Opinion Per PARKER, J.

[112 Wash.

finding in appellant's behalf. A general exception was, however, taken to the refusal of the court to make findings, ten in all, requested by counsel for appellant, which general exception is evidenced in the record by these words: "plaintiff duly excepted thereto" indorsed at the foot of the requested findings.

According to our repeated holdings, findings of fact made by a trial court are conclusive upon appeal, unless duly excepted to. While this is a suit in equity wherein findings are not necessary as in law actions, when they are made in such a suit, they become as conclusive upon appeal as when made in a law action. Yakima Grocery Co. v. Benoit, 56 Wash. 208, 105 Pac. 476; Hagen v. Balcom Mills, 74 Wash. 462, 133 Pac. 1000, 134 Pac. 1051; Harbican v. Chamberlin, 82 Wash. 556, 144 Pac. 717; Yarbrough v. Pellissier, 83 Wash. 49, 145 Pac. 81; Beeler v. Barr, 90 Wash. 258, 155 Pac. 1040; Ready v. McGillivray, 109 Wash. 387, 186 Pac. 902.

It is equally plain, under our decisions, that such a general exception as we have here, is not sufficient, when directed to a number of findings covering the whole case upon the merits, to call for a review of the evidence to determine questions of fact upon appeal; and this is true whether exception be taken to the findings made by the court or to the refusal of the court to make a number of requested findings, as was done in this case. In Pederson v. Ullrich, 50 Wash. 211, 96 Pac. 1044, it was said:

"No exceptions either to findings made or to those requested and refused appear in the record. In their reply brief the appellants concede that the only mention of any exceptions being taken appears in the certificate of the trial judge to the statement of facts, as follows: 'That the findings of fact and conclusions of

Aug. 1920]

Opinion Per PARKER, J.

law hereto attached were the ones proposed by defendants and rejected and refused by the court and exception allowed thereto.' This, if conceded to be an attempt at exceptions to findings requested, will not secure a review of the evidence, as a general exception to all findings made, or all findings requested and refused, is insufficient for any such purpose.

See, also, Crowe & Co. v. Brandt, 50 Wash. 499, 97 Pac. 503; Fender v. McDonald, 54 Wash. 130, 102 Pac. 1026; Yakima Grocery Co. v. Benoit, 56 Wash. 208, 105 Pac. 476; Snohomish River Boom Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 57 Wash. 693, 107 Pac. 848; Meacham v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 238, 124 Pac. 1125; Sallaske v. Fletcher, 73 Wash. 593, 132 Pac. 468, Ann. Cas. 1914 D 760, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 320.

We conclude, therefore, that we must view the facts as found by the trial court. We deem it not out of place, however, to here observe that a perusal of the short abstract convinces us that our disposition of the case upon its merits would be in respondents' favor even if it were necessary for us to discuss the merits.

While counsel for appellant seems to make his principal contention upon the merits of the case in the light of the evidence, he also makes contention that the defense of damages by way of set-off as against appellant's claim was not well pleaded. It is true, as counsel points out, that respondents plead in their affirmative answer in the concluding paragraph thereof, that appellant has "forfeited any right to compensation." This, however, is only pleading a conclusion which, in the light of the preceding allegation, can only mean that the damages which respondents claim to have been caused by appellant's neglect of the work exceeds the amount of appellant's claim. It is not the pleading of a technical forfeiture, as counsel for appellant seems

HOLCOMB, C. J., MAIN, MACKINTOSH, and MITCHELL, JJ., concur.

[No. 15797. Department One. August 3, 1920.]

MANLEY SMITH, by his Guardian etc., Appellant, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Respondents, IRENE CROSS, Defendant.1

COUNTIES (59)-REPRESENTATION-TORTS OF OFFICERS OR AGENTSSCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT AS AGENT-LIABILITY. A county is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the torts or negligence of the county superintendent, as the relation of principal and agent does not exist, since the officer is elected by the people, his duties prescribed by statute, and not subject to the control of the county in the execution of its governmental powers.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (29-1)-NEGLIGENCE (6)-DANGEROUS ELEVATOR IN SCHOOL BUILDING-CARE AS TO EMPLOYEE OF LICENSEE. A school district is not liable for injury suffered by a twelve-year-old boy through the dangerous condition of an elevator used by him while employed by the manager of a lunch room in a high school building during the holding of a teachers' institute in charge of the county superintendent, since the superintendent was a mere licensee under Rem. Code, § 4481, granting permission to use the school room for certain public gatherings; and the boy being an employee of the licensee, was entitled to no greater rights in respect to the condition of the elevator.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Ronald, J., entered November 4, 1919, dismissing an action for personal injuries, in sustaining demurrers to the complaint. Affirmed.

'Reported in 191 Pac. 858.

Aug. 1920]

Opinion Per HOLCOMB, C. J.

Meyers & Couden and Edward H. Wright, for appellant.

Henry W. Pennock and James R. Gates, for respondent Seattle School District No. 1.

Fred C. Brown and Wm. Parmerlee, for respondent King County.

HOLCOMB, C. J.-Plaintiff, a minor, brought this action by his guardian ad litem against defendants to recover for personal injuries sustained by him because of the alleged negligence of defendants in the operation of a freight elevator while plaintiff was employed in a lunch room maintained at the Broadway High School Building in Seattle. This appeal is from orders of the trial court sustaining separate demurrers by defendants Seattle School District No. 1 and King county to plaintiff's amended complaint, and dismissing his action upon his refusal to plead further.

The alleged facts may be summarized as follows: Respondent Seattle School District No. 1 had caused a lunch room to be installed in the Broadway high school building, and during regular sessions of the school it was operated for the convenience of teachers and pupils of that school; but on August 28, 1917, at the time of appellant's injury, the lunch room was in operation for the benefit of teachers attending an institute being conducted in the building by the county school superintendent with the permission of respondent Seattle School District No. 1. This lunch room was on the fifth floor of the building, and the electric freight elevator upon which appellant was injured ran between the fifth floor and the basement. On the 28th day of August, 1917, appellant, a boy twelve years of age, was employed by the manager of the lunch room to assist

3-112 WASH.

Opinion Per HOLCOMB, C. J.

[112 Wash.

in kitchen work in connection with the operation of the lunch room, and in the performance of such duties he was directed by the manager to do an errand in the basement. He used the elevator to reach the basement, and in attempting to return the same way, he stepped into the open space between the edge of the elevator and the wall of the shaft and sustained the injuries for which recovery is sought.

The complaint charged that the elevator was negligently maintained, because (1st) there was a space of from four to six inches between the floor of the elevator and the front wall of the elevator shaft with no guard to prevent a person riding on the elevator from stepping therefrom into the open space between the edge of the elevator floor and the wall of the shaft; and because (2nd) no notice was posted in or near the elevator calling attention to its construction or to the fact that its operation by a person of tender years was dangerous and constituted a menace to life and limb. Respondents were charged by the complaint with notice of the alleged dangerous condition of the elevator.

Portions of paragraphs V and VI of the amended complaint read as follows:

"That the said lunch room was constructed and equipped in said high school building for the purpose of furnishing healthful food to the pupils and teachers of said Broadway high school while they are in attendance at the sessions of said school. That said lunch room was not constructed or maintained for profit, but solely for the purpose of contributing to the physical welfare of the pupils in attendance at said school."

"That for the convenience of the teachers and others who were required to attend the session of the said teachers' institute the said county school superintendent made arrangements for the operation of the lunch room and its equipment, which was in said high school building during the period when said institute was in