

2

in the ftrict obferving of it. For definitions, as has been faid, being only the explaining of one word by feveral others, fo that the meaning or idea it ftands for may be certainly known; languages are not always fo made according to the rules of logick, that every term can have its fignification exactly and clearly expreffed by two others. Experience fufficiently fatisfies us to the contrary; or elfe thofe who have made this rule, have done ill, that they have given us fo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

11. General and univerfal are Creatures of the Un

derftanding.

To return to general words, it is plain by what has been faid, that general and univerfal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own ufe, and concern only figus, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been faid, when used for figns of general ideas, and fo are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general, when they are fet up as the reprefentatives of many particular things; but univerfality belongs not to things themfelves, which are all of them particular in their exiftence; even thofe words and ideas, which in their fignification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that reft are only creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of fignifying or reprefenting many particulars. For the fignification they have, is nothing but a relation, that by the mind of man is added to them. (1)

*

(1) Against this the bishop of Worcester objects, and our author anfwers as followeth; however, faith the bishop, the abstracted ideas are the work of the mind, yet they are not mere creatures of the mind; as appears by an inftance 46 produced of the effence of the fun being in one fingle individual; in which cafe it is granted, That the idea may

In his first letter.

12. Abftra& Ideas are the Effences of the Genera and

Species.

THE next thing therefore to be confidered, is, What kind of fignification it is, that general words have. For

"be so abstracted; that more funs might agree in it, and it "is as much a fort, as if there were as many funs as there are "ftars. So that here we have a real cffence fubfifting in one "individual, but capable of being multiplied into more, and "the fame effence remaining. But in this one fun there is a "ieal effence, and not a mere nominal, or abstracted effence:

but fuppofe there were more funs; would not each

"of them have the real effence of the fun? For what is it "makes the fecond fun, but having the fame real effence "with the first? If it were but a nominal effence, then the "fecond would have nothing but the name."

弹

This, as I understand it, replies Mr. Locke, is to prove that the abstract general effence of any fort of things, or things of the fame denomination, v. g. of man or marygold, hath a real being out of the understanding? which, I confefs, I am not able to conceive. Your lordship's proof here brought out of my effay, concerning the fun, I humbly conceive, will not reach it; because what is faid there, does not at all concern the real but nominal effence, as is evident from hence, that the idea I fpeak of there, is a complex idea; but we have no complex idea of the internal conftitution or real effence of the fun. Befides, I fay exprefsly, That our diftinguishing fubftances into fpecies, by names, is not at all founded on their real effences. So that the fun being one of thefe fubftances, I cannot, in the place quoted by your lordfhip, be fuppofed to mean by effence of the fun, the real effence of the fun unless I had fo expreffed it. But all this argument will be at an end, when your lordship fhall have explained what you mean by these words, " true fun." In my fenfe of them, any thing will be a true fun to which the name fun may be truly and properly applied, and to that fubftance or thing the name fun may be truly and properly applied, which has united in it that combination of fenfible qualities, by which any thing elfe, that is called fun, is dif singuished from other fubftances, i. e. by the nominal-effence: and thus our fun is denominated and diftinguished from a fixed ftar, not by a real effence that we do not know (for if we did, it is poffible we fhould find the real effence or comiti: