lived at Red Hook and Poughkeepsie. Having never met him, we are glad to get this photograph of him. His articles in this journal have excited a great deal of praise and inquiry, and certainly have been remarkable for learning and exhaustive research, and what is less common, for independent and original criticism. Mr. Corliss, we understand, is only about thirty years old. We expect yet to hear of him as a judge and perhaps a seuator. How the English law journals do sauce their judges! This is from the Solicitors' Journal: We observe that in one of the county council applications last week Mr. Baron Huddleston is reported to have said: "You have it from one of the highest legal authorities in the kingdom that the act was puzzling to him, aud how much more therefore to a mere country 80licitor." A mere country solicitor! Does the learned judge, may we ask, know much of country solicitors? We do; and we say without hesitation that we could name dozens of "mere country solicitors" whose knowledge of law and skill in the interpretation of acts of Parliament would do no discredit to the "highest legal authorities." Would it not be desirable that learned judges, before expressing such sublime contempt for the legal attainments of country solicitors, should take an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the nature of the duties they have to perform? Perhaps Mr. Ellett, for instance, or Mr. Gray Hill, of Liverpool, could accommodate Mr. Baron Huddleston with a chair in his office for a few days during the Long Vacation. being of lands abutting on relator's uplands, affirmed with costs--People, ex rel. Charles G. Barnham, respondents, v. Edward F. Jones and, others, commissioners of the State land office, appellants.- Appeal dismissed with costs-In re Estate of John F. Delaplaine, deceased. Judgment affirmed with costs Benjamin Webb, administrator, and another, respondents, v. David B. Sanford, appellant.—Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event -Mary D. Clark, respondent, v. William R. Post and another, executors, etc., appellants. Judgment affirmed with costs-Mary J. Utter, appellant, v. William T. Richmond, successor, etc., respondent.Judgment affirmed with costs-Margaret Shiner, administratrix, respondent, v. Horace Russell and another, receivers, appellants.--Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Mary J. Hussey, administratrix, respondent, v. John J. Cager, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs-Heury S. Myers, administrator, respondent, v. Long Island Railroad Company, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Philip Dieffenbach, respondent, v. Jacob Roch, appellant.-Judgments of General and Special Terms reversed, new trial granted, costs to all parties to be paid out of the fund-John Parker and another, executors, appellants, v. Maria Linden, respondent, and John Lythgow and others, appellants. And appeal dismissed in Parker v. Same without costs to either party.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Eliza H. Douglass, administratrix, respondent, v. John T. Murray, appellant. -Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to abide event-Jane Bishop, administratrix, appellant, v. Grand Lodge of Empire Order of Mutual Aid of New York, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs--Augusta Lindeman, respondent, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, appel-after-dinner reading, it is generally considered that lant. Judgment affirmed with costs-Elizabeth A. Jenness, administratrix, respondent, v. Andrew J. Constantine, surviving partner, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event -James S. Cox and another, respondents, v. Edgar (. Pearce and others, appellants.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Margaret Sullivan, administratrix, respondent, v. Tioga Railroad Company, appellant.Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Michael Bennet and another, executors, appellants, v. John M. Peck, respondent.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Adolphus F. Warburton, survivor, respondent, v. John T. Camp, appellant.—Order of General Term reversed, judgment of Special Term affirmed, with costs of all parties who have appeared in this action to be paid out of the estateCharles H. Henderson, executor, appellant, v. John C. Henderson and others, respondents. Motion to dismiss denied. They also seem not to be afraid of the "Thunderer." The following is from the same source: "However interesting and diverting the Times' reports may be as their semi-popular character and necessarily hasty pro- We were quite surprised to find "Judge Patterson" playing in The Old Homestead" in New York. He sings a song, too. A bill before the Nevada Legislature makes it a misdemeanor for any woman to wear a hat at any theatre of greater height than three inches.-New York Tribune. We don't see how she could get into a theatre of less than three inches in height, and what is the sense of compelling her to go bareheaded when she goes to higher theatres? Baker, Voorhis & Co., of New York, announce a new edition of Sedgwick on Damages, entirely rewritten and re-arranged, by Mr. Arthur G. Sedgwick of New York, and Mr. John G. Wigmore of Boston. This is a work long needed owing to the disproportion of notes to text, and the lack of convenient arrangement, and will be welcomed. In one State persons who have committed minor The Albany Law Journal. crimes are committed to what is called the 'poor ALBANY, MARCH 16, 1889. CURRENT TOPICS. THE Rev. Edward Everett Hale makes some note worthy observations in the March number of the Cosmopolitan Magazine on the increase of crime in America, by which he denotes that it is by no means easy to prove that crime is increasing in America. As some figures which we recently published seem to lead to the contrary conclusion, it is interesting to note what Mr. Hale says. In the first place he urges that much of the crime comes with immigration, and that this raises a difficulty in the computation. That is a good argument to be taken into account respecting the alleged increasing criminal tendency of our native population, but still it is a factor in the amount of crime present here. Crime is increasing, perhaps, although it may be in a measure not indigenous. A greater difficulty he finds in the variety of legislation in the several States, and the fact that the data "are to be collected from thirty-nine different sets of public reports, no two of which are made out on the same principle. It would be hard enough to find out how many people were in prisons in all the American States, Territories and in the District of Columbia on the 1st of January, 1889, and to compare this number, say, against the number in prison on the 1st of January, 1860 or 1850. But if any one should bring together this mass of figures and place them in reliable form, he would find when he had done that he had only deceived himself by the results, and that they did not express the amount of crime at one period or at the other. The doubt arises principally from the difference in legislation between one period and another. Thus if a certain State determine to punish drunkenness, for instance, with a fine, the persons so punished pay their fines and do not appear in any list of prisonThe next State, very probably, may punish the same offense by imprisonment, and of course in the tables it appears to have a much larger number of 'criminals' than the other State has. But in point of fact there may be no difference between the two. The criminal returns' are thus entirely misleading. The difficulty is greater when the same State changes its legislation, as we all know our States do. Suppose for a period of years drunkenness is punished by a fine; suppose that after that time the Legislature determine to punish it by imprisonment; suppose that the returns of criminality are based, as they usually are, simply upon the number of prisoners-the impression is then given that there has been a great increase of criminality in that State. Another cause of difficulty is the calculation of results from the different classification of penal institutions and institutions which are penal perhaps in fact but not in name. VOL. 39- No. 11. ers. house' or 'alms-house.' The maker of a census goes around, and he returns this institution as being a charitable institution, and not as a penal institution. In the next State an institution, with perhaps exactly the same purpose, is called a 'house of reform,' or has some similar name given to it. The authorities who make the census there class it ano hp appear in the statistics is larger on that among penal institutions, and the number of crimiaccount. It will probably prove that the only useful studies on the subject will be those conducted from the other end. It will be necessary to attempt in a single county, or perhaps in a single city, an inquiry, carried into a good deal of detail, as to the number of cases tried in court. This must include even those cases tried before 'magistrates' in many States, of which, unfortunately, it is very difficult to procure statistical returns." There seems to be a good deal of plausibility in this reasoning, and it may account for the singular apparent increase of crime long after and not during or shortly after the civil war, on which we have heretofore commented. The lawyers get almost all the cabinet offices, as usual. Mr. Blaine may be claimed as a lawyer, because he had a legal education. Our eminent citizen, Judge Tracy, has drawn the navy office. Why, we cannot exactly understand. It seems to us it would be discreet to bestow that portfolio for once on a man who knows something about ships, say on a ship-builder or on a naval officer. Probably the Judge is not quite so ignorant of ships as the commodore's widow in Cooper's "Red Rover," who used to cruise with her husband and was "posted up" by the sailors, so that she was accustomed to exclaim, "what a beautiful sight is a noble ship, chasing her wake and cutting the waves with her taffrail!" We have known the new secretary as a learned lawyer, a powerful advocate and a discreet magistrate; also as a lover of fast horses. But not as a sailor. Perhaps it was thought that he is familiar with the horse marines. We wish him success however, and from his reputation as a sensible man of affairs, we believe he will achieve it. We are pleased to see one influential newspaper in this State opposing the proposed change in the law of libel in the interest of public journals. The Nation in a careful editorial gives several excellent reasons why there should be no change in any point save one, which coincide in substance with what this journal has urged. The Nation says: “1. The notion that any retraction or correction can be made 'effectual,' in the full and proper sense of the term, is illusory. A charge against a man is always more eagerly read than his explanation or defense. Moreover, it is not possible to make any retraction or apology cover the exact ground covered by the original charge. The two things inevitably go to * * * * some extent in different directions. Large numbers of people who see one are sure not to see the other. Papers which copy one will not copy the other- a very common experience. 2. It is the more undesirable that the law should be changed in any way to diminish vigilance, because the direction in which the newspaper business is growing is almost altogether hostile to the rights of individuals in the matter of libel or libellous annoyance. In the trade the doctrine is being more and more accepted that the sole function of the newspaper is to make money. This doctrine was indeed openly avowed at the convention of newspaper publishers here a fortnight ago. * * Now the enterprising publisher, intent on putting in whatever will sell his paper, is sure not to be very careful about the rights or feelings of individuals. It has been said before the committee of the Massachusetts Legislature that he cannot sift things in 'the small hours of the morning,' just before his Doubtless he cannot sift, paper is going to press. but he can omit or hold over until he makes inquiries. What prevents his doing this now in any doubtful case, or makes him reluctant to do it, is the fear that a rival may get a beat on him.' The only thing which can overcome the fear of a beat' is the fear of the law. Remove the fear of the law, and we venture to say little or no care would be exercised in examining, any piece of news. Every thing would go in when it was known that a few lines of apology or retraction would set any mistake to rights. Moreover, it is to be borne in mind that it is not the old and wise heads of the office who are apt to be on duty in the small hours of the morning. It is the young fellows, who dread of all things getting left' with regard to any piece of news however trifling. 3. There is no sign of any change in journalism which tends to make legal restraint unnecessary. On the contrary, the changes are all in the other direction. The indifference to intellectual or moral influence, as compared to income, seems to grow. So does the tendency to seek topics of discussion in the personal or domestic life, and to eschew those of a more serious and general nature. Journalistic success is more and more measured in dollars and cents, and contempt for whatever interferes with this success is more and more openly avowed. This means that the power of the journal over the individual's comfort has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished." The Nation however argues that ample security for costs ought to be exacted in such cases. Here we cannot agree with The Nation, and it seems to us that its other arguments furnish ample reason why this should not prevail. Many an abused citizen could not furnish security. It is against the policy of our law to require it in any case. * * * Unrestrained free dom to sue is the only doctrine consistent with justice, and if any exception should be conceded it certainly should not be in favor of hasty, eager, and too often unscrupulous news vendors, such as The Nation has so powerfully depicted. We have read with great disgust a chapter of "Reminiscences of Lawyers " in a recent issue of the Tribune. A "well-known" member of the bar was made to tell the story of his own rascality and shame with a show of pride. According to this man's confession, when defending a client on a charge of counterfeiting he secretly changed the counterfeit bill produced by the district attorney, and substituted a good one which he had procured for the purpose, and by confusing and shaking the witnesses got his man off. The tale sounds like an invention of an ingenious young reporter, but if there is such a man practicing law he ought to be disbarred. We are glad to see a correspondent of the Tribune taking the same view. He says: "From the manner in which is told in your columns of to-day, under 'Reminiscences of Lawyers,' the story of a guilty man saved by a sleight of hand trick,' your readers would think that it was an every-day affair for 'well-known lawyers' to clear their clients by dishonorable tricks. For the honor of the profession let it be fully understood that no lawyer, who has any regard for his own honor, not to speak of his duty to the court of which he is an officer, would be guilty of such a piece of rascality as that confessed by the 'well-known' lawyer, who says he did it when he was young and had a reputation to make. What a treacherous, ignoble foundation on which to build a reputation! It calls for but one comment. If he did such a thing -- one may be pardoned for doubting the veracity of a man who would make so shameless a confession- as a callow youth, and he now glories in it as a well-known lawyer,' he ought to be disbarred." * ** The recent failure to obtain a jury in the city of New York in one "boodler" case, and the successful effort in another only after two weeks' session, emphasizes the necessity of setting about to invent some remedy for this intolerable state of affairs. It is really ridiculous that two weeks should be consumed in impanelling a jury in one case. The result of such a sifting may well be unjust to both parties, for the twelve men found after such a quest must generally be ignorant and unintelligent. The Post says on this topic: "Every judge nowadays is a reader of the newspapers, and has inevitably formed an opinion of some sort beforehand about every case of importance which comes before him. We have no guaranty but his character that he will divest himself of the prejudice thus formed, during the trial of the case. Under the theory on which we make up our juries however, the judge's character ought not to save him from investigation touching the effect of newspaper reading on his mental apparatus. There ought to be an assumption that more or less damage to his judicial faculty results from such reading not so much as in the case of jurors, but still some - and he ought to be put through some process of repair or purgation." It may be that society will eventually be compelled to accept triers who have derived a hos- breaking down of the bridge under such circumtile opinion or impression, provided it is removable stances, although his injuries were the direct results by evidence. It is not apparent that the abolition of such imperfections and defects in the bridge.' of the jury system would guarantee an unpreju- | The court declined to charge either of the proposidiced tribunal, for as the Post points out, the judge will be just as apt to have a prejudice as the juryman. But society cannot afford this waste of time in procuring the tribunal. It is really one of the most potent causes of the delays in the administration of justice. The Post also calls for a reform of the law in respect to "that preposterous nuisance, 'requests to charge,' and in respect to new trials for uninfluential defects of procedure. The Post says: "Occasionally the State has to go to the expense of repeating long and troublesome investigations for reasons about as pertinent and material as the judge's opening court late, or missing his footing on the steps of the bench, or the court criers saying 'damn' to a juryman. These things are unworthy of a highly civilized people. What the Court of Appeals should be asked to say in criminal cases is simply whether any thing was at the trial said or left unsaid, done or left undone, which might be reasonably supposed to have affected the verdict of the jurors." To all of which we cordially assent. NOTES OF CASES. * ** tions requested further than as it had already charged * IN Clapp v. Town of Ellington, 51 Hun, 58, while plaintiff was passing over a highway bridge, riding upon a steam traction engine, with a tank attached, weighing together 8,500 pounds, the bridge broke down and he was injured. Upon the trial of this action to recover damages evidence was given tending to show that one of the beams of the bridge had become rotten; that it had not been repaired, and that it was in consequence of the defective condition of the bridge that the injury was occasioned. Held, that the action was not maintainable. The court said: "At the conclusion of the trial the defendant's counsel asked the court toger, whether it be in respect to the kind or characcharge the jury that it was not the official duty of the highway commissioner to so construct and maintain the bridge in question as to insure the safety of persons passing over it in a manner involving peculiar and special danger arising from the unusual way and method of construction and manner of locomotion of the vehicle used in pass-opened and prepared for the public use in the coming over it;' and again, he requested the court to mon intercourse of society, and in the transaction charge that if the jury are satisfied from the evi- of usual and ordinary affairs of business, he then dence that the vehicle upon which the plaintiff was takes every possible risk of loss upon himself, and riding, and with which he was connected in pass- he can have no remedy against the town to recover ing over the bridge at the time of the accident in recompense for injury sustained, although they be question, was unusual and extraordinary in weight, the direct result of defects and imperfections in a in method of construction or manner of propelling way, for which it would be responsible in case of the same along the highway, and such unusual injury to individuals in the lawful and proper use weight, method of construction and locomotion was of it.' It appears to us that the rule as thus laid such as to cause unusual and extraordinary strain down is both wise and just. The commissioner of upon the bridge in passing over it, then the plain-highways is required to construct and maintain tiff took every possible risk of injury upon himself in trying to pass over the bridge, and the plaintiff cannot recover for the injuries sustained by the ter of animals led or driven, or the magnitude or construction of carriages used, or the bulk or weight of property transported. And if any person undertakes to use or travel upon a public highway in an unusual or extraordinary manner, or with animals, vehicles or freight not suitable or adapted to a way bridges of sufficient strength and material to insure the safety of persons passing over them with such vehicles as are commonly or ordinarily used in that country; but he cannot be required or expected to Somerville, J., said: "I concur in the opinion of construct and maintain bridges which will insure the chief justice in this case. The law under conthe safety of persons passing over them in a man-sideration, in my judgment, passes beyond the lener involving peculiar and special danger arising from unusual weight and so forth. As for instance, heavy buildings are sometimes moved through the public-way, yet we should not expect a commissioner of highways to construct and maintain bridges of sufficient strength to support moving buildings. We are therefore inclined to the view expressed by the learned judge in the opinion quoted from, that it was a question for the jury, and that if the jury became satisfied from the evidence that the vehicle upon which the plaintiff was riding at the time of the accident was unusual and extraordinary in weight, method of construction or manner of propelling the same, and that such weight, method of construction and locomotion was such as to cause unusual and extraordinary strain upon the bridge, that the plaintiff in running upon the bridge took upon himself the risk of injury, thereby becoming guilty of contributory negligence, which precludes his recovery even though there was negligence on the part of the highway commissioner. It is true, as the trial court stated, that improved implements of travel are invented, and machinery for threshing and other agricultural purposes are matters involved in civilization. It is further true that these traction engines in farming communities have within the last few years come into use in the threshing of grain, and that they are usually propelled from place to place through the highways, and that these facts will have to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining whether they are unusual or extraordinary; but the question has heretofore been one for the jury and not for the court. The Legislature has now provided that no town shall be liable for any damage resulting to a person or property by reason of the breaking of any bridge by a traction engine in crossing the same of the weight of four tons or over, while such person is engaged in transporting or driving such engine along or upon the highways of the State. Laws of 1887, chap. 526. In the future cases will have to be determined under the provisions of this act. The case of Mc Cormick v. Township of Washington, 112 Penn. St. 185, is a case in point, and sustains the views expressed in the case of Gregory v. Inhabitants of Adams." In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Baldwin, Alabama Supreme Court, February 6, 1889, it was held that the act of Alabama, February 28, 1887 (Sess. Acts, 1886-7, p. 87), requiring all persons employed by railroad companies in any capacity calling for discrimination of color signals, to be examined by a State board of examiners as to their ability to distinguish colors, and making it a misdemeanor to accept or continue in such employment without a certificate from the examiners, is unconstitutional, as depriving persons of property without due process of law, in so far as it requires the fees for such examinations to be paid by the railroad companies. gitimate domain of the police power, and reaches |