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them, the thoughts are prefently carried beyond the thing fo named; and nobody overlooks or doubts of a relation where it is fo plainly intimated. But where languages have failed to give correlative names, there the relation is not always fo easily taken notice of.. Concubine is, no doubt, a relative name, as well as wife; but, in languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative term, there people are not fo apt to take them to be fo, as wanting that evident mark of relation which is between correlatives, which feem to explain one another, and not to be able to exift, but together. Hence it is, that many of those names which, duly confidered, do include evident relations, have been called external denominations. But all names, that are more than empty founds, muft fignify fome idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is pofitive, and is looked on as united to, and exifting in, the thing to which the denomination is given: or else it arifes from the refpect the mind finds in it to fomething diftinct from it, with which it confiders it; and then it includes a relation.

3. Some feemingly abfolute Terms contain Relations. ANOTHER fort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or fo much as external denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of fignifying fomething abfolute in the fubject, do conceal a tacit, though lefs obfervable relation. Such are the feemingly pofitive terms of old, great, imperfect, &c. whereof I fhall have occafion to speak more at large in the following chapters.

4. Relation different from the Things related. THIS farther may be obferved, that the ideas, of relation may be the fame in men, who have far different ideas of the things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. those who have far different ideas of a man may yet agree in the notion of a father; which is a notion fuperinduced to the fubftance, or man, and refers only to an act of that thing called man, whereby

he contributed to the generation of one of his own kind, let man be what it will.

§ 5. Change of Relation may be without any Change in

the Subject

THE nature therefore of relation confifts in the referring or comparing two things one to another; from which comparifon, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of thofe things be removed or ceafe to be, the relation ceafes, and the denomination confequent to it, though the other receive in itself no alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I confider today as a father, ceases to be fo to-morrow, only by the death of his fon, without any alteration made in himfelf. Nay, barely by the min's changing the object to which it compares any thing, the fame thing is capable of having contrary denominations at the fame time v. g. Caius, compared to feveral perfons, may truly be faid to be older and younger, ftronger and weaker, &c.

§6. Relation only betwixt two Things.

WHATSOEVER doth or can exift, or be confidered as one thing, is pofitive; and fo not only fimple ideas and fubftances, but modes alfo are pofitive beings, though the parts of which they confift are very often relative one to another; but the whole together, confidered as one thing, and producing in us the complex idea of one thing; which idea is in our minds, as one picture, though an aggregate of diverfe parts, and under one name, it is a pofitive or abfolute thing, or idea. Thus a triangle, though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative, yet the idea of the whole is a pofitive, abfolute idea. The fame may be faid of a family, a tune, &c.; for there can be no relation but betwixt two things confidered as two things. There must always be in relation two ideas, or things, either in themfelves really feparate, or confidered as diftinct, and then a ground or occafion for their comparison.

§7. All Things capable of Relation. CONCERNING relation in general, these things may be confidered:

First, That there is no one thing, whether simple idea, fubftance, mode, or relation, or name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of confiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no small part of men's thoughts and words: v. g. one fingle man may at once be concerned in, and fuftain all these following relations, and many more, viz. father, brother, fon, grandfather, grandson, fatherin-law, fon-in-law, hufband, friend, enemy, fubject, general, judge, patron, client, profeffor, European, Eglishman, iflander, fervant, mafter, poffeffor, captain, fuperiour, inferiour, bigger, lefs older, younger, contemporary, like, unlike, &c. to an almost infinite number; he being capable of as many relations, as there can be occafions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of agreement, difagreement, or refpect whatsoever. For, as I faid, relation is a way of comparing or confidering two things together, and giving one or both of them, fome appellation from that comparison; and fometimes giving even the relation itself a name.

§ 8. The Ideas of Relations clearer often than of the Subjects related.

SECONDLY, This farther may be confidered concerning relation, that though it be not contained in the real exiftence of things, but fomething extraneous and fuperinduced: : yet the ideas, which relative words stand for, are often clearer and more diftinct than those fubftances to which they do belong. The notion we have of a father or brother, is a great deal clearer and more diftin&t than ..that we have of a man: or, if you will, paternity is a thing whereof it is eafier to have a clear idea than of humanity and I can much eafier conceive what a friend is, than what God: because the knowledge of one action, or one fimple idea, is oftentimes fufficient to give me the notion of a relation; but to the knowing of any substantial being, an accurate collection of fundry ideas is neceffary. A man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be fuppofed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them; fo that, when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a

very clear idea of that relation. The ideas then of relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our minds, than thofe of fubftances; because it is commonly hard to know all the fimple ideas which are really in any fubftance, but for the most part easy enough to know the fimple ideas that make up any relation I think on, or have a name for; v. g. comparing two men, in reference to one common parent, it is very eafy to frame the ideas of brothers, without having yet the perfect idea of a man. For fignificant, relative words, as well as others, ftanding only for ideas; and thofe being all either fimple, or made up of fimple ones, it fuffices for the knowing the precife idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that which is the foundation of the relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick, between the two caffiowaries in St. James's Park, though perhaps I have but a very obfcure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves.

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§ 9. Relations all terminate in fimple Ideas. THIRDLY, Though there be a great number of confiderations, wherein things may be compared one with another, and fo a multitude of relations; yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about, thofe fimple ideas either of fenfation or reflection: which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge. To clear this, I fhall fhow it in the most confiderable relations we have notion of, and in fome that seem to be the moft remote from fenfe or reflection; which yet will appear to have their ideas from thence, and leave it paft doubt, that the notions we have of them are but certain fimple ideas, and so originally derived from fenfe or reflection. 1.

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§ 10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated are relative.

FOURTHLY, That relation, being the confidering of one thing with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evi

dent that all words that neceffarily lead the mind to any other ideas than are fuppofed really to exift in that thing, to which the words are applied, are relative words ; v. g. a man, black, merry, thoughtful, thirfly, angry, extended; thefe, and the like, are all abfolute, because they neither fignify nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is fuppofed really to exist in the man thus denominated: but father, brother, king, husband, blacker, merrier, &c. are words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alfo fomething else feparate and exteriour to the existence of that thing.

§ 1. Conclufion.

HAVING laid down these premifes concerning relation in general, I fhall now proceed to show, in fome instances,, how all the ideas we have of relation are made up, as the others are, only of fimple ideas; and that they all, how refined and remote from fenfe foever they feem, terminate at last in fimple ideas. I fhall begin with the most comprehenfive relation, wherein all things that do or can exist are concerned; and that is, the relation of caufe and effect: the idea whereof, how derived from the two fountains of all our knowledge, sensation and reflection, I fhall in the next place confider.

**

CHAP. XXVI.

OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, AND OTHER RELATIONS.

IN

1. Whence their Ideas got.

N the notice that our fenfes take of the conftant viciffitude of things, we cannot but obferve, that feveral particular, both qualities and fubftances, begin to exift; and that they receive this their exiftence from the due application and operation of fome other being. From this obfervation, we get our ideas of cause and effect. That which produces any fimple or complex idea, we denote by the general name, confe; and that which is produced, effect. Thus, finding that in that substance which we call wax, fluidity, which is a fimple idea that was not in it before, is conftantly produced by the ap

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