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any ruling of the court in the progress of the trial, and of a special finding of the court upon facts, that there is nothing open for our consideration outside of the questions embraced in the certificate of the judges. We accept the certificate as sufficient to warrant an answer to the fifth question, although it does not state, in the terms of section 652 or section 693 of the Revised Statutes, that the judges disagreed upon the points stated in the five questions, or that their opinions were opposed upon such questions, but only that they disagreed as to whether the judgment should be for the plaintiff or the defendant, notwithstanding all of said questions. Having arrived at the conclusion that the fifth question must be answered in the affirmative, and such result disposing of the writ of error taken by the defendant, we do not deem it necessary to answer the other four questions. The fifth question assumes that the bonds were originally illegal and void, and we so assume, without so deciding, in answering that question.

The question is not an open one, on this record, as to whether the plaintiff is a bona fide owner of the bonds and coupons for value, without knowledge or notice of any facts affecting their validity, as alleged in the petitions and replies, and denied in the answers. That issue is found for the plaintiff by the general finding in his favor as to all the causes of action, except those on coupons which fell due before July 1, 1877. This general finding has the same effect as the verdict of a jury, and we cannot review it.

It is contended for the defendant that the failure to give the four weeks' notice of the election, as provided by section 26 of the act marked "B," and the failure to include in the vote the question of taxation, as provided by section 27, constituted such a want of power to issue the bonds that the legislature could not validate their issue. The territorial act of January 11, 1861, the proceedings for the election and its result, and the state act marked "D,” were before this court in Railroad Co. v. Co. of Otoe, 16 Wall. 667, at December term, 1872. After that act was passed, and in September, 1869, the commissioners of Otoe county issued to the Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Company, named in that act, as a donation, the $150,000 of bonds mentioned in it; there having been no vote of the people, other than the one above mentioned, authorizing the issue of the bonds. The bonds and their coupons were transferred for value, and before the maturity of any of the coupons, by that company, to the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, and it sued the county, on some of the coupons, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska. Upon the trial of that suit, two questions were certified to this court: (1) Whether the act marked "D," authorizing the county to issue bonds in aid of a railroad outside of the state, conflicted with the constitution of the state; (2) whether the county commissioners, under that act, could lawfully issue the bonds, without the proposition to vote the bonds for the purpose indicated, and also a tax to pay the same, being or having been submitted to a vote of the people of the county, as provided by the territorial act of January 11, 1861. This court held (1) that the act of February 15, 1869, authorizing the county of Otoe to issue bonds in aid of a railroad outside of the state, did not conflict with the constitution of the state; (2) that it was a valid exercise of legislative authority, to authorize a county to incur indebtedness and impose taxation in aid of railroad companies; (3) that the legislature could constitutionally authorize a donation of the county bonds to the railroad company; (4) that it could authorize aid to a railroad beyond the limits of the county and outside of the state; (5) that under said act of February 15, 1869, the county commissioners could lawfully issue the $150,000 of bonds without a vote of the people, as provided by the territorial act of January 11, 1861, on the proposition to issue them, and on the question of taxation to pay them. This court said, by Justice STRONG: "If the legislature had power to authorize the county officers to extend aid on behalf of the county or state to a railroad company, as we have seen it had, very

plainly it could prescribe the mode in which such aid might be extended, as well as the terms and conditions of the extension, and it needed no assistance from the popular vote of the municipality. Such a vote could not have enlarged legislative power. But the act of 1869 was an unconditional bestowal of authority upon the county commissioners to issue the bonds to the railroad company. It required no precedent action of the voters of the county. It assumed that their assent had been obtained. That prior to 1869 the sanction of approval by a local popular vote had been required for municipal aid to railroad companies or improvement companies, is quite immaterial. The requisition was but the act of an annual legislature, which any subsequent legislature could abrogate or annul."

It cannot be doubted that the two acts of February 15, 1869, taken together, intended to legalize the $40,000 of bonds issued to the Council Bluffs & St. Joseph Railroad Company. Those bonds fall within the description of section 8 of the act marked "C," as bonds theretofore "voted and issued" by the county of Otoe to aid in the construction of a railroad. The vote was a vote of the county to issue $200,000 of bonds "for the purpose of securing an eastern railroad connection for Nebraska City;" and the $40,000 of bonds were issued as a donation to said company, to aid it in building a railroad so near to Nebraska City as to secure to that city and to the county of Otoe an eastern railroad connection by the way of St. Joseph. The defects and irregularities alleged in respect to the bonds were defects and irregularities in submitting to a vote of the people of the county the question of issuing the bonds, in regard to the publishing of notice, and in regard to including in the vote the question of taxation. It was alleged that the bonds were not voted upon or issued in conformity with law. The statute enacted that, notwithstanding such defects or irregularities, the bonds should be legal and valid, and should have the same legal validity and binding force as if they had been legally authorized, voted upon, and executed. The act of the same date, marked "D," refers to and identifies sufficiently the election held, and the authority given by the vote to the county commissioners to issue the bonds of the county, to the amount of $200,000, “to any railroad in Fremont county, Iowa, that would secure to Nebraska City an eastern railroad connection." It recites the authority as one to issue the bonds "in payment of stock." But the question is one merely of identity, and it is not pretended there was any election in Otoe county to the purport set forth, including the words "in payment of stock," while there was just such an election leaving out those words. The identity is further shown by the words in the act, "and whereas, but forty thousand dollars have been issued," and by the authority given to issue $150,000 "of the bonds aforesaid;" that is, of the $200,000 of bonds so voted, as a donation to any railroad company that would "secure to Nebraska City a direct eastern railroad connection." It is not pretended that any $40,000 of bonds were issued except those named in the bonds sued on in this suit. Taking the two acts together, the legislature recognized the fact that the voters of Otoe county had voted to issue $200,000 of bonds to secure an eastern railroad connection for Nebraska City, in that county; that $40,000 had been issued; and that the defects and irregularities before named were alleged to have occurred in respect to the voting upon and issuing the $40,000 of the bonds; and it enacted that those bonds should be legal and valid, and that $150,000 more of the $200.000 should be issued for the same purpose.

The decision by this court in regard to the $150,000 of bonds leaves but little more to say in regard to the $40,000. As the legislature had power to authorize the issue of bonds without any precedent action of the voters of the county, it could validate the issue of bonds by curing and legalizing defects in respect to the voting. The bonds were assigned by the railroad company, and came to the plaintiff after the acts of 1869 were passed, and he became a

bona fide holder of them on the faith of those acts. The doctrine is well settled in this court that the legislature of a state, unless restrained by its organic law, has the right to authorize a municipal corporation to issue bonds in aid of a railroad, and to levy a tax to pay the bonds and the interest on them, with or without a popular vote, and to cure, by a retrospective act, irregularities in the exercise of the power conferred. Thomson v. Lee Co. 3 Wall. 327; Campbell v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wall. 203.

Much stress is laid by the defendant on the decision of the supreme court of Nebraska in Hamlin v. Meadville, 6 Neb. 227, in 1877. That was a suit brought in February, 1871, by an owner of property in Otoe county, to enjoin the county treasurer from collecting a tax levied on his property to pay the interest on these $40,000 of bonds, and to have the bonds declared void. A judgment to that effect was rendered, and was affirmed by the supreme court. The question adjudged in the case was the power conferred on the county commissioners, by the acts of 1860 and 1861, to issue the bonds. It was held that the only authority, if any, given by the vote of the people was to subscribe for stock in a railroad company. The act marked "C" was not considered. It was held that it was not the purpose of the act marked “D” to legalize the $40,000 of bonds, but only to authorize the issue of the $150,000 of bonds; and that the only subject or object expressed in its title was the issuing of bonds. The adjudication in Hamlin v. Meadville is not set up as a judgment binding on the plaintiff. Nor can it be. He was no party to it, nor was any holder of the bonds.

It is objected that the act marked "C" is void because section 19 of article 2 of the constitution of Nebraska, of 1867, provided that "no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title," and because the act does not comply with those provisions. It is plain, we think, that the bill does not contain more than one subject. That subject is municipal bonds issued, or to be issued, to aid in making works of internal improvement. There is but one purpose, object, or subject, and that is the aiding of such works by bonds, and the status of such bonds. The subject of the act, to authorize future bonds and legalize existing bonds, for such purpose, is clearly expressed in its title.

But it is objected that the title of the act is limited to bonds issued, or to be issued, to aid works in Nebraska, while the body of the act extends to works anywhere; and that so the subject of the act is not expressed in its title.The first section of the act relates to the future issue of bonds by "any county or city in the state;" the seventh section relates to like issues by "any precinct in any organized county of this state;" and the eighth section relates to "bonds heretofore voted and issued by any county or city in this state." The railroads and works of internal improvement referred to in the body of the act are not limited to those situated in the state. It would, we think, be a strained construction, to hold that the title of the act is to be so interpreted as to be limited to works situated in the state, when such limitation does not exist in the body of the act, and when the words "in this state," in the title, may fairly be regarded as applicable to the prior words "counties, cities, and precincts," to which words they are applied in the body of the act. This principle of construction is sanctioned by the views expressed in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 152, S. C. 2 SUP. CT. REP. 391, and in City of Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. Louis R. Co. 110 U. S. 192, S. C. 4 SUP. CT. REP. 67. See, also, Cooley, Const. Lim. 141 et seq. We have not been referred to any decision of the supreme court of Nebraska which we regard as in conflict with these views.

The question sought to be raised by the writ of error of the plaintiff is that the statute of limitations had not run against the coupons which were more than five years past due when the first suit was commenced, because, under section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Nebraska, the disability of a mar

ried woman, from whom the plaintiff purchased the bonds, intervened for a sufficient time, between their date and such purchase by him, to prevent what would otherwise be the bar of the statute. Without considering that question, it is sufficient to say that the facts on which it could be raised are not admitted in the pleadings or specially found by the court, and that the general finding for the defendant on the causes of action on coupons which were more than five years past due when the actions were brought, and the absence of any exception by the plaintiff to any ruling of the court in regard to the question, preclude any adjudication here upon it.

The fifth question certified is answered in the affirmative, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

(110 U. S. 720)

CUTLER 0. KOUNS and another.

(March 10, 1884.)

1. AFFIRMATION OF ACTS OF CONGRESS-ACT JULY 13, 1861, 7, (12 Sr. 255.)

A purchasing agent acting under the authority of congress (12 St. 255) properly exacted of its owners one-fourth of the New York market value of certain cotton brought into New Orleans from western Louisiana and eastern Texas, July 6, 1865. 2. SAME-ACT OF MARCH 3, 1863, 7, (12 ST. 757.)

A person assuming himself aggrieved by the conduct of some one acting, during the rebellion, under authority of the president or the congress of the United States, cannot recover for the injury claimed to have been committed after two years have elapsed since its commission.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

The congress of the United States, by section 3 of an act passed July 13, 1861, (12 St. 255,) enacted that it should be lawful for the president, by proclamation, to declare that the inhabitants of any state or part of a state in rebellion against the United States were in a state of insurrection, and that "thereupon all commercial intercourse by and between the same and citizens thereof and the citizens of the rest of the United States should cease and be unlawful so long as such condition of hostilities should continue." By his proclamation dated August 16, 1861, (12 St. 1262,) the president declared, among others, the states of Louisiana and Texas to be in a state of insurrection against the United States, (excepting such parts thereof as might, from time to time, be occupied by the forces of the United States,) and forbid all commercial intercourse between the same and the inhabitants thereof, with the exceptions aforesaid, and the citizens of other states and other parts of the United States. On April 26, 1862, the city of New Orleans was occupied by the forces of the United States, and remained in their possession until the close of the civil war. From the date named New Orleans was therefore exexcepted from the operation of the non-intercourse act. In this state of affairs, on July 2, 1864, an act of congress was passed, entitled “An act in addition to the several acts concerning commercial intercourse between loyal and insurrectionary states, and to provide for the collection of captured and abandoned property, and the prevention of fraud in states declared in insurrection." 13 St. 375. Section 8 of the act provided as follows: "That it shall be lawful for the secretary of the treasury, with the approval of the president, to authorize agents to purchase for the United States any products of states declared in insurrection, at such places therein as shall be designated by him, at such prices as shall be agreed on with the seller, not exceed

ing the market value thereof at the place of delivery, nor exceeding threefourths of the market value thereof in the city of New York, at the latest quotations known to the agent purchasing."

In pursuance of the authority thus conferred, the secretary of the treasury designated certain cities, among them the city of New Orleans, as places of purchase, and appointed purchasing agents. By regulations dated May 9, 1865, he directed that, to meet the requirements of the eighth section of the act of July 2, 1864, the agents should receive all cotton brought to the places designated as places of purchase, and forthwith return to the seller threefourths thereof, or retain out of the price thereof the difference between threefourths the market price and the full price thereof in the city of New York. While the statute and these regulations were in force, to-wit, on June 6, 1865, the defendants in error, George L. Kouns and John Kouns, brought to the city of New Orleans about 900 bales of cotton, which they had caused to be transported, a part from near Shreveport, in the state of Louisiana, and the residue from Jefferson, in the state of Texas. At the time last mentioned, Cutler, the plaintiff in error, was the purchasing agent in New Orleans, appointed by the secretary of the treasury. As such agent he took possession of the cotton, and before releasing it to the plaintiffs in error exacted from them the one-fourth of its market value in New York, which they paid under protest. They paid the money in three installments-$13,695.92 on June 12, $7,200 on June 15, and $8,588.41 on June 20. The money so paid was covered into the treasury by Cutler. On July 1, 1871, the defendants in error brought this suit against Cutler to recover back the money so paid. Cutler set up several defenses, only two of which it is necessary to notice. These were,-First, that the seizure of the cotton and the exaction of the money paid to him were authorized by section 8 of the act of July 2, 1864, and the regulations of the secretary of the treasury made in pursuance thereof; and, second, that the suit was barred by the limitation enacted by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1863, entitled "An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases." 12 St. 755. Upon the trial of the case in the circuit court the defendant, Cutler, moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for him on the ground that the exaction of the money sued for was lawful. The court refused to give this instruction. The defendant also moved the court to direct the jury to return a verdict for him on the ground that the action was barred by section 7 of the act of March 3, 1863, because the suit had not been commenced within two years after the wrong done to redress which the suit was brought. This motion was also denied, and the court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the sum of $7,200 paid by them to the defendant on June 15th and the sum of $8,588.41 paid on June 20th, with interest. In pursuance of this instruction the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for $29,679.55, for which the court rendered judgment in their favor against the defendant. This writ of error is prosecuted by the defendant, now the plaintiff in error, to reverse that judgment.

Sol. Gen. Phillips, for plaintiff in error.

Henry C. Bliss and Henry S. Neal, for defendants in error.

WOODS, J. The errors assigned are-First, the refusal of the circuit court to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the money sued for was lawfully exacted from the defendants in error; and, second, its refusal to give a similar direction on the ground that the action was barred. We think both these assignments are well founded.

It is not disputed that on June 6, 1865, when the cotton was brought to New Orleans, the exaction by Cutler, the purchasing agent, of one-fourth its market value in the city of New York, was lawful, and that under the statutes and the treasury regulations it was his duty to make it. The contention of the defendants in error is that by the proclamation of the president, dated

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