him with a mischief, and to please his vicious prince, thrusts him forward to eternal ruin. But he that, to humour him, carries his neck aside, or shrugs his shoulders in the same manner, or holds his knife at dinner by his pattern, is a flatterer; but he only loves his prince, and is a worthy servant, who fights bravely if his prince be valiant, and loves worthy things by his example, and obeys his laws, and celebrates his fame, and promotes his interest, and does those things in imitation, for which his lord is excellent and illustrious in all the world. 38. But because against a rule no example is a competent warrant; and if the example be according to the rule, it is not the example, but the rule, that is the measure of our action; therefore it is fit to inquire, of what use it can be to look after the examples either of the Old or New Testament; and, if it be at all, since the former measures are not safe, to inquire which are. In which inquiries we are not to consider concerning examples, whose practices are warranted by rules; for in them as there is no scruple, so neither is there any usefulness, save only that they put the rule into activity, and ferment the spirit of a man; and are to the lives of men, as exhortation is to doctrine; they thrust him forward to action, whose understanding and conscience was pre-engaged, Of the Use of Examples in the Old and New Testament. 39. But then if it be inquired,—What use examples are of beyond the collateral encouragement to action, and which are safe to be followed?-I answer: 40. (1.) That in cases extraordinary, where there is no rule, or none that is direct or applicable with certain proportions to the present case, then we are to look for example, and they are, next to the rule, the best measures to walk by. But this is of no use in any matter, where God hath given a law; but may serve the ends of human inquiry in matters of decency and personal proportions, when men are permitted to themselves and their intercourse with others. For the measures of human actions are either the τὸ ἅγιον, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, "that which is holy and that which is just;" and of this our blessed Lord hath given full rules and measures: or else the measure is, rò xaλòv naì tò πρÉTOV, "that which is worthy and becoming such a person:" and because laws do not ever descend to such minutes, the practices and examples of imitable and exemplary persons is the auxiliary of laws. But this is coincident to that of fame and reputation; thus if it be inquired, in the days of persecution, whether it be fit to fly or to abide the worst,-although we are, by all general rules, unlimited and unconstrained, and so the question of lawful or unlawful will cease, yet because it may be a question of the Tò ngέTOV, we may look about and see, what such men as we are and ought to be, have done: "Shall such a man as I fly?" said the brave Eleazar: he did not, and so made up the rule by becoming a worthy precedent. 41. (2.) In complicated questions, when liberty and necessity are mingled together, rule and example together make the measures. Thus if it be inquired, how we are to comport ourselves towards our king, and what are the measures of our duty towards a tyrant or a violent injurious prince: the rule is plain, "we must not strike princes for justice;" and we must not hurt the Lord's anointed, nor revile the ruler of the people; but if we inquire further concerning the extension of a just defence, the example of David is of great use to us, who not only comported himself by the laws of God and natural essential reason, but his heart smote him for that he had cut off the lap of Saul's garment; and, by his example, kept us so far within the moderation of necessary defence, that he allowed not any exorbitancy beyond it, though it was harmless and without mischief. 42. (3.) In the use of privileges, favours, and dispensations, where it is evident that there is no rule, because the particular is untied from the ligatures of the law; it is of great concernment, that we take in the limits of the best examples. And in this we have the precedent of our blessed Saviour to be our guide: for when, in the question of gables or tribute-money, he had made it appear, that himself was, by peculiar privilege and personal right, free; yet that he might not do any thing, which men would give an ill name to, he would not make use of his right, but of his reason, and rather do himself an injury, than an offence to others. This is of great use in all the like inquiries; because it gave probation, that it is better to depart from our right, than vulgo, veritatis pessimo interpreti, probatum sitd." "The crowd is the worst argument in the world: let us inquire not what is most usual, but what is most excellent;" let us look after those things, which may place us in the bosom of beatitude, not those which can tune with the common voices, which are the worst interpreters of truth in the whole world: and, therefore, that some persons were recorded in the Scriptures, is no hallowing of the fact, but serves other ends of the Spirit of God. But in this there is no question. 27. (2). The actions of good men in Scriptures are not a competent warrant for our imitation, not only when they are reproved, but even when they are set down without censure. The reasons are plain: 1. Because all the stories of the Bible are not intended to be sermons; and "the word of God is useful for doctrine, for reproof, for exhortation, and for information ;" not every comma, and period, for every one of these purposes, for they are contrary; but in the whole there is enough to make the man of God perfect and readily instructed to every good work,' to every holy purpose. Therefore as we must not imitate the adultery and murder of David, which are expressly condemned, so neither may we dissemble madness, as he did at Gath, nor persuade another to tell a lie for us, as he did to Jonathan, that he should say he was gone to Bethlehem, when he went but into the fields, and to pretend sacrifice, when it was a very flight. 2. Because every man is a liar, and therefore unless himself walks regularly, he can be no rule to us. 3. Every servant of God was bound up by severe measures, and by his rule he was to take account of his own actions, and therefore so are we of his. 4. There were in the Old Testament greater latitudes of permission than there are to us: polygamy was permitted "for the hardness of their hearts," but it is severely forbidden to us; and though, without a censure, we find Jacob to be husband to two sisters at once, yet this cannot warrant us, who are conducted by a more excellent Spirit, taught by a more perfect institution, governed by a severer law, under the last and supreme lawgiver of mankind : μείζονα ἐπιδείκνυσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὅτι πολλὴ τοῦ πνεύματος χάρις ἐκκέχυται νῦν, καὶ μεγάλη τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίας ή δωρεά, said St. Chrysostom 4 Seneca de Vita Beata, c. 2. Ruhkopf, vol. i. p. 541. • De Virgin. "we Christians ought to show a greater virtue, and more eminent sanctity, because we have received abundance of the Spirit of God, and Christ's coming is a mighty gift;" and if we should derive our warranties from the examples of the Old Testament, it were all one as if, from the licenses of war, we should take pattern for our comportment in the days of peace and laws, or from children learn what were the measures of a man. 5. Because sometimes the actions of good men were in them innocent, because done before a law was given to them; but the symbolical actions, by a supervening law, afterwards became criminal. Thus, although the drunkenness of Noah is remarked without a black character, and plainly told without a censure, it cannot legitimate drunkenness in us, because he was not by any positive law bound from a free use of wine, directly by proper provision, but we are. 6. Because the actions of holy men in Scripture are complicated, and when they are propounded as examples, and the whole action described, there is something good, and something bad, or something naturally good, and something peculiar and personally good, which cannot pass into example. Thus, when St. Paul speaks of Gideon and Jephthah, Samson and David, Deborah and Baruch, who 6 through faith subdued kingdoms;' here their subduing kingdoms by invasion and hostility, is not propounded as imitable: but their faith only, and therefore let us follow their faith, but not their fighting: and carry the faith to heathen countries, but not arms. So, when the fact of Razis is propounded as glorious and great, when he killed himself to avoid Nicanorf, the whole action is not imitable, but only so much of it as was pious and prudent; and the other is to be praised as being the choice of a lesser evil, or is to be left to its excuse, as being necessary and unavoidable. 28. (3.) The actions of men in the Old Testament, though attested and brought to effect by the providence of God, is no warrant for our practice, nor can they make an authentic precedent. I instance in the fact of Jeroboam, who rebelled against the house of Solomon; although God was the author of that change, and by his providence disposed of the event, yet Jeroboam had rules to have gone by, which, if he had f 2 Mac. xv. observed, God would, by other means, have brought his purposes to pass; and Jeroboam should not have become a prodigy, and a proverb of impiety. For a man is circumscribed in all his ways by the providence of God, just as he is in a ship for although the man may walk freely upon the decks, or pass up and down in the little continent, yet he must be carried, whither the ship bears him. A man hath nothing free but his will, and that indeed is guided by laws and reasons; but although by this he walks freely, yet the divine providence is the ship, and God is the pilot, and the contingencies of the world are sometimes like the fierce winds, which carry the whole event of things whither God pleases. So that this event is no part of the measure of the will; that hath a motion of its own, which depends not upon events and rare contingencies, or the order of secret providence; and therefore this which could not commend his action, cannot warrant our imitation. 29. (4.) Actions done in the Old Testament, though by a command of God, do not warrant us, or become justifiable precedents, without such an express command as they had; if the command was special and personal, the obedience was just so limited, and could not pass beyond the person. Thus Jehu took up arms against the house of Ahab, by the command of God, who intended to punish him severely. But we may not lift up our hand against our prince, though he be wicked, unless God give us such an express commandment: for nothing is imitable, but what is good. But in this there was nothing good but the obedience; and, therefore, nothing can legitimate it but a commandment. 30. (5.) Actions of good men, if done upon a violent cause, or a great necessity, are not imitable, unless it be in an equal case, and a like necessity. David, when he was hungry, went into the priests' house, and took the bread, which was only lawful for the priests to eat,' and to this example Christ appeals; but it was in a like case, in a case of necessity and charity. He that does the same thing, must have the same reason, or he will not have the same inno cence. 31. (6.) Examples, in matters of war, are ever the most dangerous precedents, not only because men are then most violent and unreasonable, but because the rules of war are |