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Mr. LANTOS. Thank you. Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Torricelli. Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I know that the hour is late and the members have to leave, so I will be brief.

Mrs. Liu, I would suppose that one of the real answers to Mr. Lantos' question is that your husband believed that he would be safe here, because those who would do him ill would respect American laws, would not try to commit this murder on our soil, and the fact is your husband was mistaken in accounting for his enemies.

They were more vicious than one might have imagined, and certainly did not respect the laws of our country, as he believed. Isn't that perhaps the real answer for this inconsistency, the fear of return to Taiwan, with the belief in safety in America? Mrs. Liv. I think so, yes.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I also wanted to add that in listening to Mr. Lantos' remarks, that in fact there is an explanation for the fact that those who might be in leadership in Taiwan now have brought about worse publicity than one might have, I imagine, and the possible explanation for their expectations of how, whether it be an organized crime figure, whoever it might be in Taiwan, the expectations for publicity, and the reality of this hearing, and the cost that this has brought to those murderers, the difference in those expectations is you, your own courage in coming here and in speaking out, and in complicating the plans of those who might have brought about his crime, and on that I would add my congratulations and my respect, as others have.

Mrs. LIU. Thank you. Mr. TORRICELLI. I only wanted to conclude with two brief questions. Knowing of your own family's finances and incomes, was your husband ever compensated for any of his writings by a foreign government?

Mrs. LIU. No.

Mr. TORRICELLI. What has been the principal means of support for your family in the last several years?

Mrs. Liu. Well, we have been working since we got to this country, and we have our own business to support our living.

Mr. TORRICELLI. And that business has been the sole means of support of your family?

Mrs. LIU. Yes.

Mr. TORRICELLI. During the investigation of the murder, did any of the law enforcement officials ask to see financial or tax records of your family? Mrs. Liu. No.

Mr. TORRICELLI. So the answer is no, no one has looked into the family's finances? Mrs. Liu. Yes.

Mr. TORRICELLI. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Torricelli.

Mrs. Liu, I think all of us have been deeply moved and touched by your testimony this afternoon. If the American writer, Ernest Hemingway, was right when he defined courage as grace under pressure, you are a very courageous woman indeed.

Mrs. LIU. Thank you.

Mr. SOLARZ. We are deeply grateful to you for your willingness to come and share this willingness with us at this time.

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I want to join you and the members of the committee in expressing my deep sympathy to Mrs. Liu, and to commend her for her courage in coming here today.

Mrs. Liu. Thank you very much.

SUBCOMMITTEE BUSINESS Mr. SOLARZ. Before we hear from Mr. Glennon, while the other members are still here, are there any comments on the proposed agenda for the subcommittee that anyone would like to make at this time?

Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very pleased to see that item No. 4 is on your agenda. This is a matter that needs to be fully considered. I have great reservations about the direction of the U.S. Government with respect to this territory and I would hope that we can allow a substantial period of time and staff direction to background information on this subject because I do not consider it a matter to be pushed lightly, as is the apparent intention by some people downtown.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are talking about the hearings on lessons of Vietnam?

Mr. BEREUTER. I am talking about Micronesia No. 4.
Mr. SOLARZ. There are two 4's. That is a misprint.

Let me say to my friends that I had discussion over this with the chairman the other day who would like our subcommittee to handle this, and I told him that we would be prepared to do so but only if the administration was prepared to cooperate in making logistical support available for us to actually go out to Micronesia so we could see for ourselves exactly what the conditions are like. And I think the gentleman has already gone, but many of the rest of us haven't yet, and I am prepared to take this up with the chairman. I think the committee is obligated to deal with this.

The only question is whether it should be dealt with initially in our subcommittee or by the full committee and I just feel very strongly that before we undertake that responsibility, we should have an opportunity to get out there. And we were going to do this in December. The gentleman may know, unfortunately, we weren't able to get the cooperation we were seeking from the administration.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would lend any support to your effort to have it considered, and the subcommittee, because I intend to give this exhaustive attention and that is the kind of procedure that ought to take place at the subcommittee level.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would the gentleman be interested in joining a study mission to Micronesia if we undertake it in a subcommittee?

Mr. BEREUTER. I will consider the possibility if you will guarantee me safe conduct.

Mr. SOLARZ. I refer you to Mr. Solomon for that.
Mr. SOLOMON. Again, I yield to the ranking member.

Mr. Chairman, there are two other areas of interest. One is the refugee problems that we have in the entire area of our jurisdic

tion, and I would hope that we might also be able to concentrate on that.

Second, as you may know, I am the new ranking member on the Human Rights and International Organizations Subcommittee, and if you recall, Mr. Chairman, you promised me last year that we would hold hearings on human rights violations in mainland China I think this is a good time today to mention that. From some of the reports that I have seen, from Amnesty International and some others, there is an atrocious situation there.

While we are at it, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask unanimous consent to submit for the record the written testimony of a Mr. A. James Gregor. He is a professor, as you know, of political science and principal investigator of the Pacific Basin Project, Institute of International Studies, at the University of California in Berkeley.

Let me cite one thing and I will yield back.

In his report he not only talks about the improving human rights situation and political situation in Taiwan, which seems to go counter to some of what we have heard today, he also cites on page 7, which will become part of the record, the most recent cases of gross interference with the activities of Chinese in the United States. We are talking about the People's Republic of China now and two individuals. He cites their names and goes on to say that one of the gentlemen disappeared in July 1984, here in this country, after having sought political asylum from the U.S. Immigra

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He cites another individual who committed suicide in the PRC's New York Consulate only 3 days after he had asked for political asylum. These two incidents are similar to what we are investigating today, and we ought to look into such incidents concerning other countries besides Taiwan. I would ask that this written testimony be submitted for the record.

Mr. SOLARZ. Without objection, the testimony submitted by Mr. Gregor will be included in the record. 1

Let me say to the gentleman that we are prepared to have hearings on the situation in China as we will subsequently on the situation, general situation in Taiwan.

Today's hearing was fundamentally on the Henry Liu matter and we will be prepared to work with the gentleman from New York in terms of seeing if we can develop a consensus concerning any resolutions that might emerge from the committee concerning both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.

Mr. SOLOMON. I look forward to that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. SOLARZ. Before we adjourn, I thank the gentleman for his comments, we do have one last witness, Mr. Glennon. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. GLENNON, PROFESSOR OF LAW,

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI Mr. GLENNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say I appreciate the lateness of the hour and I will try to be brief.

1 See appendix 1.

Let me begin by thanking the subcommittee for inviting me to be here today, and by commending the subcommittee for its interest in the acute and recurring problems of harassment, intimidation, and surveillance of residents of the United States by agents of the intelligence services of foreign countries.

I participated in a study of that subject in the late 1970's while I was a legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That study remains classified. Obviously, I am unable to engage in any specific discussion of its contents here today. There is, however, a vast amount of information on the public record concerning this subject.

This testimony responds to specific questions put to me by the subcommittee. It may be that you have further questions afterward. In the event any question is asked that calls for information that is not in the public record, I trust the subcommittee will understand if I decline to answer.

My testimony is largely a synopsis of an article I wrote that appeared last year in the Harvard International Law Journal, which sets forth my thoughts in much greater detail and also includes extensive citations and footnotes to the public record.

With the chairman's permission, I would like to ask that the article appear at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. SOLARZ. Without objection. Mr. GLENNON. Mr. Chairman, foreign intelligence agencies-including those of Taiwan-have conducted extensive harassment, intimidation, and surveillance of U.S. residents here on American soil. Typically, these activities are supervised by case officers operating under diplomatic cover, although some may pose as students, businessmen, or tourists. The case officers direct agents, who are tasked to carry out specific intelligence missions. The most frequent is surveillance, including the infiltration of groups thought to be inimical to the foreign regime, attendance at demonstrations, and similar activities directed at identifying critics of the regime. Another frequent mission is the disruption of antiregime activities, such as speeches, demonstrations, and organizational planning.

Once the critics are identified, several things may occur. They may be threatened or assaulted. Relatives in their homeland may be harmed. Upon returning home, the critic may be imprisoned, possibly tortured. On rare occasions, he or she may be murdered here in this country.

Certain of these activities have violated three Federal statutes that require the registration of foreign agents. For a variety of reasons, the registration statutes have proven ineffective. What I will refer to as the “Solarz Amendment of 1981” was a step in the right direction, but it now appears that the amendment has had little effect; experience with it suggests why.

First, the cutoff is optional. Arms sales are terminated only in the event the President makes the determination in question, but the amendment does not require that he make that determination.

Second, some nations engaged in these activities do not buy arms from the United States, or they can obtain the arms elsewhere. Restricting the penalty to a cutoff only in arms sales renders the statutory penalty meaningless in those situations.

* See appendix 2.

Third, the amendment refers only to a “consistent pattern of harassment or intimidation,” but it makes no reference to surveillance. Most offending foreign countries normally apply sanctions in their own territory—they wait for the dissident to return home before countering him. Here the amendment is irrelevant.

A variety of political and institutional factors further impede the effective enforcement of these statutes. These become clear as the role of each executive branch actor is reviewed.

The Fedeal Bureau of Investigation is, of course, the agency primarily responsible for Federal law enforcement. The Bureau has in the past made affirmative efforts to gather information only about those foreign intelligence agencies whose activities in the United States directly implicate U.S. national security.

For the most part these have been the agencies of Communist countries. In operational terms, this has meant that the FBI has known a great deal about the intelligence activities of countries operating against the U.S. Government-agencies engaged in classic espionage. But it also has meant that the Bureau has known virtually nothing about most agencies operating against private persons-persons that conduct harassment, intimidation, or surveillance of dissidents engaged in constitutionally protected activities.

Now, one can agree or disagree with the Bureau's allocation of counterintelligence resources. My own opinion is that some measure of differentiation is appropriate. But it seems clear that the amount of resources devoted to the investigation of friendly foreign intelligence services by the FBI has been disproportionately small in relation to the substantial systemic harm caused by their activities. This, I think, is the first institutional impediment: Passivity on the part of the FBI.

Assume, in any event, that the Bureau does obtain evidence of a specific Federal Offense by a foreign intelligence agency. Two principal remedies are available. If the violator is a case officer clothed in diplomatic immunity, he can be expelled. If the violator is an agent without diplomatic immunity, he can be prosecuted. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, further institutional impediments limit the availability of either remedy.

First, the Central Intelligence Agency has a strong incentive to oppose either action. In many instances intelligence agencies know the identities of each other's personnel, and any steps taken against foreign intelligence operatives in the United States can result in retaliatory action against CIA officers stationed abroad.

Moreover, prosecution can risk the disclosure of sensitive intelligence sources and methods, because the question always arises as to how the Government knows the defendant is a foreign agent.

Second, relevant State Department officials too often are loathe to see any steps taken which will disrupt an otherwise smooth-running bilateral relationship. Conflict-avoidance mechanisms seem highly evolved in the diplomatic personality; by training and inclination, career foreign service officers, to their credit, are experts in maximizing harmony and minimizing discord.

Yet that proclivity can impede a swift and firm response to actions inconsistent with diplomatic norms. Perhaps more important,

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