zo. The most doubtful, are the Names of very compound- ed mixed Modes and Subftances. 21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words. 2, 3. First, Words without any, or without clear Ideas. 4. Occafioned by learning nanies before the Ideas they 5. Secondly, unfteady application of them. 6. Thirdly, Affected Obfcurity by wrong application. 11. As ufeful as to confound the Sound of the Letters. 12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Justice. 13. And ought not to pass for Learning. 14. Fourthly, Taking them for things. 16. This makes Errours lafting. 17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot fignify. 18. V. g. putting them for the real Effences of Substances. 19. Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Substan- ces, not to change the Species. 7 21. This Abuse contains two falfe Suppofitions. 22. Sixthly, A Suppofition, that Words have a certain 23. The Ends of Language. First, to convey our Ideas. 24. Secondly, to do it with quickness. 25. Thirdly, therewith to convey the Knowledge of 26-31 How men's words fail in all thefe. which every one finds that he reprefents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and fo under that notion confiders those several things as perfectly one, as one ship or one atom, Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men fhould make one idea, than how a man fhould make one idea; it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men, and confider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular all the diftinct ideas that make up the composition of a man, and consider them all togeth er as one. §3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas. AMONGST fuch kind of collective ideas are to be counted the most part of artificial things, at leaft fuch of them as are made up of diftinct fubftances: and, in truth, if we confider all these collective ideas aright, as army, conftellation, universe, as they are united into fo many fingle ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind, bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and difcourfe of them, united into one conception and fignified by one name, For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of compofition, bring into one idea; as is vifible in that fignified by the name univerfe. B CHAP. XXV. OF RELATION. 1. Relation what. ESIDES the ideas, whether fimple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themfelves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The understanding, in the confideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise object it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to fee how it ftands in conformity to other. When the mind fo confiders one any thing that it does, as it were, bring it to, and fet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other: this is, as the words import, relation and refpect; and the denominations given to pofitive things, intimating that refpect, and ferving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the fubject itfelf denominated to fomething diftinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things fo brought together, related. Thus, when the mind confiders Caius as fuch a pofitive being, it takes nothing into that idea, but what really exits in Caius: v. g. when I confider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the fpecies man. So likewife, when 1 fay Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare confideration of a man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Caius the name bufband, I intimate fome other perfon; and when I gave him the name whiter, I intimate fome other thing: in both cafes my thought is led to fomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into confideration. And fince any idea, whether fimple or complex, may be the occafion why the mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though ftill confidered as diftinct; therefore, any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation. As in the above mentioned inftance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occafion of the denomination or relation of hufband; and the colour white, the occafion why he is said to be whiter than freestone. § 2. Relations without correlative Terms, not eafily perceived. THESE, and the like relations, expreffed by relative terms: that have others anfwering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as father and fon, bigger and lefs, caufe and effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at first fight perceives the relation. For father and fon, hufband and wife, and fuch other correlative terms, feem fo nearly to belong one to another, and through custom do fo readily chime and anfwer one another in people's memories, that, upon the naming of either of |