1. A steamship entering or leaving the port of New York in a fog through
which vessels cannot be seen when distant more than a quarter of a
mile, should reduce its speed to the lowest point consistent with
good steerage way. The Martello, 64.
2. It is the duty of a steamship, hearing a blast from a fog-horn on its
starboard bow, indicating that a vessel is approaching from a direc-
tion which may take it across the steamer's bow, to stop at once until
she can assure herself of the bearing, speed, and course of the
approaching vessel. Ib.
3. It is within the discretion of the court below to refuse to find a fact
asked for several months after the disposal of the case on other issues,
but if such finding is made it is binding on this court. Ib.
4. The requirement in article 12 of the International rules and regula-
tions for preventing collisions at sea, that sailing vessels shall be pro-
vided with an efficient fog-horn, to be sounded by a bellows, or other
mechanical means, is so far obligatory, as to throw upon the sailing
vessel in fault the burden of proof, in case of collision, that the want
of a mechanical fog-horn could not have contributed to it. Ib.
5. In entering the port of New York, the steamship Britannia came so
close to Governor's Island as to graze the bottom. This made it neo-
essary for her pilot to direct the engines to be put at full speed till
she cleared the ground. After that the speed of the vessel was slowed,
and her wheel was put hard-a-port to round into East River. About
the time of touching bottom the Britannia sighted the steamship
Beaconsfield on her starboard bow, and blew a single whistle. The
Beaconsfield, going out from the port, had also seen the Britannia
when it came around Governor's Island; and about the time it was
disengaging itself from the ground, blew a single blast of her whistle,
put her helm to port a little, and went on at a slow speed. The
whistle of the Britannia was heard upon the Beaconsfield, but that
of the Beaconsfield was not heard on the Britannia. After clearing
the bottom and reducing her speed, the Britannia did not respond
promptly to her helm, owing to the fact that the condition of the
wind and tide was such as to form a flood eddy on the north side of
the channel between the Battery and Governor's Island, and an ebb
tide on the south side of the channel. These tides operate to turn
the head of a vessel attempting to enter the East River near Castle
William to the westward, as it crosses the ebb until it enters the flood
eddy. Such tidal action, and its effect upon vessels, were known to
the pilot of the Beaconsfield, and should have been known to the
pilot of the Britannia. It retarded the efforts of the Britannia to
pass astern of the Beaconsfield. The Beaconsfield thereupon blew
another single whistle, and, hearing no answer, put her wheel
hard-a-port, stopped her engines and reversed full speed. Her engines
were kept in this condition until her headway was stopped. Then
she lay still in the water until struck by the Britannia and sunk.
Held, (1) [All concurring,] That the Britannia was in fault in running
at a place where she was liable to meet outward going vessels, across
the ebb tide in such a way that the current prevented her from an-
swering her helm with promptness, and that such fault was enough to
render her liable, in whole or in part, for the loss occasioned by the col-
lision; (2) [BROWN and JACKSON, JJ., dissenting,] That the Beacons-
field was also in fault (a) in disregarding Rule 23 of the Rules
for preventing Collisions on the Water, Rev. Stat. § 4233, directing
that when, by Rule 19, one of two vessels shall keep out of the way,
the other shall keep her course, subject to the qualifications of Rule
24; and (b) in remaining motionless for a minute and a half, in full
view of the tardy motions of the Britannia in getting astern. The
Britannia, 130.
6. The statement in Finding 31, that "the conduct of those in charge of
the Beaconsfield . . does not warrant the inference that there
was, on their part, negligence contributory to produce the collision,"
is not a finding of fact, within the meaning of the rule, but is a con-
clusion of law upon the previous facts. Ib.
7. The act of August 19, 1890, c. 802, 26 Stat. 320, not having been pro-
claimed by the President, as required by sec. 3 thereof, it is not yet
operative, and this court is not bound by the construction put by
English courts on Art. 21, providing that "where, by any of these
rules one of two vessels is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep
her course and speed." Ib.
8. When it is agreed by a charter party, on the part of the vessel, that she
shall be tight, staunch, strong, and in every way fitted for the voyage,
the owner is bound to see that the vessel is seaworthy and suitable for
the service on which she is to be employed, and he is not excused by the
fact that a defect is latent and unknown to him; but no obligation in
that respect rests upon the owner of the cargo. The Edwin L. Mor-
rison, 199.
9. In a suit in admiralty, where the libellant sought to recover for injuries
to a cargo caused by the vessel taking in water through a hole in her
side, made by the breaking away of the cap from one of the bilge-pump
holes, and where the defence was that such breaking was caused by a
danger of the sea within the exception in the charter party and bills of
lading, the court below, after finding that such bilge-pumps were not
unusual, and describing them and the dangers to be apprehended from
them, and after finding that before sailing the cap and plate showed
no indications of looseness, in an examination which, after detailing it,
was found to be such as a reasonably prudent master might be expected
to give, and after finding the condition of the hole at the end of the
voyage, found further that "at the time of the contract and lading of
cargo and commencement of voyage the vessel was tight, staunch, and
strong, and in every way fitted for the contemplated voyage; " that
"there was no latent defect in the vessel which contributed to the
injury to the cargo;” and that “the whole of said damage to cargo
was caused by a danger of the sea, and was within the exception in
charter party and bills of lading." Held, (1) That these were findings
determined by the interpretation which the law put upon the circum-
stances of the transaction as stated in the previous findings, and, as
such, open to revision here; (2) That these deductions were incorrect,
and the specific conclusions of law did not follow. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21.
CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.
1. Seeberger v. Castro, 153 U. S. 32, followed. Spalding v. Castro, 38.
2. The Stephen Morgan, 94 U. S. 599, affirmed to the point that a party
who does not appeal from the final decree of a Circuit Court cannot
be heard in opposition thereto, when the case is properly brought here
by the appeal of the adverse party. Groves v. Sentell, 465.
3. Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584, followed.
4. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, would seem to be decisive of this case.
Lyons v. Woods, 649.
5. New York & New England Railroad Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556,
affirmed and followed. New York & New England Railroad Co. v.
Woodruff, 689.
6. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210, affirmed and
followed.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
JURISDICTION, A, 5, 6;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2;
Hager v. Swayne, 149 U. S. 241, distinguished. Seeberger v. Castro, 32.
CASES DOUBTED, QUESTIONED, OR OVERRULED.
Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Virginia, 934, questioned. Wharton v.
Wise, 155.
CHEROKEE OUTLET.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2.
1. The compact of March 28, 1785, between the States of Virginia and
Maryland, having been duly ratified by each State, is binding upon
both as to the subjects embraced within it, so far as it is not incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the United States. Wharton v. Wise,
155.
2. That compact was not prohibited by Article 6 of the articles of Con-
federation, forbidding any treaty, confederation or alliance between
two or more States without the consent of Congress; and it con-
tinued in force after the adoption of the Constitution, except so far
as inconsistent with its provisions, and received the assent of Con-
gress by the adoption or approval of proceedings taken under it. lb.
3. The compact of 1785 contained no reference to fish of any kind in
Pocomoke River or Pocomoke Sound, and no clause in that compact
gave Maryland a right to fish in that river or sound. Ib.
4. Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 75 Virginia, 934, criticised and questioned.
5. The 10th section of the compact of 1785 does not forbid the State of
Virginia from trying and convicting citizens of Maryland for offences
committed in Virginia against its laws regulating the oyster fisheries.
6. An ordinance requiring agents soliciting orders on behalf of manu-
facturers of goods to take out a license and pay a tax therefor, made by
a municipal corporation under authority conferred by a statute of the
State, granting to such corporations power to levy and collect license
taxes on hawkers, pedlers and merchants of all kinds, is an exercise,
not of the police power, but of the taxing power; and when it is
enforced against an agent, sent by a manufacturer of goods in another
State to solicit orders for the products of his manufactory, it imposes
a tax upon interstate commerce, in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States. Brennan v. Titusville, 289.
7. This court is not bound by the decision of the highest court of the
State in which such a tax is authorized and imposed, that its author-
ization and imposition are an exercise of the police power, and not of
the taxing power. Ib.
8. When a plaintiff below has the benefit of a full and fair trial in the
several courts of his own State, whose jurisdiction he invokes, and
where his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him in-
dividually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all in like
condition, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an
adverse result, the proceedings that so resulted were in "due process
of law," as that phrase is used in the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Marchant v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 380.
9. The leading cases touching the construction of that phrase in the
Amendments reviewed. Ib.
10. The act of March 7, 1891, c. 126, of North Dakota, "regulating grain
warehouses and weighing and handling of grain," declaring elevators,
etc., to be public warehouses, and their owners to be public ware-
housemen, and requiring them to give bond conditioned for the faith-
ful performance of their duty as such, fixing rates of storage, and
requiring them to keep insured for the benefit of the owners all grain
stored with them, does not apply to elevators built by a person only
for the purpose of storing his own grain, and not to receive and store
the grain of others, and being so construed it does not deny the equal
protection of the laws to the owner of an elevator made a public
warehouse by it, does not deprive him of his property without due
process of law, does not amount to a regulation of commerce between
the States; and is not in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States. Brass v. Stoeser, 391.
11. This case differs in no substantial respect from Munn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113, and Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, and an adherence to
the rulings in those cases requires the affirmance of the judgment of
the court below. Ib.
12. When a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or
controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution of the
United States, upon the determination of which the result depends,
then it is not a suit arising under the Constitution. New Orleans v.
Benjamin, 411.
13. Upon the bill and answer in this case no such dispute or controversy
arose as would give original jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of the
United States without regard to the diverse citizenship of the par-
ties. Ib.
14. The act of the legislature of Louisiana repealing the act creating the
Board of Metropolitan Police and other acts in relation thereto, was,
in itself, a mere change of an instrumentality of municipal govern-
ment, and as, upon the record, it must be assumed that the assets of
that board and the remedies in respect thereof of those who held
evidences of indebtedness issued by the board remained unaffected by
the repealing act, the act could not be attacked in this way as uncon-
stitutional because it made no specific provision for the payment of
such indebtedness, on the liquidation of the affairs of the board. Ib.
15. If several railroad corporations, each existing under the laws of
separate States, consolidate into one corporation, a statute of one of
the States, imposing a charge upon the new consolidated company
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