about any complicated administration, we are talking about moving power from one place to the other place, the power of decision.

Mr. HIRSCH. In a sense much of the discussion has added a dimension that in the past has been underemphasized in American government. We have a secretary that deals with labor issues, we have one that deals with defense issues, and we are now saying that the Nation also has numerous regions which have unique concerns. The adding of a secretary on the Cabinet level, I think, offers an opportunity. It is a bit unusual I believe, in terms of our own government, but not in terms of the British and French Cabinet, where you have a Secretary or a Minister Without Portfolio; he would not have a department to run, but he would in a sense coordinate and supervise those 10 Federal operations that are in the field.

You are concerned about partisanship. It seems to me one could readily take care of this issue. An example is, I believe, that Congress has written into law that the Civil Rights Commission, composed of seven members, can have no more than three from any one party. Thus you have already established a precedent. There is no reason why, for example, you couldn't say that of those 10, no more than five could be from any one major party, in order to get balance into this system.

The other part of it, and what really concerns me in a very narrow sense, is that the House of Representatives has passed a bill that is somewhat inconsistent with what we have been discussing this morning; i.e., the Public Works Acceleration Act of 1971. If you look at it carefully, you will see that you could end up with 1,000, 10,000 or 100,000 regional coordinators. You have stipulated that any one region that is eligible for aid would have a Federal coordinator. I am appalled by what that could mean: just the mere problem of integrating what all those different coordinators would do and find halfway qualified people to staff the positions. And that is why I feel so strongly that the sooner one moves to put some more meat on the bones of those 10 Federal administrative regions, giving them a charter, and giving them certain responsibilities, rights and obligations, we could forestall some of the inadvertent legislation that can create havoc with administration.

Chairman BOLLING. To pursue it a little further, to try to get the kind of thing we are talking about in perspective, it doesn't seem to me that it is impossible to have a continuing structure of Cabinet officers who are principal assistants to Presidents who have more specific responsibilities. God knows what is a specific responsibility of the man who is the head of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. I don't believe that at this stage in our history there is of record a single secretary who mustered his department. This raises one of the difficult questions about how much a single secretary can handle. But there is no reason why he couldn't have-is there-national policy decided through the usual process, which involves all three of the branches, the executive, the legislative, and the courts, and when executed by an executive? And unless I am completely misinformed, we still only have one Executive. We call him the Chief Executive. But unless the Congress in a rage does

what the Congress did to Mr. Roosevelt when it gave helium to Mr. Ickes the Congress at the time didn't like either, but it decided that it would slap the one with the other. But the real Executive power exists only one place, there is only one place, there is only one Executive, and everybody else is his assistant. We specify very overtly very little delegation of power to Cabinet officers. And all we are really talking about-and I hate to use a military comparison, because it offends so many people-all we are really doing is setting up a situation where you have an organization all subordinate to the executive, part of which at the national level concerns itself with the generality of administration and the detail of policy, and another part, the regional part, which concerns itself with the detail of administration, and has very little to do with the policy except as administration inevitably affects policy. What is so irrational about that kind of an approach? Call him a czar, call him something, and we will come up with a new name for him before we do it. We are not going to do it tomorrow. But is there anything fundamentally abhorrent either in terms of the political process or in terms of rationale in that kind of approach?

Mr. HIRSCH. My own view is that it is essential that we move in this direction. The country has become so large, and its complexities and problems and solutions so enormous, that unless we decentralize and assign very clearly defined operational responsibility-and I think this is the difference between policymaking and operational responsibility-we cannot hope to effectively plan and administer. The Federal coordinator's role has to be very clearly defined; that is why I took some pains in trying to define at least three different types of funds that the coordinator should have. And if we can define what type of funds he has and what he can use them for, we can delimit his role, and yet make it possible for him to go back to a central office for certain types of advice and help.

Mr. FREILICH. I would like to suggest that this staff and line function that you are talking about in the military where one serves in the collateral and the other serves in the organizational function is very important. But I think we have two dimensions to this problem, only one of which we are dealing with, and that is, Federal decentralization is essential in terms of executive Federal power. But we should not ignore the fact that executive Federal power does not necessarily reflect the interests of the region, and that there is going to be necessary a regional mechanism which reflects the interest of local and regional government so that there will not be just one official who has the sole power of decisionmaking, but that there will be come sort of a check and counter point. I think the Federal power can be reflected by a single individual who might make Federal policy subject to the chain of command of the President, but there should be a regional entity-and I am not sure this is why there are many different ways in which this can come about-but this regional entity is gonig to have to reflect local interests, and minority interests, and ethnic interests, and other problems of the region that are not necessarily reflected in the Chief Executive when he decentralizes power.

Chairman BOLLING. I happen to really agree with that.

The other end of my thinking is, I am concerned and there will be witnesses at this hearing over time, next week, as a matter of fact, there will be a man named Costikyan who will be a witness. Mr. Costikyan has proposed in a very interesting article that weand this is a disintegrated proposal that he made consciously to achieve some representation by individuals, almost-he proposed in an article some time ago that there be unofficial-he hasn't defined the duties any better then I have-elected by groups of people in the United States no larger than 5,000, whose function would not be that of an ombudsman who is appointed, but of a heckler who is not appointed, he is elected by people, who then presumably, if we carried this into effect in my congressional district, if there were 5,000, a constituency of 5,000, there would be-let's see, I think there would be 52-no, there would be 92 such hecklers after me, if you work it out on a population basis. And I think it is a very interesting way in which you might conceivably have this kind of an input at one extreme as opposed to the other extreme. You have the czar on the one hand and have the harasser at the other end. I happend to believe that the harassment is very good for politicians.

Representative BROWN. It is not only good, it is also unavoidable. I just wanted to make one observation. I think the clarification of whether the power moves in a circular way-in other words, whether the concern for a decision made at the executive level down through the czar, the pro-consul, or whatever you would call him, the regional director, whether that is an acceptable process, or an acceptable decision, deserves some method to get back up to the Presiden, who has the Executive authority. Now, the suggestion as to hecklers, whether they heckle the regional director, over whom they have no real political control, or not, when they try to exert control over the executive of the process through which he operates as a regional director-that is something, I think, that has to be given some consideration. I would hope in Congress we don't have the officially appointed heckler, just the self-appointed hecklers. But in any event, that process ought to be circular with some backing up the line, too.

Chairman BOLLING. One advantage of having hecklers of the type I described is that they, the hecklers, generally are people who are representatives of the particular interests, not representatives of a relatively small geographical area. And this is one of the great di

lemmas.

Representative BROWN. It infers as self-appointed as opposed to one who is really representative of interests where they have to be responsive to those interests, because I think some of the people who speak to the special interests speak really for themselves and not really for those special interests.

Chairman BOLLING. Absolutely.

Mr. FREILICH. I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that one of the things about the councils of government and other regional agencies is that they are not actually representative bodies at the regional level. And they also disperse power in such a way as to only

arrive at the conclusions of the least common denominator, only those the unanimous approval of the whole body can arrive at. The courts also are groping, for example, towards regional solutions. Just in the last 2 years there are a number of decisions which have interpreted the zoning power, for example, in accordance with the comprehensive plan, to mean that they must take into account_regional plans and regional considerations in making their determination, which would include such things as regional and metropolitan planning proposals and the needs of the region as a whole. So we are groping toward regional solutions and towards true methods of representation. I am certain that we can obtain this through many particular forms, either councils of government or elective procedures. But it is going to be a long process.

Chairman BOLLING. I agree with that.

Now, moving from the quite general and the somewhat philosophical to the very specific, Mr. Freilich, you were specific about everything except this business of how you would use tax rates to accomplish certain purposes, or at least I didn't understand how that would be done. And I would like to know what you mean.

Mr. FREILICH. One of the reasons why land is so rapidly developed in the urban fringe is that agricultural land as it comes within the umbrella of development, or possibility of development, increases its value mainly because of the development value that is added to that land. It does not reflect its agricultural, recreational, forest, or mountain use. What therefore happens is that the landowner who is faced with constantly rising taxes, or the farmer, or whoever it might be, is under great pressure to sell that land for development. The process of urbanization speeds and accelerates. What I am suggesting is that in connection with sequence and timing controls that we recognize that since we have put a control on development of the land that we recognize that control and therefore not increase the assessed valuation, keep it at the marginal agricultural or timberland, or whatever assessed valuation it had for those uses without development value. In that way I think we would be preserving the private enterprise system of land development, and at the same time accomplishing a rational tax proposal. Some of this has been done. California has experimented with this system. We did it in Ramapo, N.Y. through the Development Easement Acquisition Commission. This was a completely voluntary program. We were able to achieve great results in keeping open space simply by offering the landowners-if they would give us development easements for 10 years or more, the assurance that during that period of time the land would not be assessed for the developmental value. We have had tremendous positive response from people who said that without this program that land would have been forced to development, and we would have lost valuable recreational and open space land. I think this principle can be exploited.

Chairman BOLLING. That clarifies it.

Unless either of you have some further comment, I want to thank you again for a very stimulating contribution and presentation. We are grateful to you. The subcommittee will stand adjourned until Tuesday, May 18, at 10 a.m., at which time we will meet in room S-407, the Atomic Energy Committee hearing room, and we will hear Norman Elkins, executive director of the commission on Urban Government, Chicago, Ill.; Professor William I. Goodman, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.; and Professor Frank Smallwood, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.

Thank you, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 18, 1971.)