a general term thereof begun and held at St. Paul, Minnesota, on the third Monday in June, A. D. 1880.

"The respective causes were brought by the plaintiffs on certain policies of insurance bearing date as follows: That of the Commonwealth Insurance Company of Boston bearing date of eleventh of January, 1877; that of the Western Assurance Company of Toronto, Canada, bearing date of twentyseventh of December, 1876; and that of the Franklin Insurance Company of St. Louis, bearing date of twenty-ninth of December, 1876, the two latter being for $5,000 each, and the former for $2,500, insuring one Frances E. Barritt against loss or damage by fire on her stock of dry goods or other merchandise pertaining to her business, contained in the three-storied store, metal-roofed building, situated No. 37 East Third street, St. Paul, Minnesota, for a period of three months after their respective dates, with the condition that $35,000 other insurance shall be allowed. The respective policies were assigned by Frances E. Barritt, the assured, to one William Murphy on the seventh day of February, 1877, with the consent and approval of the respective companies.

"On the twenty-fifth day of February, 1877, said stock of goods was damaged by fire to the amount of $11,804.72, as found and determined by the arbitrators appointed by the assured and the respective companies. The policy of the Western Assurance Company of Toronto, Canada, contained, among other things, the following provision: The assured shall, if required, submit to an examination or examinations under oath by any person appointed by the company, and subscribe thereto when the same is reduced to writing;' and also all fraud or attempt at fraud, by false swearing or otherwise, shall forfeit all claim on this company, and be a perpetual bar to any recovery under this policy.'

"That of the Franklin Insurance Company of St. Louis contained, among others, the following provision, viz.: And the insured shall, if required, submit to an examination under oath, by the agent or attorney of this company, and answer all questions touching his, her, or their knowledge of anything relating to such loss or damage, or to their claim thereupon, and subscribe such examination, the same being reduced to writing;' and the further provision, to-wit: All fraud or false swearing shall cause a forfeiture of all claims on the insurers, and shall be a full bar to all remedies against the insurer on the policy.' That of the defendant, the Commonwealth Insurance Company of Boston, contained, among others, the following provision, towit: All fraud or attempt at fraud, by false swearing or otherwise, shall cause a forfeiture of all claims on this company under this policy;' and the further provision, viz., 'The assured shall, if required, submit to an examination or examinations, under oath, by any person appointed by the company, and subscribe to such examinations when reduced to writing.'

"Upon the trial of said causes there was evidence tending to show that the respective defendants required the assured, William Murphy, to appear before their appointed agent and submit to an examination under oath, and answer all questions touching his knowledge of anything relating to such loss or damage and his claim thereupon, and to subscribe such examination, the same being reduced to writing, which the said Murphy did, as required, and that upon said examination the question of the ownership of said goods by said Murphy was made by the defendants, and said Murphy examined at length upon the same, and he answered certain questions relating to the manner in which he paid one Frances E. Barritt for said stock at the time of his alleged purchase thereof falsely, and there was evidence tending to show that he answered thus with no purpose to deceive and defraud the insurance companies, but for the purpose of showing himself, upon the examination. consistent with a statement that he had made about it a day or two subse

quent to the purchase of said stock, to R. G. Dunn & Co.'s commercial agency at St. Paul, Minnesota, with a view of obtaining a large commercial credit in eastern cities. There was evidence tending to show that on the ninth day of February, 1877, said William Murphy went to said agency and reported that he had bought the stock of Frances E. Barritt for $35,484.20; that he had paid for the same in cash and securities, and plaintiffs claimed that if the false statements were made to the agents of the insurance company upon examination, even though made upon a material question without intent to deceive or defraud the insurance companies, it would not prevent a recovery upon the policies, and requested the court upon that point to charge as follows: If you find, from the evidence, that any incorrect statements made by William Murphy upon his examination were made for the purpose of protecting himself against the statements made by him to the coumercial agency for the purpose of obtaining more credit than he was actually entitled to, and not for the purpose of deceiving and defrauding the defendants, then such statements constitute no defense to this action;' and also, No false statements made by Murphy on his examination, under oath or otherwise, constitute a defense to this action, unless the same were made upon material issues between him and the defendants, and unless you are satisfied, from the evidence, that Mr. Murphy made them knowingly and willfully, with intent thereby to deceive and defraud the defendants.'

"The court (his honor Judge MILLER addressing the jury) refused to give said instructions, but told the jury in its charge that the said questions relating to the manner in which Mr. Murphy paid said Frances E. Barritt for said stock at the time of his alleged purchase thereof were upon a material point, upon which the defendants had a right to interrogate Mr. Murphy, and were material questions, to which they had a right to true answers from Murphy in said examinations, and upon the point in controversy upon which the said instructions were asked, charged the jury as follows, to-wit: 'It is said here, and the point is urged with a good deal of force, that unless Mr. Murphy made these false statements, if they were false, and it is conceded that they were false, with the intent to deceive and defraud these corporations, and if he made them with the intent to deceive and defraud some one else, that is is immaterial to this issue. I do not think that is the law. I do not think it was necessary in order to avoid the policy that the statements made by Mr. Murphy should have been solely, or even partly, with a view to get money wrongfully out of the companies; however, that is a point I wish to draw your attention to. If these statements had been wholly immaterial, that doctrine may be right; if it was a matter that the company had no right to inquire into or interrogate him about, if he did swear falsely and intend to deceive some one else, that does not interfere with the policy; but these companies had a right to have from him the truth about every matter that was material as evidence to show whether he owned these goods or not; they had a right to have the truth from him whatever his intentions might have been, that is, as far as the truth was material; and so far as his testimony before the notary had a tendency to mislead the companies on an important matter, it was false swearing and false testimony within the meaning of the policy, and would avoid the policy. If he stated that which was intended for their action, and which would probably influence their action, and these statements were false, then he swore faisely within the meaning of the pol icy, though he did not intend to cheat them, but intended to cheat somebody else; for, without looking to his motives, the company had a right to an hon- . est statement from him to all questions that went to show whether he was the owner of these goods or not.'

"To which refusals to charge as requested, and to said charge as given. v.3--33

plaintiff's counsel thereupon duly excepted, and, after the rendition of the verdict for the defendants, moved for a new trial on account thereof, and said motion was duly argued by John B. Sanborn, Esq., counsel for the plaintiff, and Cushman K. Davis, Esq., counsel for the defendant, and after due consideration thereof the court denied the motion, and upon the question as to whether said instructions should be given to the jury as requested, or the jury instructed as in the said charge of the court, the opinions of the said judges were opposed.

Whereupon, on motion of the plaintiffs, H. B. Claflin & Co., by counsel, that the points on which the disagreement hath happened may, during the term, be stated under the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of the court to the supreme court, to be finally decided.

"It is ordered that the foregoing state of the evidence and cases, and the questions on which the disagreement of opinion hath happened, which is made under the direction of the judges, be certified according to the request of the plaintiffs, by their counsel, and the law in that case made and provided."

It was set out in the answer and relied on as a defense that the policy of original insurance made to Frances E. Barritt had been fraudulently procured for her by one Johnson, upon false representations, greatly overvaluing the stock insured; that Murphy received the assignment of the stock and policy with knowledge of the fraud, and that the pretended sale to him by Mrs. Barritt was without consideration, and merely colorable and fictitious; that Murphy consequently never acquired or had any insurable interest in the stock and property insured; that after the fire Murphy, in making proof of loss, stated under oath that the actual cash value of the property insured, at the time of the fire, amounted to $35,491.61, and that the same belonged to him; that the property insured was injured to the amount of $26,827.06, and that of said amount $6,463.39 was the cost and value of goods totally destroyed, and $20,360.67 was the amount of the loss on that part of the stock damaged but not destroyed, whereas in truth and in fact the cash value of the goods insured, at the time of the fire, did not exceed $18,000, and the total amount of the loss and damage thereto by fire did not exceed $5,000, and that said goods did not belong to Murphy, as he well knew; "that thereafter the said Murphy was examined under oath, at the city of St. Paul, by an agent of the defendant, as provided in said policy, before J. D. O'Brien, Esq., and before R. B. Galusha, Esq., who were then and there re-. spectively notaries public within and for the county of Ramsey, and in such examination the said Murphy did swear that he had purchased said stock from said Barritt, and that he was the sole owner thereof, and that no other person had any interest therein, and that he had fully paid for the same, each and every of which statements as to said purchase, ownership, interest, payment, and the manner thereof, were wholly false, as said Murphy well knew."

It is quite obvious that upon the issues, as made in the pleadings and actually tried, it was material to show what title and interest Murphy had at the time of the loss in the property insured. If he had no insurable interest, that certainly would have been a defense.

The object of the provisions in the policies of insurance, requiring the assured to submit himself to an examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the company to possess itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to their rights, to enable them to decide upon their obligations, and to protect them against false claims.t And every interrogatory that was relevant and pertinent in such an examination was material, in the sense that a true answer to it was of the substance of the obligation of the assured. A false answer as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry, knowingly and willfully made, with intent to deceive the insurer, would be fraudulent. If it accomplished its result, it would be a fraud effected; if it failed it would be a fraud attempted. And if the matter were material and the statement false, to the knowledge of the party making it, and willfully made, the intention to deceive the insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend the natural consequences of his acts. No one can be permitted to say, in respect to his own statements upon a material matter, that he did not expect to be believed; and if they are knowingly false and willfully made, the fact that they are material is proof of an attempted fraud, because their materiality, in the eye of the law, consists in their tendency to influence the conduct of the party who has an interest in them, and to whom they are addressed. "Fraud," said Mr. Justice CATRON, in Lord v. Goddard, 13 How. 198, "means an intention to deceive." "Where one," said SHIPLEY, C. J., in Hammatt v. Emerson, 27 Me. 308-326, "has made a false representation, knowing it to be false, the law infers that he did so with an intention to deceive." "If a person tells a falsehood, the natural and obvious consequence of which, if acted on, is injury to another, that is fraud in law." BOSANQUET, J., in Foster v. Charles, 7 Bing. 105; Polhill v. Walter, 3 Barn. & Adol. 114; Sleeper v. Ins. Co. 56 N. H. 401; Leach v. Republic F. Ins. Co. 58 N. H. 245.

An attempt is made by counsel for the plaintiffs in error to distinguish between matters that are material only as evidence and matters material to the contract and liability of the defendants in error thereunder, and in argument the distinction is illustrated by the following statement:

"Where the question is as to the extent of the loss, and the assured know ingly exaggerates his loss, and makes false statements concerning the same, his conduct must of necessity be held fraudulent, for he invites the company to take a false position, to assume new and unjust obligations,, to pay a loss that has not been sustained and does not exist, to do that which will prejudice and damage the company. But if the assured had made a true statement of his actual loss, and then answered falsely, for personal reasons, as to the parties from whom he had purchased the goods, or the value of those purchased from a certain house, then there could be no fraud, because there could be no prejudice or damage. The questions would be material as evidence, but not material as to the rights and liabilities of the company."

But this position is untenable. The fact whether Murphy had an insurable interest in the merchandise covered by the policy was directly in issue between the parties. By the terms of the contract he was bound to answer truly every question put to him that was relevant to that inquiry. His answer to every question pertinent to that point was material, and made so by the contract, and because it was material as evidence; so that every false statement on that subject, knowingly made, was intended to deceive and was fraudulent. And it does not detract from this conclusion to suppose that the purpose of Murphy in making these false statements was not to deceive and defraud the companies, as is stated in the bill of exceptions and certificate, but for the purpose of preventing an exposure of the false statement previously made to the commercial agency in order to enhance his credit. The meaning of that we take to be simply this, that his motive for repeating the false statements to the insurance companies was to protect his own reputation for veracity, and that he would not have made them but for that cause. But what is that but that he was induced to make statements known to be false, intended to deceive the insurance companies, lest they might discover, and others through them, the falsity of his previous statements; in other words, that he attempted, by means of a fraud upon the companies, to protect his reputation and credit? In any view, there was a fraud attempted upon the insurers; and it is not lessened because the motive that induced it was something in addition to the possible injury to them that it might work. The supposition proceeds upon the very ground of the false statement of a material matter, knowingly and willfully made, with the intent to deceive the defendants in error; and it is no palliation of the fraud that Murphy did not mean thereby to prejudice them, but merely to promote his own personal interest in a matter not involved in the contract with them. By that contract the companies were entitled to know from him all the circumstances of his purchase of the property insured, including the amount of the price paid and in what manner payment was made; and false statements, willfully made under oath, intended to conceal the truth on these points, constituted an attempted fraud by false swearing which was a breach of the conditions of the policy, and constituted a bar to the recovery of the insurance.

Such we understand to be the precise effect of the rulings of the justice presiding at the trial of the case in the court below, in refusing the requests to instruct the jury as asked by the plaintiffs in error, and in giving the instructions contained in the charge excepted to, and finding no error in them, the judgment is affirmed.