secret, shall be spoken upon the tops of houses:" so both the Christian and the heathen are conjoined in the several expressions of the same great truth. This fear is deposited in conscience, and is begotten and kept by this proposition,that "God is a rewarder of all men according to their works." Consequent to this is the love of virtue. RULE IV. The second Band of Virtue is Love, and its proper and consequent Deliciousness. THIS is not wholly natural, but in much of it is empirical, εύρημα χρόνου καὶ βίου proceeding from the grace of God, and the experience of the deliciousness and rewards of virtue, and the excellency of a greater hope which does entertain our spirits in the outer courts of pleasant expectations: ŏr ¿x φιλοσοφίας τοῦτο οὐτῷ περιγέγονε τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν α' τινες διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσι, as both Aristotle and Xenocrates did speak. It is the effect of philosophy and religion, of virtuous and severe institutions to do that for love and without constraint, which fools, and vicious and weak persons, do for fear of laws. Now this, I say, is not natural, that is, although it be agreeable to nature, yet not primarily introduced by it, without a tutor, because nature forbids injustice, but does not command justice,-but secondarily, and by accident, and upon supposition of other contingencies. To do injustice is always a sin, but not to do a justice is not always. For a man may depose the person of a judge, or a trustee, or a delegate; but they who habitually do justice, find the rewards of reputation, and the ease of being freed from the torments of an evil conscience, which is a delicacy, like the being eased of the horrid gripes of the colic; and so insensibly grow in love with justice, that they think they love justice for justice' sake. Ipsa sui merces erat et sine vindice præda. Concerning which it is fit we consider a little, lest it become the occasion of scruples and nice opinions. Anti gonus Sochæus, an old Jew, was famed for saying, 'Be not servants who serve their lord, that they may receive a reward from him; but be such who serve him without consideration of wages, or recompenses, and let the fear of God be upon you:' Baithus and Sadoc, his disciples, from whom the sect of the Sadducees did spring, not well understanding him, took occasion from hence to deny the resurrection and rewards after this life. And, indeed, such sayings as these are easily abused; and when some men speak great things, and others believe as much of it as they understand, but understand it not all, they make sects and divide their schools, and ignorance and faction keep the doors, and sit in the chairs sometimes. It is impossible a man should do great things, or suffer nobly, without consideration of a reward; and since much of virtue consists in suffering evil things, virtue of herself is not a beatitude, but the way to one. He does things like a fool, who does it for no end: and if he does not choose a good end, he is worse: and virtue herself would, in many instances, be unreasonable, if, for no material consideration, we should undertake her drudgery: and, therefore, St. Austin said well, "Sublatis æternis præmiis et pœnis verum staturum à partibus Epicuri:" sensual pleasure were highly eligible, and not virtuous sufferings, if in this life only we had hope.' But if it be accounted the top of virtue to love virtue for virtue's sake, and without intuition of the reward; many times good men observing, that themselves are encouraged by all God's promises to obedience and patience, and that in martyrdom there is no natural or sensitive pleasure, and that it cannot be loved for itself, but wholly for its reward, will find themselves put into 'fear where no fear is,' and that a 'nequam humilitas,' an unworthy opinion of their duty, shall affright their peace and holy confidence. Peregrinus, the philosopher, in A. Gellius, expressed this love of virtue for itself, thus: "Etiamsi Dii atque homines ignoraturi forent;" to do good though "neither God nor men should know of it:"but as this is impossible in fact, so it is in speculation; for there were no such thing as virtue, if it were not relative and directed to God or man: but yet the thing which they mean, is very good. Good men love virtue for virtue's sake, a Lib. xii. c. 11. that is, they act it and love it, they do it with so habitual and confirmed elections and complacency, that many times they have no actual intuition to the reward; they forget this, they are so taken with that; like a man that chooses a wife upon many considerations, as portion, family, hopes, and beauty; yet when he hath conversed long with her, and finds her amiable and fruitful, obedient and wise: he forgets all other considerations, and loves her person for her own perfections, but will not quit all his other interests. The difference is best understood by variety of motions. Some motions cannot be continued, unless some agent or other do continually urge them; but they are violent and unnatural: others are perfective and loved, and they will continue and increase by their own principle, if they be not hindered. This is the love of virtue, that is, fear, or, it may be, hope; save that hope is a thing between both, and is compounded of both, and is more commendable than fear. But to love virtue for itself, is nothing else, but to love it directly and plainly; he that loves it only for the reward, and is not, by the reward, brought to love the thing, loves not this at all, but loves something else: but he that loves it at all, sees good in it, because he finds good by it; and therefore loves itself, now, whatever was the first incentive: and the wooden arch may be taken away, when that of marble is concentered. 2. "Vir fortis et justus-in summa voluptate est et periculo suo fruitur.” "When a good man lays before him the price and redemption of his mortality, the liberty of his country, the safety of his friends, he is hugely pleased and delights in, and enjoys his danger. But if he feels not this pleasure, yet without trembling and uncertainty he will dare to die, facere recte pieque contentus; and if you tell him, this reputation which he gets of his citizens, will die almost as soon as he shall die; he answers, all those things are without the nature and consideration of my work: Ego ipsum contemplor, hoc esse honestum scio:' I look upon the work itself, and find it honest ;" and that is enough; meaning secretly; that though these outward rewards were pared off, yet there are secret pleasures, which will follow and stick close to virtue, as the shadow does to the body, and this good men must consider, because they feel it, and that is part of the reward. 6 3. They are pleased with the virtue itself, and their soul is as much delighted with it, and as naturally as the eye with beauteous colours, or the throat with unctuous juices, or the tongue with moist sweetnesses. For God hath made virtue proportionably to all the noble ends, and worthy desires of mankind, and the proper instrument of his felicity; and all its beauties, and all its works, and all its effects, and all that for which it can be loved, is part of the reward. And therefore, to say a man can love virtue for virtue's sake, and without consideration of the reward, is to say a man can love virtue without any reason and inducement, without any argument to move his affections. 4. For there can be but two causes of amability in the world, perfection and usefulness, that is, beauty and profit; that in the thing itself, this as it relates to me: now he that says, 'a man may love virtue for its own sake without consideration of the reward,' says no more than that a man may love a flower which he never hopes to smell of;' that is, he may admire and commend it, and love to look on it, and just so he may do to virtue. But if he desires either, it is because it is profitable or useful to him, and hath something that will delight him; it cannot else possibly be desired. Now to love virtue in the first sense is rather praise than love, an act of understanding rather than of the will, and its object is properly the perfections of the flower or the virtue respectively but when it comes to be desired, that is, loved with a relation to myself, it hath for its object other perfections, those things that please, and that delight me, and that is nothing but part of the reward or all of it. The question being thus explicated, it follows, that to love virtue for virtue's sake, is so far from being the honour of a good and perfect man, that it is the character of an evil man, if it goes no further. For it amounts to nothing but this, that the understanding is convinced of the worthiness of it, video meliora proboque *. it is that which St. Paul calls "a delighting in the law after the inner man." But it is a relative, material, practical love a Ov. M. vii. 20. Gierig, vol. i. pag. 421. proper of virtue that makes a good man; and the Est profecto Deus, qui quæ nos gerimus, auditque et videt. inducement said the comedian'; "God hath so endeared justice and virtue to us, that he hearing and seeing all things, gives good things to them that do good things; but he will be even with the evil man." 5. Lastly, to love virtue for virtue's sake, is to love it without consideration of human rewards, praise of men, honours, riches, rest, power, and the like, which indeed are the hinges of most men's actions. Cura, quid expediat, prius est, quam quid sit honestum; Et cum fortuna statque, caditque fides. Nec facile invenias multis in millibus unum, Virtutem pretium, qui putet, esse sui. Ipse decor, recte, facti si præmia desint, Non movet: et gratis pœnitet esse probum. Now he that is a good man, and loves virtue virtuously, does not love it principally for these secular regards; but without such low expectations, and without apprehension of the angry sentence of the laws: but this does not exclude the intuition of the Divine reward from having an influence into the most perfect love of virtue; for this is intrinsical to the sanction and the nature of the law; the other is extrinsical and accidental. The first is such a reward as is the perfection of the work; for glory is the perfection of grace; and he that serves God for hope of glory, loves goodness for goodness' sake; for he pursues the interest of goodness, that he may be filled with goodness; he serves God here that he may serve him hereafter; he does it well that he may do it better; a little while that he may do it over again for ever and ever. Nothing else can be a loving virtue for virtue's sake; this is the greatest perfection and the most reasonable and practicable sense of doing it. And if the rewards of virtue were not the great practical inducement of good men's b In Capt. Plaut. act. 2. scen. 2. Ernesti, vol. page 158. |