thus anfwering thofe powers, they are what they should be, true ideas. Nor do they become liable to any imputation of falsehood, if the mind (as in most men I believe it does) judges thefe idear to be in the things themfelves. For God, in his wifdom, having fet thein as marks of diftinction in things, whereby we may be able to difcern. one thing from another, and fo choose any of them for our ufes, as we have occafion; it alters not the nature of our fimple idea, whether we think that the idea of blue be in the violet itself, or in our mind only; and only the power of producing it by the texture of its parts, reflecting the particles of light, after a certain manner, to be in the violet itself. For that texture in the object, by a regular and conftant operation, producing the fame idea of blue in us, it ferves us to diftinguifh, by our eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing mark, as it is really in the violet, be only a peculiar texture of parts, elfe that very colour, the idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact refemblance. And it is

equally from that appearance to be denominated blue, whether it be that real colour, or only a peculiar texture in it, that causes in us that idea: fince the name blue,. notes properly nothing, but that mark of diftinction that is in a violet, difcernible only by our eyes, whatever it confifts in, that being beyond our capacities diftinctly to know, and perhaps would be of lefs ufe to us, if we had faculties to difcern.

§ 15. Though one Man's Idea of blue should be different from another's.

NEITHER Would it carry any imputation of falsehood to our fimple ideas, if by the different structure of our organs it were so ordered, that the fame object should produce in feveral men's minds different ideas at the fame time; v. g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the fame that a marygold produced in another man's, and vice verfa. For fince this could never be known, because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced by thofe organs; neither the ideas hereby, nor the names would be at all confounded. VOL. II.

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or any falsehood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conftantly the idea which he called blue: and thofe which had the texture of a marygold, producing conftantly the idea which he has conftantly called yellow: whatever thofe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diftinguish things for his ufe by those appearances, and understand and fignify thofe diftinctions marked by the names blue andyelloqu, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from thofe two flowers, were exactly the fame with the ideas in other men's minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the fenfible ideas produced by any object in different men's minds, are most commonly very near and undifcernibly alike. For which opinionI think, there might be many reafons offered: but that being befides my prefent bufinefs, I fhall not trouble my reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary fuppofition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life, and fo we need not trouble ourselves to examine it.

§ 16. Firft, Simple Ideas in this Senfe not falfe, and why. FROM what has been faid concerning our fimple ideas, I think it evident, that our fimple ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things exifting without us. For the truth of these appearances, or perceptions in our minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our fenfes fuch appearances in us; and each of them being in the mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to such a pattern, be false. Blue, or yellow, bitter, or fweet, can never be falfe ideas: - these perceptions in the mind are just fuch as they are there, answering the powers appointed by God to produce them; and fo are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may Indeed the names may be mifapplied; but that in this re pect makes no falfehood in the ideas : as if a man ignorant in the English tongue fhould call purple fcarlet.

17. Secondly, Modes not Falfe.

SECONDLY, Neither can our complex ideas of modes, in reference to the effence of any thing really exifting, be falfe. Because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exifting, and made by nature it is not fuppofed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath; nor to reprefent any thing but fuch a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of fuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himfelf fuch meat, drink, and clothing, and other conveniences of life as his riches and estate will be fufficient to fupply, and his station requires, I have no falfe idea; but fuch an one as represents an action, either as I find or imagine it; and fo is capable of nei ther truth or falsehood. But when I give the name fru gality, or virtue to this action, then it may be called a falfe idea, if thereby it be fuppofed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of fri gality doth belong; or to be conformable to that law, which is the ftandard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. Thirdly, Ideas of Subftances when false. THIRDLY, Our complex Ideas of fubftances being all referred to patterns in things themfelves, may be falfe. That they are all falfe, when looked upon as the reprefentations of the unknown effences of things, is fo evident, that there needs nothing to be faid of it. I fhall therefore pafs over that chimerical fuppofition, and confider them as collections of fimple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of fimple ideas exifting together conftantly in things, of which patterns they are the fuppofed copies and in this reference of them, to the existence of things, they are falfe ideas. 1. When they put together fimple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the shape and size that exift together in a horse, is joined, in the fame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog: which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falfe idea of an horfe. 2. Ideas of fubftances are, in this refpect, alfo falfe, when from any collection of funple

ideas that do always exift together, there is feparated, by a direct negation, any other fimple idea which is conftantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenfion, solidity, fufibility, the peculiar weightinefs, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixednefs than is in lead or copper he may be faid to have a falfe complex idea, as well as when he joins to thofe other fimple ones the idea of perfect abfolute fixednefs. For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of fuch fimple ones as have no union in nature may be termed falfe. But if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixedness quite, without cither adually joining to, or feparating of it from the reft in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a falfe one; fince though it contains not all the fimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exift together.

§ 19. Truth or Falsehood always fuppofes Affirmation or

Negation.

THOUGH, in compliance with the ordinary way of speaking, I have showed in what fenfe, and upon what ground our ideas may be fometimes called true or false; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cases where any idea is called true or falfe, it is from fome judgment that the mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true or false. For truth or falsehood, being never without fome affirmation or negation, exprefs or tacit, it is not to be found but when figns are joined or feparated, according to the agreement or difagreement of the things they stand for. The figns we chiefly ufe are either ideas or words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining or feparating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or difagree; and falfehood in the contrary, as fhall be more fully fhowed hereafter.

$20. Ideas in themfelves neither true nor falfe. ANY idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any ideas in the minds of other men, cannot properly for this

alone be called falfe. For thefe reprefentations, if they have nothing in them but what is really exifting in things without, cannot be thought falfe, being exact reprefentations of fomething: nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be faid to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not reprefent. But the mistake and falfebood, is,

§ 21. But are falfe, 1. When judged agreeable to anoth er man's Idea without being fo.

FIRST, When the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the fame that is in other men's minds fignified by the fame name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received fignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not which is the most ufual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas also are liable to it. § 22. 2. When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not:

SECONDLY, When it having a complex idea made up of fuch a collection of fimple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a species of creatures really exifting as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fufibility and fixedness of gold:

§ 23. 3. When judged adequate without being fo. THIRDLY, When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of fimple ideas that do really exift together in fome fort of creatures, but has also left out others as much infeparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a fort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of fubftance, yellow, malleable, most heavy and fufible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixednefs and folubility in aqua regia are as infeparable from thofe other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are: one from another.

§ 24. 4. When judged to represent the real Effence. FOURTHLY, The mistake is yet greater when Ijudge that this complex idea contains in it the real effence of any body exifting when at least it contains but fome few of thofe properties which flow from its real effence and conftitu