self when he came home from business; he would go to his room and lie on his bed with his hat and overcoat on, and not come out to his meals." The experts called for the plaintiff testified that Ferguson was suffering from that kind of unsoundness of mind which they termed melancholia. There was clearly some evidence of insanity for the jury, and the question of its weight was for them, and not for the court. Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232.

The remaining, and the most important, question in the case is whether a self-killing by an insane person, having sufficient mental capacity to understand the deadly nature and consequences of his act, but not its moral aspect and character, is a death by suicide, within the meaning of the policy. This is the very question that was presented to this court in 1872 in the case of Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580. At that time there was a remarkable conflict of opinion in the courts of England, in the courts of the several states, and in the circuit courts of the United States, as to the true interpretation of such a condition. All the authorities agreed that the words "die by suicide" or "die by his own hand" did not cover every possible case in which a man took his own life, and could not be held to include the case of self-destruction in a blind frenzy or under an overwhelming insane impulse. Some courts and judges held that they included every case in which a man, sane or insane, voluntarily took his own life. Others were of opinion that any insane self-destruction was not within the condition.1

In Terry's Case, (the trial of which in the circuit court before Mr. Justice MILLER and Judge DILLON is reported in 1 Dill. 403,) it was admitted that the person whose life was insured died by poison, selfadministered; and the insurance company requested the court to instruct the jury-First, that if he destroyed his own life, and at the time of self-destruction had sufficient capacity to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it, the plaintiff could not recover on the policy; and, secondly, that if the self-destruction was intended by him, he having sufficient capacity at the time to understand the nature of the act which he was about to commit, and the consequences which would result from it, it was wholly immaterial that he was impelled thereto by insanity, which impaired his sense of moral responsibility, and rendered him to a certain extent irresponsible for his action. 15 Wall. 581. The circuit court declined to give either of the instruc

Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. & G. 639; S. C. 5 Scott, N. R. 418; Dormay v. Borradaile, 10 Beav. 335; Schwabe v. Clift, 2 Car. & K. 134, and 3 C. B. 437; Stormont v. Waterloo Ins. Co. 1 Falc. & F. 22; Dufaur v. Professional Ins. Co. 25 Beav. 599, 602; Solicitors' Assurance Soc. v. Lamb, 1 Hem. & M. 716, and 2 De Gex, J. & S. 251; Breasted v. Farmers' Trust & Loan Co. 4 Hill, 73, and 8 N. Y. 299; Dean v. American Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 96; Cooper v. Massachusetts Ins. Co. 102 Mass. 227; Eastabrook v. Union Ins. Co. 54 Me. 224; Gove v. Farmers' Ins. Co. 48 N. H. 41; St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush, 268; Nimick v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. 10 Amer. Law. Reg. (N. S.) 101; Gay v. Union Ins. Co. 9 Blatchf. C. C. 142; Terry v. Life Ins. Co. 1 Dill. 403.

tions requested, and instructed the jury in substantial accordance with the first of them only, saying:

It devolves on the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the part of the decedent, existing at the time he took the poison, as will relieve the act of taking his own life from the effect which, by the general terms used in the policy, self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid the policy. It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of the insanity, and the mind of the decedent must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act he was about to do, the company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law, prima facie or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe from the evidence that the decedent, although excited, or angry, or distressed in mind, formed the determination to take his own life, because, in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties, he preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy." 15 Wall. 582.

The necessary effect of giving these instructions, after refusing to give the second instruction requested, was to rule that if the deceased intentionally took his own life, having sufficient mental capacity to understand the physical nature and consequences of his act, yet if he was impelled to the act by insanity, which impaired his sense of moral responsibility, the company was liable. That the ruling was so understood by this court is apparent by the opening sentences of its opinion on page 583, as well as by its conclusion, which, after a review of the conflicting authorities on the subject, was announced in these words: "We hold the rule on the question before us to be this: If the assured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches and there can be no recovery. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impared that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable." Pages 590, 591. In Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232, the same rule was expressly reaffirmed. In that case the circuit court declined to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if the assured knew that the act which he committed would result in death, and deliberately did it for that purpose; and instead thereof, repeated to the jury the instructions of the circuit court in Terry's Case, and the conclusion of the opinion of this court in that case, as above quoted. This court, in

affirming the judgment, said: "This charge is in the very words of the charge sanctioned and approved by this court in the case of Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, including an explanatory clause of the opinion of the court in that case. We see no reason to modify the views expressed by us on that occasion." 95 U. S. 241.

The policies in the cases of Terry and of Rodel used the words "die by his own hand," instead of which the policy before us has the words "die by suicide." But, for the purposes of this contract, as was observed in Terry's Case, 15 Wall. 591, the two expressions are equivalent.

In the present case, the defendant requested the court to instruct the jury "that if Israel Ferguson died by suicide the plaintiff cannot recover, unless he has proved to your satisfaction that such act of self-destruction was not Ferguson's voluntary and willful act; that he had not at the time sufficient power of mind and reason to understand the physical nature and consequences of such act, and did not have, at the time, a purpose and intention to cause his own death by the act;" "that unless the evidence established that Israel Ferguson did not commit suicide consciously and voluntarily, the plaintiff cannot recover;" and "that if he thus committed it, it is immaterial whether he was capable of understanding its moral aspects, or of distinguishing between right and wrong."

The court declined to give these instructions, and read to the jury the second instruction refused in Terry's Case, and the instructions given therein, as above quoted, and stated that the refusal of the former and the giving of the latter had been approved by this court, and that its decision contained a full exposition of the law, so far as it was necessary to be understood for the purposes of this case, and laid down the rule which would determine them in the application of the evidence which had been introduced; and further instructed them as follows:

"Upon the part of the defendant, all argument based upon the peculiar circumstances surrounding the suicide has been addressed to you, which is deserving of consideration; the various circumstances, showing premeditation. plan, thought, which, it is very fairly urged, afford quite strong evidence that at the time of his death he was in the full possession of his mental faculties. A serious question, gentlemen, which you will ask yourselves in this case, it seems to me, is this: Had he, in view of his misfortunes, and of the probable future that awaited him, deliberately come to the conclusion that it was better to die than to live, and did he in that view commit suicide; or was he so far mentally unsound that he could not exercise a rational judgment upon the question of life and death? Did he become oblivious to the duties which he owed to his family, to his friends, and to himself? Was he impelled by a morbid impulse which he had not sufficient strength of will to resist, and, acting under the influence of this insane impulse, did he determine to take his own life? Because, if his reasoning faculties were so far impaired that he could not fairly estimate the moral consequences, the moral complexion of the act, even though he could reason sufficiently well to prepare with great deliberation, and to execute his design with success, nevertheless, within the authority which I have read, he was so far insane that the plaintiff is entitled to recover on this policy."

These instructions are in exact accordance with the adjudications in the cases of Terry and Rodel; and upon consideration we are unani mously of opinion that the rule so established is sounder in principle, as well as simpler in application, than that which makes the effect of the act of self-destruction, upon the interests of those for whose benefit the policy was made, to depend upon the very subtle and difficult question, how far any exercise of the will can be attributed to a man who is so unsound of mind that, while he foresees the physical consequences which will directly result from his act, he cannot understand its moral nature and character, or in any just sense be said to know what it is that he is doing.

If a man's reason is so clouded or disturbed by insanity as to prevent his understanding the real nature of his act, as regards either its physical consequences or its moral aspect, the case appears to us to come within the forcible words uttered by the late Mr. Justice NELSON, when chief justice of New York, in the earliest American case upon the subject: "Speaking legally, also, (and the policy should be subjected to this test,) self-destruction by a fellow-being bereft of reason can with no more propriety be ascribed to his own hand than to the deadly instrument that may have been used for the purpose;" and, whether it was by drowning, or poisoning, or hanging, or in any other manner, "was no more his act, in the sense of the law, than if he had been impelled by irresistible physical power." Breasted v. Farmers' Trust & Loan Co. 4 Hill, 73, 75. Judgment affirmed.

(109 U. S. 117)

DOUBLE-POINTED TACK Co. v. Two RIVERS MANUF'G Co. and others."

(November 5, 1883.)

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-FIRST AND SECOND CLAIMS IN LETTERS PATENT No. 147,343 HELD VOID.

The first claim of letters patent No. 147,343, granted February 10, 1874, to the Double-pointed Tack Company, as assignees of Purches Miles, the inventor, for an improvement in bail-ears," namely: "(1) The compound staple-fastening, d, for bails, made with the diagonally cut penetrating points, 2 and 3, loop, 4, and body, 5, said diagonally cut points being positioned as set forth, so as to bend upwardly in driving into the wood, as set forth,"-does not, in view of what existed before in the art, set forth any patentable invention.

It was commonly known that the effect of a diagonal cut on a penetrating point was to force the point, in being driven, in a direction away from the cut. Doublepointed staples, with a diagonal cut on each point, but the diagonal cut on one point on the upper and outer side, and on the other point on the lower and outer side, as the staple was driven, were old, the effect in driving being to bring the points together; and there was nothing more than mechanical skill in putting the diagonal cuts on the same side of each leg, so as to incline both points, in driving, in the same direction.

1S. C. 3 Fed. Rep. 26.

The second claim of the patent, namely: "(2) The convex metallic washer, e, in combination with the compound bail-fastening staple, d, having upwardly penetrating points, 2, 3, and loop, 4, as and for the purposes specified,"-does not set forth a patentable combination, but only an aggregation of parts. Neither the staple nor the washer affects or modifies the action of the other.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

A. v. Briesen, for appellant.

Wm. P. Lynde, for appellee.

BLATCHFORD, J. This is a suit in equity brought in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Wisconsin, for the infringement of letters patent No. 147,343, granted February 10, 1874, to the plaintiff, the Double-pointed Tack Company, as assignees of Purches Miles, the inventor, for an "improvement in bail-ears." The circuit court dismissed the bill, and the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

The specification of the patent says:

Fig. 1.

"Wire staples have been employed to form the fastening eyes for bails, and these have been driven into the wood with the penetrating points nearly at right angles to the surface, and in use they are liable to pull out by the weight. My invention consists in a bail-fastening staple made of wire, with the penetrating ends cut at such an angle that, in driving them into the wood, they will assume an upward inclination, so that the weight will tend to force such points inwardly rather than to draw them out, and the bending of the ends in clinching will always be upwardly, thus making a better and more reliable article than heretofore; and I combine with such fastening a convex metallic washer to keep the bail from contact with the wood or the paint thereon. In the drawing, figure 1 is a section of the fastening, complete; figure 2 shows the compound staple-fastening separately; and figure 3 is an elevation of the washer. The wood-work, a, represents part of a bail or tub, and the bail, b, is of wire, having eyes, c, at the ends, which are bent so as to stand parallel, or nearly so, to each other. The compound staple-fastening, d, is made with the penetrating points, 2, 3, loop, 4, for the eye, c, and the body, 5. The ends, 2, 3, of the wire are cut diagonally, so that, in driving them into the wood, the tendency is to bend upwardly and clinch, and they will usually be long enough to pass through the wood and be clinched. The body of the fastening stands vertically, or nearly so, and will usually be partially embedded in the wood. The sheet-metal washer, e, prevents the eye, c, coming against the wood. The points of the staple penetrate the wood upwardly, so as effectually to prevent the staple pulling out under the ordinary strain to which it is subjected."

The claims of the patent are these:

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

2

"(1) The compound staple-fastening, d, for bails, made with the diagonally cut penetrating points, 2 and 3, loop, 4, and body, 5, said diagonally cut points