HABEAS CORPUS.

Under a writ of habeas corpus the inquiry is not addressed to errors, but to
the question whether the proceedings and judgment are nullities; and
unless it appears that the judgment or sentence under which the pris-
oner is confined is void, he is not entitled to his discharge. United
States v. Pridgeon. 48.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2.

INDICTMENT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 7, 9 to 15.

INTEREST.

See DAMAGES, 3.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. On a writ of mandamus in behalf of a State to the Commissioner of
Patents to register, under the act of March 3, 1881, c. 138, a trade-
mark used by the State on intoxicating liquors in commerce with a
foreign nation, and which the Commissioner of Patents has refused
to register, on the ground that the State by its own laws had no author-
ized trade in liquors outside of its limits, the validity of an authority
exercised under the United States is not drawn in question; and
therefore, in the absence of evidence of the value of the registra-
tion, a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
denying the writ of mandamus, cannot be reviewed by this court on
writ of error, under the act of February 9, 1893, c. 74, § 8. South
Carolina v. Seymour, 353.

2. This court has no jurisdiction over an appeal from the judgment of a
Circuit Court denying the application of counsel for a solicitor's allow-
ance out of a fund realized from a sale made under direction of that
court in execution of a mandate of this court, the appeal being taken
after July 1, 1891, and not being taken under the provisions of
section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517. Mason v.
Pewabic Mining Co., 361.

3. This court has jurisdiction to revise the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee in this case, deciding that the provision in the
eleventh section of the Tennessee charter of the Mobile and Ohio
Railroad Company that no tax shall ever be laid on said road or its
fixtures which shall reduce the dividends below eight per cent does
not forbid the assessment and collection of taxes under the acts of
the legislature of Tennessee referred to in the opinion of that
court; that "the said eight per cent clause is invalid," "null and
void," and that the said legislation "does not violate or impair the
obligation of any contract with the Mobile and Ohio Company."
Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 486.

4. When the record in a case brought by writ of error from a state court
shows nothing of what took place in the state court of original juris-
diction, and in the appellate state court no objection raising a Federal
question during the trial and before judgment, but such question is
raised for the first time in the appellate court on a motion for a re-
hearing, the writ of error must be dismissed upon the ground that the
Federal question is not properly presented by the record. Miller v.
Texas, 535.

5. Insurance Company v. The Treasurer, 11 Wall. 204, affirmed and followed
to the point that in order to give this court jurisdiction by writ of
error to a state court, it must appear by the record that a Federal
question was raised. N. Y. & N. E. Railroad v. Woodruff, 689.
6. Delaware Navigation Company v. Reybold, 142 U. S. 636; Hammond v.
Johnston, 142 U. S. 73; and New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works
Co., 142 U. S. 79, followed to the point that even if a Federal question
was raised in a state court, yet, if the case was decided on grounds
broad enough in themselves to sustain the judgment, without refer-
ence to the Federal question, this court will not entertain jurisdiction.
Ib.

See CASES AFFIRMED, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
Whether this suit be regarded as seeking a decree against defendants as
on a creditors' bill, or as by analogy to garnishee process, it was, under
the pleadings, a suit to recover the contents of choses in action within
the meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1887 and 1888, and, as the bill
contained no averment that the suit could have been maintained by
the assignors, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court cannot be sus-
tained on the ground of diverse citizenship. New Orleans v. Ben-
jamin, 411.

See CUSTOMS DUTIES, 4.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

The right of action upon a judgment or decree of a court of record of the
United States, sitting within the State of Wisconsin, is limited by the
Revised Statutes of that State of 1858, to twenty years after the cause
of action accrued. Metcalf v. Watertown, 671.

See USURY, 3.

LOCAL LAW.

1. In view of the Nebraska statutes concerning the operation of statutes
of limitation, there was no error in the instruction of the court below
in that respect. Hegler v. Faulkner, 109.

2. A note by which three parties, signing it, promise to pay to the order
of the payee at a bank in New Orleans the sum named therein with

interest, not negotiable, is a joint obligation under the law of Louisi-
ana, and binds the several parties thereto only for their proportion of
the debt; since, to make it a solidary obligation, binding each of the
promisors for the whole debt, the solidarity must, under the law of
that State, be expressly stipulated, and is never presumed. Groves
v. Sentell, 465.

3. The promisors on that note, in order to secure it, mortgaged real estate
in Louisiana, which they then held in common, undivided. They
thereby severally declared that they were indebted to the mortgagee,
etc., and that they did thereby mortgage to the mortgagee the prop-
erty described in the deed. There was no stipulation showing an
intention to mortgage separately an undivided part of the property
for an undivided part of the debt. Held, that it was the intention of
the parties that the security for the purchase money should rest upon
the entire entity. Ib.

4. A mortgagor has the power, under the laws of Louisiana, to exclude
indivisibility in contracting the mortgage, and, if he fails to do so,
indivisibility applies, not alone as a result of his silence, but also
because, being the general rule and of the nature of the contract, it
exists unless excluded by its express terms or by a plain implication
deducible from it. Ib.

5. The divisibility of a debt secured by a mortgage does not necessarily
import the divisibility of the mortgage securing it. lb.

6. The voluntary partition by the mortgagees of the property covered by
the mortgage did not operate to prevent the mortgage creditor from
enforcing his security against either part. Ib.

7. A subsequent mortgage creditor, who became such after the division of
the property, and only as to one undivided part, is entitled to be sub-
rogated to the rights of the first mortgage creditor, as they existed at
the time of the subrogation. Ib.

8. If a party interested in the result of the suit, claiming under the subse-
quent mortgage, files a bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader, he
cannot be allowed a solicitor's fee, to be paid from the fund dedicated
to the payment of the mortgage. Ib.

1. Mandamus is the proper remedy when a mandate of this court has
been disregarded. In re City Bank, 246.

2. In this case the court cannot hold that its mandate was disregarded by
the decree rendered under it by the Circuit Court. 1b.

3. When a mandate of this court has been misconstrued or disregarded
by a Circuit Court, the proper remedy now is by mandamus; but in
this case the Circuit Court was at liberty to consider the application
for an allowance, and its action in that regard was open to review in
the Circuit Court of Appeals. Mason v. Pewabic Mining Co., 361.
See JURISDICTION, A, 1.

MANDATE.

See MANDAMUS.

MORTGAGE.

See LOCAL LAW, 3-8.

OKLAHOMA.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2.

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. When a question between contending parties, as to priority of inven-
tion, is decided in the Patent Office, the decision there made must be
accepted as controlling, upon that question of fact, in any subsequent
suit between the same parties, unless the contrary is established by
testimony which, in character and amount, carries thorough convic-
tion. Morgan v. Daniels, 120.

2. The claims covered by letters patent No. 56,793, issued July 31, 1866,
to Henry Pearce for "a new and useful machine for crushing and
pulverizing quartz-rock, stone, and any description of ores," were not
infringed by the machine made by the defendants, and were, in some
respects, anticipated by the invention patented to Jonathan F. Ostran-
der by letters patent No. 4478, dated April 25, 1846; by the invention
patented to George H. Wood by letters patent No. 28,031, dated April
24, 1860; and by the invention patented to James W. Rutter by
reissued letters patent No. 3633, dated September 7, 1869. Gates Iron
Works v. Fraser, 332.

3. The invention patented to Charles M. Brown by letters patent No.
201,646, dated March 26, 1878, for "a new and useful improvement
in ore-crushers," was in its general features a reproduction of the
machine patented to James W. Rutter by reissued letters patent No.
3633, dated September 7, 1869; and, in view of the prior patents to
Rutter and Tripp, must receive a narrow construction, which frees
the defendants from the charge of infringing them. Ib.

4. The invention patented to George Raymond and Albert Raymond by
letters patent No. 237,320, dated February 1, 1881, for "improvements
in grinding mills," was for a combination which included several
features not found in the machines made by the defendants. Ib.
5. The function of the safety pin in letters patent No. 110,397, issued to

John H. Rusk, December 20, 1870, and antedated December 9, 1870,
is practically the same as that of the pin in the combination patented
to George and Albert Raymond. lb.

6. The claim in letters patent No. 243,343, issued June 21, 1881, to Phile-
tus W. Gates for the segmental cast-bearing for the ball of the socket
joint, having a form which gives it a bearing contact upon the ball,
was anticipated by machines constructed by Charles M. Brown and
in public use more than two years before Gates applied for his pat-
ent. lb.

7. The claim in letters patent No. 243,545, issued June 28, 1881, to Philetus
W. Gates for a novel application of a loose collar around the eccentri-
cally gyrating shaft to prevent dirt from getting into the bearing, was
anticipated in the Brown machine, as changed in 1878, by a circular
washer or collar upon the top of the sleeve that surrounded the break-
ing head, which fitted around the shaft. Ib.

8. The invention patented to Philetus W. Gates by letters patent No.
246,608, dated September 6, 1881, viz., a device for a depression or
groove in the outer bearing surface of the bearing-box, and applying
within this depression a removable portion of carbon-bronze metal,
so as to correct the wear of the machine at that place, is void for want
of patentable invention. Ib.

9. The alleged invention in letters patent No. 250,656, issued December
13, 1881, to Philetus W. Gates, is for a combination of old features,
viz., a shaft, a bearing for the shaft, a hard metal plate in the lower
end of the shaft, an adjustable sliding step block, an oil step box, and
a hard metal plate at the end of the shaft, all of which, except the
metal plate, were present in the Brown machine as made and sold
more than two years before Gates applied for the patent; and the
metal plate was old and in use for the same purpose as in Gates's
machine long before his application. Ib.

10. The use of safety pins for saving machinery from the strain of a
sudden jar did not involve patentable invention. Ib.

11. A verbal assignment of an interest in letters patent is held to have no
force or effect against a subsequent assignee claiming under a formal
written transfer, and having no knowledge of the previous verbal
transfer. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. A ruling by the court below, correct when applied to this case, is sus-
tained without regard to its correctness as a general proposition.
Spalding v. Castro, 38.

2. Depositions placed in the custody of the clerk as taken in this case
may be opened and filed, as well as map exhibits, and an order is
made for the taking of further testimony, and for the receiving of
such documents and maps as the city of Oakland may offer touching
its title to the lands in dispute, and for the opening and filing of the
same when returned to the clerk. California v. Southern Pacific Com-
pany, 239.